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Introduction
In 2015, 244 million people were living outside their country of birth. While the stock
of international migrants is at an all time high, it keeps increasing by 4.4 million each
year. The majority of these migrants made the choice to move to another country for
economic or family related reasons. However, a non-negligible number of almost 20
million people has been forcefully displaced internationally. A majority (58 percent) of
migrants are living in developed countries, while 42 percent are hosted by developing
countries. Of those migrants that live in a developed country, 39 percent originate from
another developed country, whereas 61 percent come from a developing country.1 This
global movement of people has, among others, broad political, cultural, sociological and
economic consequences.
This thesis analyses the economic effects of migration in source and destination countries.
We first focus on the source countries and investigate the consequences of emigration.
This literature is mainly concerned with with brain drain at a macroeconomic or sec-
toral level (Clemens, 2013; Docquier and Rapoport, 2012; Freeman, 2006). However,
researchers have argued that emigration has countervailing positive effects due to remit-
tances (Russell, 1986) and incentives to invest in education (Beine et al., 2001). It is thus
an unresolved question, whether emigration has adverse or positive effects on the source
country.
One element that is mostly missing in the emigration literature is the role of firms.2 Firms
are affected by emigration as they lose their workers. However, they might gain due to
1Source: Statistics are taken from the UN (2016).
2This is in many cases due to the unavailability of high quality firm level data in source countries.
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the fact that their former employees are gaining new knowledge abroad and sending back
some of this knowledge. Chapter 1 and 2 of this thesis are therefore investigating the
effect of emigration on firms. We show that while firms in general are becoming less
productive due to a loss in firm-specific human capital, not all firms are affected in the
same way. Innovating firms are actually benefiting from knowledge flows and can increase
patenting levels.
Besides the effect on source countries, migration also impacts destination countries. One
has to differentiate between the effects on natives and on the migrants themselves; even
though they are inherently inter-related. The economic literature has put a strong focus
on the labour market consequences of immigration on natives. Butcher and Card (1991),
Friedberg and Hunt (1995) and Hunt (1992) have shown that immigrants hardly com-
pete with natives in the labour market. More recently, the evidence has become more
ambiguous (Aydemir, 2011; Borjas, 2005; D’Amuri et al., 2010; Peri and Sparber, 2009)
and has also taken into account other effects of immigration such as on innovation, vot-
ing behaviour or crime. The literature on immigrants’ own labour market integration is
relatively smaller and generally comes to the conclusion that immigrants perform worse
on the labour market for a number of different reasons (Bevelander and Nielsen, 2001;
Borjas, 1985).
In the third chapter, we focus on one particular group of migrants, namely refugees, who
typically have the worst labour market performance among all migrants. We investigate
to what extent frictions in the labour market pose a barrier to refugees’ employment and
ask, if these barriers can be overcome with specific matching services. Another aspect
which has received little attention in the economic literature so far is the integration of
refugees into society, and how this can be measured and improved. We aim at shedding
some new light on this topic.
There are various reasons why migration has increased tremendously in recent decades.
The migration literature differentiates between push and pull factors. Push factors are
reasons that lie in the unattractiveness of source countries, while pull factors describe
reasons that characterise the attractiveness of the destination. One recent and impor-
tant push factor has been the Arab Spring, which started in December 2010 and has
2
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destabilised a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa. While it has
led to destructive wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen, it also caused periods of political
instability in Egypt and Tunisia, leading to the fall of long-lasting dictatorships. The
fourth chapter is looking at the political instability in Egypt from 2011 until 2013 and
its effect on household behaviour. While we are unable to analyse migration outcomes
for these households, we can look at the effects on wages, savings, education investments
and health expenditures. These outcomes, especially the reduction in income and the
increase in savings might trigger emigration decisions. Indeed emigration from Egypt
has surged in recent years and reached a peak in 2015, with 3 million Egyptians living
abroad (UN, 2015).
One element that is common to all four chapters of this thesis is the use of identification
strategies that focus on the estimation of causal effects. While trying to answer the
questions posed in the four chapters, one immediately encounters endogeneity problems.
Migration decisions are inherently endogenous, job finding probabilities are endogenous
and political instability is endogenous. Therefore, it is vital to use methodologies that
can overcome these challenges. We use three different strategies to estimate causal effects.
The first two chapters exploit a natural experiment and use exogenous legislation changes
as an instrument for emigration. In the third chapter, we conduct a randomised controlled
trial to create a comparable control and treatment group. In the fourth chapter we use
treatment variation across different governorates to implement a difference-in-difference
strategy.
To sum up, this thesis contributes new ideas to investigate the causal effects of migra-
tion in source and destination countries. The following part describes the content and
contribution of each chapter in more detail.
The first chapter of this thesis analyses the effects of skilled emigration on firm perfor-
mance. Using firm-level data from ten Central and Eastern European countries, we show
that firms in industries that were exposed to higher outflows of skilled workers experi-
enced a drop in total factor productivity (TFP). The estimates are robust to different
specifications and to various measures of TFP and firm profits. We further find evidence
for a shorter tenure of workers in sectors that are strongest hit by emigration. However,
3
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foreign owned and innovating firms, can circumvent these negative TFP effects by increas-
ing training and personnel costs. To identify the causal relationship, we exploit changes
in EU labour mobility legislation that have been introduced due to the accession of new
member states. These transitional provisions applied by the old EU member states from
2004 to 2014 created a quasi-experimental setting by allowing a staggered introduction
of free labour mobility for workers in certain sectors. While these transitional provisions
were in force, emigration opportunities for citizens from new member countries varied,
depending on their country of origin and the industry they were qualified to work in.
This chapter’s contribution to the literature is threefold. The first contribution is to
bring the brain drain discussion to the firm level. While the previous literature on
the consequences of emigration has focused on macroeconomic or sectoral outcomes,
we are the first to analyse various firm level consequences of emigration. This has the
advantage of being able to dig deeper in terms of channels, heterogeneity and policy
implications. The second contribution is the construction of a new instrument that solves
the endogeneity problem of migration. It is difficult to estimate the effects of emigration
on firm productivity as migrants might leave the worst performing firms or quit due to
an unobservable third factor, for instance a bad manager, that drives both emigration
and low productivity. Our instrumental variable, which builds on exogenous changes
in labour mobility legislation is able to overcome this endogeneity challenge. Third, we
contribute to the literature on the consequences of the EU enlargement. We complement
previous research by showing that there are negative effects on firms.
This first chapter has important policy implications. On the firm level it shows that firms
can benefit from active human resource strategies, focusing, for instance, on providing
training and retention measures. On the government level, the prevalence of skill short-
ages can justify the need to invest in the skills of the local labour force and to mitigate
search frictions. In the short term a skill upgrading of the local labour force can be ad-
dressed by providing specific training courses by public institutions and in the long term
by adjusting the education system to labour market needs. Another way to mitigate the
negative consequences of emigration is return migration. If companies and politicians in
the new EU member states succeed in bringing back their skilled workers after some time
4
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abroad, then firms could benefit from experienced returning workers. These workers can
create knowledge spillovers and bring their firms closer to the technological frontier.
The second chapter uses a very similar setting and also investigates the consequences
of emigration. The difference is that it focuses on innovation outcomes, in particular
patenting levels, and on high-skilled migration. Using data on patent applications and
migration flows from 32 European countries, we find that emigration of highly skilled
people increases patenting in source countries. We argue that knowledge flows play a
crucial role in the positive effect of emigration on patenting. Countries that experience
the emigration of high-skilled workers start to cite patents from the emigrants’ desti-
nations more frequently than before and compared with other possible countries. The
international mobility of high-skilled workers seems to enlarge R&D networks and pro-
motes the transfer of tacit knowledge. In this way, migration enables a faster diffusion
of knowledge from more to less developed countries and helps the latter to catch up.
Similar to the first chapter, the identification strategy is based on the changes in EU
labour mobility legislation and thus allows a causal interpretation of our results.
We make two main contributions to the literature. First, we provide causal evidence that
emigration leads to an increase in patenting. We thereby confirm what Kerr (2008) and
Choudhury (2015) have shown for China and India in a very different context and using
another methodology. As we have comparable patenting data for source and destina-
tion countries, we can extend this result and show that emigration leads to convergence
in patenting levels. Second, we expand the literature on knowledge flows to the Euro-
pean context using an identification strategy that allows for a causal interpretation. We
build a unique dataset by merging comparable migration data for 32 European countries
with European patent data and find evidence for knowledge flows. Due to our unique
European enlargement setting, we are able to estimate causal effects of labour mobility
independently of other integration events by exploiting different opening times for trade,
foreign direct investment (FDI) and migration.
There are a number of policy implication that arise from our contributions. First, the EU
could benefit from further facilitating high-skilled migration within Europe. As there are
no more legal barriers to free labour mobility, hindering factors are mostly language and
5
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administrative barriers. In this way, the EU could exploit the full potential of high-skilled
migrants both for destination and source countries. These benefits of knowledge flows
can be maximised by facilitating research networks with emigrated inventors, for example
by organising conferences in the origin countries. Furthermore, governments can design
programmes to actively keep the diaspora engaged and by encouraging and facilitating
return migration. Return migrants bring back the newly gained knowledge and many
times create their own start-ups which can foster development in the countries of origin.
The third chapter moves the focus from the source to the destination country and focuses
on refugees in Germany as opposed to high skilled economic migrants from Central and
Eastern Europe. The motivation of the paper arose following the large influx of refugees
to Germany in 2015 and in anticipation of the challenge of their labour market integration.
In this chapter, we design a field experiment to evaluate the role of matching frictions
in the labour market integration of refugees. During CV writing sessions with refugees
in Munich, we collect information from around 300 refugees that recently arrived in
Munich and have a work permit. All participants receive a complete CV in German
and basic job search information. We then randomly allocate half of the refugees to the
treatment group. These participants are added to the database of an NGO that matches
job candidates to suitable employers. This treatment can isolate the effect of matching
frictions, while it has no effect on the underlying skill set of refugees. The experimental
setting allows us to track both control and treatment groups over time and to compare
their labour market outcomes six months later. Our survey data includes information
on the background characteristics of refugees, their existing job-search strategies, and
perceptions of integration. In a pilot follow up, we track 54 refugees that receive the
treatment. While 39 percent found work, the jobs are mostly unskilled, poorly paid and
temporary.
We believe that this chapter makes two main contributions to the existing literature.
First, we provide a thorough evaluation of a job matching service for refugees through
a randomized controlled trial. Using a clean identification strategy is important in this
context, since comparing refugees who voluntarily decide to access services of an NGO
with other refugees would create a selection problem. We show that refugees do not know
6
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where to look for work and that this friction can be alleviated by a job matching service.
This suggests that policies targeted at facilitating labour market entry may be effective.
Second, we provide new data and descriptive statistics on newly arrived refugees and
their short-term labour market and integration outcomes.
The feasibility of refugees’ labour market integration is a large controversy in German and
European politics and is likely to have severe consequences for politics (Dustmann et al.,
2016b). This experiment shows that besides missing language skills, frictions in the labour
market matter. Those frictions can be reduced by the provision of better support. Beside
the better support that is needed to promote the labour market integration of refugees,
there are several labour market regulations that need to be removed to guarantee a free
and efficient labour market entry for refugees. These labour market regulations include
the residency requirement, the priority rule, the prohibition of temporary employment
agencies and the prohibition of self employment during the asylum process.
The fourth chapter studies one of the reasons for the large increase in migration from
the Middle East and North Africa: the Arab Spring. Using representative household
survey data, we study the short-term microeconomic effects of the Egyptian revolution
on household behaviour in terms of education and health expenditure as well as income
and savings. We construct a new measure of political instability by analysing the number
of killed individuals during political protests throughout the country. Our findings show
that affected households i.e. households living in particularly violent areas, increased
spending on education, especially on their sons’ higher education. Furthermore, house-
holds decreased spending on health and increased their savings. Our results are robust
to placebo tests, excluding Cairo and alternative ways of measuring political instability.
We also explore some channels to explain the results. We interpret the increased savings
and lower health expenditure as precautionary behaviour due to an uncertain environ-
ment. The increase in education expenditure is particularly prominent in areas where
households were in favour of a regime change. We argue that after the fall of Mubarak
those households had a positive outlook towards the future, with better labour market
prospects, and therefore invested more in their sons’ education.
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Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, and most importantly, we analyse
a major and unanticipated intense political crisis which had significant effects in many
countries in the Middle East, including Egypt, a country that has not been extensively
researched previously. While the literature has shown that civil wars have devastating
effects on affected communities, our contribution is to show that violence and unrest,
a milder and more common form of conflict, can also have important effects on the
behaviour of households. Our unique dataset allows us to analyse the effects of violence
on the governorate level with detailed information on the intensity of the events. Second,
we add to the literature on the response of households to shocks by exploring the relation
between violence and political change, education, health expenditure and savings. We
offer a new interpretation of a surprising result - the increase in education expenditure
of affected households - although this result needs to be treated with caution due to a
small sample size. Third, this paper contributes to the large literature on risk-coping
and decision making after large and traumatising aggregate shocks. We contribute to
this literature by showing the effects of violent demonstrations and protests on savings
behaviour in the context of post-revolution Egypt.
Our results suggest that political instability and change can affect long-term outcomes
for households. Those consequences of political instability may be difficult to quantify, or
even to recognise, and they have not yet been sufficiently integrated in a policy discussion
on the consequences of the Egyptian revolution. Such a change in economic behaviour,
however, requires policy responses that hedge the risks for individuals through targeted
policies such as loans, insurances or risk pooling in order to keep the ‘cost’ of social
unrest at a minimum. However, as this is often overlooked, we aim to contribute with
our research to a better understanding of these consequences. Furthermore, our results
can influence the decision to migrate if individuals feel desperate and think that they
have better opportunities abroad.
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Chapter 1
Firms Left Behind: Emigration and
Firm Productivity∗
1.1 Introduction
The emigration of high-skilled workers poses a challenge for many countries, not only
in the developing world. As workers leave their firms to follow better opportunities
abroad, policy-makers and managers complain about skill shortages and emphasise the
negative effects of brain drain. However, whether there is a causal link from skilled
emigration to firm productivity is not clear. Scarcity of firm-level data from emigrants’
countries of origin and the endogeneity of migration flows inhibit from going beyond
anecdotal evidence. The direction of causation could well go the other way with migrants
leaving the least productive firms or a change in unobservable variables triggering both
lower firm performance and higher emigration rates. Yet, identifying firm-level effects of
emigration and thoroughly disentangling the mechanisms is indispensable for the design
of appropriate policies in source countries.
Central and Eastern Europe is a region that has experienced particular high emigration
rates in recent years. Following the EU accession of Central and Eastern European
countries in 2004 and 2007, migration flows from new member states (NMS) to old
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Nadzeya Laurentsyeva.
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EU member states have increased considerably. In 2003, the number of NMS migrants
residing in other EU countries amounted to 846,000 people and by 2014 this number
had reached 3.95 million. Although the skill level of emigrants varies across destination
countries, on average, NMS migrants have been positively selected. As of 2014, 25% of
the post-accession NMS emigrants had tertiary education. To compare, among NMS non-
migrants, people with university degree accounted for 13.5%.1 Despite important positive
consequences of free labour mobility in terms of lower unemployment and a better skill
match, there have been growing concerns that the emigration of skilled workers has
created a severe challenge for source countries (Kahanec, 2012; OECD, 2013; Zaiceva,
2014).
This paper investigates the causal effects of skilled emigration on firm performance. As
‘skilled’, we denote individuals with either tertiary education or a professional quali-
fication. To identify the effect of interest, we exploit changes in EU labour mobility
legislation from 2004 to 2014. The transitional provisions applied by old EU member
states created a quasi-experimental setting by allowing earlier or later free labour mo-
bility for certain categories of NMS workers. While these transitional provisions were
in place, emigration opportunities for NMS citizens varied, depending on their country
of origin and the industry they were qualified to work in. Using firm-level data from
NMS countries, we show that firms in industries that were exposed to higher outflows of
skilled workers experienced a drop in total factor productivity (TFP). The estimates are
qualitatively robust to various measures of TFP and firm profits.
Apart from analysing the reduced-form effects of legislation changes on firm productivity,
we also perform 2SLS regressions to estimate the effect for firms which effectively expe-
rienced skill shortages due to higher emigration rates. Changes in EU labour mobility
laws strongly predict skill shortages as reported by firms in NMS. This allows us to use
the legislation changes as an instrument. We argue for the validity of this instrument:
detailed sector- and country-specific legislation changes had not been anticipated and are
uncorrelated with other integration-related events, such as the free movement of goods
or capital. Using annual data from the European Commission Business Survey, we find
1 Source: Eurostat LFS Data. Only migrants, who entered the old EU countries after the EU
accession are taken into account.
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that a one percentage point increase in instrumented skill shortages leads to a 1.6 percent
drop in firm TFP.
To analyse more thoroughly how emigration reduces firm productivity, we develop a
simple theoretical framework that illustrates one plausible channel behind this result.
Better emigration opportunities induce more skilled workers to quit their jobs. This re-
sults in higher job turnover rates that reduce the existing firm-specific human capital and
lower firms’ incentives to invest in firm-specific training of new employees. As turnover
increases and more workers have to be trained, intensive training programmes become
costlier. Consequently, the stock of firm-specific skills and knowledge decreases. The ef-
fect is captured by TFP, as this form of human capital is not fully accounted for in wages.
Our results are consistent with this mechanism. We find evidence for higher turnover
of workers in sectors that are strongest hit by emigration and document an increase in
firms’ personnel and training costs. This mechanism fits well into the previous literature.
Konings and Vanormelingen (2015) find that the productivity of workers increases by
more than their wage after they have participated in training. Consequently, if trained
workers are leaving, this is captured by labour productivity and residual TFP. Jäger
(2016) shows that longer-tenured workers are harder to replace with outsiders. For more
studies on the relationship between job turnover, firm-specific human capital, and firm
productivity we refer to Brown and Medoff (1978), Shaw (2011), Strober (1990), and
Yanadori and Kato (2007). The firm has several ways to adapt to higher quitting rates
of skilled workers. It can substitute labour with capital (see Dustmann and Glitz (2015)
for the case of immigration), substitute high-skilled with low-skilled workers or improve
training technology for new hires.
Panel data allow us to account for firm heterogeneity and to explore the link between
firms’ characteristics and their sensitivity and adaptation to higher quitting rates of
workers. We find that innovating and foreign-owned firms substantially increase their
per-employee personnel costs. These firms are apparently able to (at least, partly) match
wages offered abroad and provide more training, and therefore prevent the loss of firm-
specific human capital.
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This paper makes three key contributions to the literature. The first and main contribu-
tion is that we analyse the effects of emigration at the firm level. So far, the economic
effects of emigration and brain drain have focused on the aggregate level (Clemens, 2013;
Docquier and Rapoport, 2012; Freeman, 2006; Grossmann and Stadelmann, 2011, 2013).
We expect that the migration literature can gain richer insights into the consequences
of migration by investigating firm-level outcomes. Kerr et al. (2014), Kerr et al. (2013)
and Kerr (2013), for instance, are encouraging the firm-level approach for the analysis of
migration. Accounting for firm level outcomes, adaptation mechanisms and firm hetero-
geneity is important as it shapes the observable effect of migration on macro outcomes.
While there is an emerging migration literature that focuses on the firm as the unit of
analysis, it has focused on immigration until now. Peri (2012), Kerr and Kerr (2013),
Kerr et al. (2014), Paserman (2013), Mitaritonna et al. (2014) and Ottaviano et al.
(2015) study the effects of immigration on firm productivity in the US, Israel, France and
the UK respectively. They find that an increase in the supply of foreign-born workers
positively affects firm productivity due to a faster growth of capital and the specialisation
of natives in more complex tasks. Lewis (2013) furthermore finds that besides increased
investment, firms also adapt new technology. Using firm-level German data, Dustmann
and Glitz (2015) analyse how industries and firms respond to changes in the local labour
supply. They find that immigration alters the local skill composition and investigate three
adaptation mechanisms: a change in factor prices, a within-firm change in skill intensity,
and an adjustment through the entry and exit of firms. Our research is complementary to
this literature. While these authors look at the effects of immigration on firms, we focus
on the consequences of emigration. Moreover, we propose a plausible mechanism that
links the outflow of skilled workers to firms’ total factor productivity. This mechanism
emphasises the role of firm-specific human capital for firms’ performance and allows
drawing concrete policy recommendations for firms.
The second contribution is the creation of an instrument that circumvents the endogeneity
of migration. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to exploit industry-
level variation in labour mobility laws to causally evaluate the effect of emigration on firm
performance. Due to a lack of firm level data for source countries and the endogeneity
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of migration, the causal analysis is not trivial. To address these issues, we create an
extensive dataset that merges migration and firm level data on the country, year and
industry level to exogenous labour mobility legislation changes. We are thus able to
show that emigration imposes binding skill shortages for firms and lowers TFP via a loss
of firm specific human capital.
Third, we add to the literature on the consequences of EU enlargement. This is of
very high relevance to policy makers in Brussels, in accession countries, and in candidate
countries, for instance Serbia. In particular, we complement the research that investigates
the consequences of the recent emigration wave from the NMS. Mayr and Peri (2009)
develop a model to study the consequences of European free labour mobility on human
capital in the sending countries and differentiate between brain drain and brain gain
due to return migration and increased incentives to invest in education. Dustmann et
al. (2015) and Elsner (2013) estimate the effects of emigration on wages in Poland and
Lithuania and find that wages increase for the stayers. Our contribution is to illustrate
that, while firms in general experience a drop in TFP, there are various adaptation
mechanisms for firms. Moreover, we suggest policies that concerned governments can
implement to mitigate the negative effects.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section outlines a theoretical framework to
motivate and structure our empirical analysis. Section 3 provides background information
on the EU opening and transitional provisions regarding free labour mobility, which
helps to understand our identification strategy. Section 4 describes the data, followed
by Section 5 that presents the empirical specification. Section 6 discusses the results
including heterogeneous effects, while Section 7 provides robustness checks. Section 8
concludes.
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1.2 Theoretical Framework
1.2.1 General Setting
Our theoretical framework illustrates the consequences of skilled emigration at the firm
level in the source country. Using a partial-equilibrium framework, we generate predic-
tions about changes in firms’ factor demand, training provision, and TFP.
We assume that there are frictions in the labour market: job separations occur at an
exogenous rate and in order to fill vacant positions firms post costly vacancies. One
trigger for job separations, for instance, is an easier access to foreign labour markets,
which induces higher emigration. If the job separation rate increases, firms in source
countries experience higher skill shortages. In this setting, skill shortages are not a
disequilibrium phenomenon, but correspond to some measure of search frictions (for
example, the number of posted vacancies for skilled employees).
We allow firm-specific human capital to explicitly enter the production function. A
higher labour turnover destroys part of the firm-specific human capital. Since the latter
is not fully captured by wages, this loss translates to a drop in TFP. In this way, we
characterise one possible micro channel, through which skilled emigration directly affects
firm productivity.2
The economy consists of a representative firm that produces output according to the
production function:
Y = Af(K,Ls, Lu) (1.1)
Af() is a general production function, where K is the capital input and Ls and Lu are
the skilled and unskilled labour inputs. f() increases in the production factors K,Ls, Lu;
exhibits diminishing marginal returns toK,Ls, Lu and is twice-differentiable. Each period
Ls and Lu workers are involved in the production process. At the end of the period, a
2On a macro level, this problem was examined by Grossmann and Stadelmann (2011). In their
overlapping generations model, the drop in TFP is attributed to less firm entry and, consequently, to
the reduction in human capital externalities of skilled employees.
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proportion δs (δu) of skilled (unskilled) job matches are destroyed. The total turnover
rate δ is defined as the number of separations over the total number of employees. To
fill the positions with new workers, a firm posts vacancies. For simplicity, we assume
that vacancies are matched with probability one. In equilibrium, the number of job
separations must equal the number of matched vacancies:
Vi = δiLi, i = s, u. (1.2)
Posting vacancies creates a search cost of cs (cu) per period.
We represent TFP as A = tγ. In our setting, the firm TFP consists entirely of firm-
specific knowledge t. This tacit knowledge makes all the input factors more productive.
It could be, for instance, a collection of the firm’s best practices, a code of conduct, or
tricks of an internal IT system. In order to employ this knowledge in the production, the
firm has to train all skilled workers how to use it. We assume that there is no training
needed for unskilled workers. If a skilled worker leaves and the firm hires a new worker as
a replacement, it has to pay the training costs for the new worker, which are proportional
to the amount of firm-specific knowledge to learn. Given a turnover rate δs, the total
training costs per period would amount to δsLsctt, where δsLs is the number of newly
hired skilled workers. ct denotes the marginal costs of training, which we set equal to 1.
The total training costs can also be interpreted as the loss of firm-specific human capital
due to worker turnover. We treat the amount of training per worker t as adjustable when
the firm hires new skilled workers. For instance, if it becomes too expensive to teach a
particular firm practice to all the new hires, the firm can drop this practice, thus reducing
its knowledge t. If there is no turnover, δs = 0, the firm-specific knowledge stays constant.
1.2.2 The Firm’s Optimisation Problem
The firm chooses inputs K,Ls, Lu to maximise profits Π. In addition, when hiring skilled
workers, the firm decides on t - the amount of firm-specific knowledge to teach. The
15
Firms Left Behind
exogenous variables are the output price (P ), wages (ws, wu), the interest rate (r), the
job destruction rate (δs, δu), and the vacancy costs (cs, cu).
Π = PY − ∑
i=s,u
(wiLi + ciVi)− rK − Vst (1.3)
s.t.
Vi = δiLi, i = s, u;
Y = tγτf(K,Ls, Lu)
Using the constraint to substitute for Vi yields the total personnel costs of skilled workers:
Ls(ws + csδs + tδs). These costs comprise wages, search costs, and training expenses.
Similarly, the total personnel costs of unskilled workers are equal to Lu(wu + cuδu).
The emigration of skilled workers raises δs and results in a higher turnover (
δsLs
L
). The
marginal hiring costs of a skilled worker (δs(cs+t)) increase.3 Thus, emigration augments
the marginal personnel costs of a skilled worker (ws+δs(cs+t)) and affects the relative in-
put demand of the firm. Further, the incentives for training change. The higher turnover
rate makes training more expensive, which consequently reduces the optimal level of the
firm-specific knowledge t. This result follows from the fact that the firm has to teach all
its specific knowledge t to all newly hired skilled workers.4 Therefore, when δs increases,
it becomes more expensive for a firm to sustain its knowledge level due to higher training
costs. We provide a proof of the comparative statics results for a general production
function in the Appendix.
3The model is generalisable to the situation in which both skilled and unskilled workers emigrate.
In this case turnover would increase for both groups but firm-specific human capital would only be lost
for skilled workers.
4For instance, unless all of a firm’s sales managers know how to use a Customer Relationship Man-
agement (CRM) system, there will be very poor coordination among them. This may lead to both the
sales managers and the CRM system being unproductive.
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1.2.3 Comparative Statics
We are interested in the effect of emigration on firm productivity. If workers obtain the
possibility to emigrate to a country with higher wages, this results in a higher quitting
probability. This can be triggered by exogenous political events such as the EU accession.
In the model, the introduction of free labour mobility that resulted in higher emigration
rates can thus be represented by higher job separation rates δs and δu. In the comparative
statics, we focus on the effect of raising δs, because it has direct implications for firm
TFP.
Proposition: An increase in the job separation rate δs reduces the firm’s TFP through
the reduction in firm-specific knowledge t.
1. An increase in δs raises the marginal hiring costs of a skilled worker. This cor-
responds to an increase in the personnel costs ws + δs(cs + t). Depending on the
elasticity of substitution between the inputs, firms might find it optimal to substitute
high-skilled workers with low-skilled workers or with capital. The ratio Ls
L
decreases
and/or the ratio C
L
increases.
2. An increase in δ leads to a lower provision of training (t) per hired skilled worker
because higher turnover rates increase marginal training costs. This results in a
negative effect on the firm’s TFP. However, the total training costs δsLst might
increase as, on the extensive margin, due to a higher δs, the firm has to train more
workers.
In our simple framework, we assume that wages are exogenously given, which is a realistic
assumption if we consider an average small or medium-sized firm. Emigration lowers the
available supply of skilled labour and should lead to a general increase of ws. This will
increase personnel costs ws + δs(cs + t) and thus lower the relative demand for skilled
workers. Provided δs is now kept constant, the effect on the training provision t will be
of a second order. Hence, if emigration leads only to the adjustment of wages, we would
not observe a strong negative effect on firm TFP.
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1.3 Transitional Provisions for the Free Movement
of Workers from New Member States
Before testing the derived predictions with the data, we provide background information
on the transitional provisions applied by old EU member states from 2004 to 2014. This
section shows how the gradual opening of the EU labour markets created time, country,
and industry-level variation in the emigration rates of NMS citizens.
In 2004, ten Eastern and Southern European Countries joined the EU: Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
While free mobility of goods and capital was introduced either prior to or at the point
of accession by all countries, free labour mobility was initially restricted. Some EU15
countries5 feared an inflow of cheaper labour. The EU Commission thus allowed the old
member states to unilaterally restrict their labour markets by national laws for a period
of up to seven years. These transitional arrangements were applied to all new members in
the same way, except Malta and Cyprus. We thus denote the remaining eight countries as
NMS8. In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania (NMS2) joined the European Union, also facing
the transitional agreement rules.
The option to unilaterally restrict labour markets generated different rules within the EU.
While Ireland, Sweden, and the UK decided to open their labour markets immediately
in 2004 without any restrictions, other countries delayed the access or applied special job
schemes in certain industries. Denmark, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, for instance, re-
moved restrictions only in 2009. France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Austria opened their
labour markets gradually, allowing only workers in certain industries and introducing
quotas. Germany kept the labour market almost completely closed until the expiration
of the transitional agreements (2011 for NMS8; 2014 for NMS2). Other EFTA members,
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, also applied transitional provisions and
we thus include them in our analysis (EU15+4 denote all countries that applied tran-
5Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (EU15).
18
Firms Left Behind
Table 1.1: Overview of the gradual opening of the EU15+4 labour markets
Country NMS8 NMS2 Sectoral Exceptions
(2004 entry) (2007 entry)
Austria 2011 2014 NMS8 (2007-2010), NMS2 (2007-2013): Construction, Manufactur-
ing of Electronics and Metals, Food and beverage services (restau-
rant business), other sectors with labour shortages
Belgium 2009 2014 -
Denmark 2009 2009 -
Finland 2006 2007 -
France 2008 2014 NMS8 (2005-2007), NMS2 (2007-2013): Agriculture, Construction,
Accommodation and food services (tourism and catering), other
sectors with labour shortages
Germany 2011 2014 NMS8 (2004-2010), NMS2 (2007-2013): sectors with labour short-
ages
Greece 2006 2009 -
Iceland 2006 2012 -
Ireland 2004 2012 -
Italy 2006 2012 NMS8 (2004-2005): sectors with labour shortages; NMS2 (2007-
2011): Agriculture, Construction, Engineering, Accommodation
and food services (tourism and catering), Domestic work and care
services, other sectors with labour shortages; Occupations: Man-
agerial and professional occupations
Lichtenstein 2011 2016 -
Luxembourg 2008 2014 NMS2 (2007 - 2013): Agriculture, Viticulture, Accommodation and
food services (tourism and catering)
Netherlands 2007 2014 NMS8 (2004-2006), NMS2 (2007-2013): International transport, In-
land shipping, Health, Slaugther-house/meet-packaging, other sec-
tors with labour shortages
Norway 2009 2012 NMS8 (2004-2008), NMS2 (2007-2011): sectors with labour short-
ages
Portugal 2006 2009 -
Spain 2006 2009 Reintroduction of restrictions for Romanians: 11/08/2011 -
31/12/2013
Sweden 2004 2007 -
Switzerland 2011 2014 -
United Kingdom 2004 2014 NMS2 (2007-2013): Agriculture, Food manufacturing
Notes: Column 2 shows the year of the labour market opening of the respective country for NMS8 countries, column 3
shows the year of the labour market opening of the respective country for the NMS2 countries. Column 4 shows, which
sectors were exempt from restrictions.
Source: European Commission.
sitional provisions). Table 1.1 provides an overview of the precise opening dates and
industry details per country.
This sequential opening by country, year and industry had a significant effect on migration
rates. Constant (2011) and Kahanec (2012) provide descriptive evidence of EU migration
flows following the enlargement. They show that the transitional agreements influenced
the movement of migrants. The UK and Ireland, for example, have become the main
EU destination country for Polish, Slovakian and Latvian workers. Kahanec et al. (2014)
apply a difference-in-differences analysis and confirm that outward migration from the
NMS increased with the EU entry, but its full potential was hampered by the presence
of transitional arrangements.
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One might argue that the restriction of a country’s labour market is endogenous and
related to local labour market conditions. Germany, for instance, experienced high un-
employment rates during the mid-2000s and this was one of the reasons for its labour
market restrictions. However, while the transitional arrangements are endogenous to
labour market conditions and firm productivity in the receiving country, they are exoge-
nous to firm outcomes in the source countries.
There are additional worries that concern the validity of the instrument. One possible
identification problem could arise if the decisions to open a particular industry by EU15
countries were to some extent endogenous to conditions in the new member countries.
For example, mobility restrictions might have been directed at the NMS citizens working
in countries and industries with high volumes of EU15 FDIs. This is not the case for
the following reasons. First, EU15 countries could not differentiate transitional provi-
sions across countries in NMS8 and NMS2 groups. Second, this proposition is hard to
reconcile with significant time-variation in the removal of provisions. One might further
suggest that the industry-specific timing of labour market openings coincided with trade
liberalization. Yet, all new EU member countries had signed and enforced Free Trade
Agreements with the EU prior to their accession. It is plausible to conclude that the ap-
plication of transitional provisions by the EU15 was driven mainly by their own economic
conditions and is thus exogenous to firm outcomes in the NMS.
The transitional agreements have not only affected the employed people in the new mem-
ber states, but have also given new opportunities to the unemployed. One might assume
that the unemployed had the highest incentives to leave their countries and to look for
work abroad. This would bias our estimated coefficient towards zero as the emigration of
unemployed workers would not lead to the loss of firm-specific human capital and would
leave firm productivity unaffected. Another concern is that people might change indus-
tries as they migrate. This will again bias our estimate towards zero. It is plausible to
assume though that people have the smallest emigration costs if the industry they work
in opens for immigration. If they eventually work in another industry after migration,
this does not affect our results as we are only interested in the fact that they left and it
does not matter in which industry they actually work in their destination country.
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1.4 Data Description
For our analysis we use firm-level financial and survey data, aggregate industry- and
country-level indicators, detailed migration data, and information from EU labour legis-
lation.
We obtain firm-level data from Bureau Van Dijk’s AMADEUS database that provides
standardised annual balance-sheet and profit information for European public and private
companies. We work with an unbalanced panel of about 110,000 firms located in NMS.
The period covered ranges from 2000 to 2013, and there are five annual observations for
each firm on average. The sample includes companies in manufacturing, construction,
retail trade and services. Apart from financial reports, the dataset provides information
on firms’ patenting activities, ownership structures, export markets, and exit status (such
as bankruptcy or liquidation).
We include firms with at least two years of available financial data to calculate the TFP
index. As a note of caution, we might not capture companies at the lower tail of the
productivity distribution if they are less likely to be included in the sample. Based on
observables, though, firms in the regression samples are not statistically different from
the full sample (see table A.1). We used the largest possible number of firms with non-
missing observations. The number of firms across regression results slightly varies due to
differences in the availability of variables.
To obtain data on the training of employees, we complement this data with firm-level in-
formation from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS)
administered by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in all
NMS. The survey was conducted in 2002, 2005, 2009 and 2012 and contains an extensive
questionnaire on firms’ self-reported financial performance, workforce composition, man-
agement practices, innovation, and perceptions of the business environment (including
the availability and quality of human capital). The survey data provides a representative
sample of manufacturing, construction, service, and retail trade firms. In total, there
are 13,972 firm-year observations, of which 2,556 (with 1,293 unique firms) make up an
unbalanced panel.
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Disaggregated emigration data by country and industry does not exist.6 Therefore, we
cannot perform a meaningful OLS or first-stage regression using migration data. For our
baseline estimations, we thus conduct reduced-form regressions where the main explana-
tory variable Free Movement (FM) is constructed directly using the legislation informa-
tion. To construct the FM variable, we use the Labour Reforms database (section on
labour mobility) of the EU Commission and complement it with information from the
national legislation of EU15+4.
To shed more light on one potential channel, we measure if the opening of labour markets
predicts firms’ labour shortages. The measure of skill shortages is taken from the EU
Commission Business Survey, which is conducted quarterly in all EU member countries
by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN). The survey
addresses representatives of the manufacturing, service, retail trade, and construction
sectors and asks for firms’ assessment and expectations of the business development.
Among other questions, the survey’s participants are asked to evaluate factors limiting
their production (such as labour, access to finance, demand, and equipment). The EU
commission publishes information on a two-digit NACE industry level, thus the obtained
measure is equal to the share of firms in a given industry reporting to be constrained by
labour. To match the data to other datasets, we aggregated quarterly indicators to annual
levels. As an alternative measure, we consider firms’ replies from the BEEPS survey,
which asks respondents to evaluate the importance of ‘inadequately educated labour’ as
an obstacle for businesses. To make it more comparable with the EU Commission Survey,
we aggregate individual firm responses on a two-digit industry level.
As additional covariates, we use aggregated (two- and four-digit NACE) industry level
data, which is available for all EU member states and is harmonised by Eurostat. The
structural business statistics database contains annual information on industries’ perfor-
mance, including output, investment, employment, and personnel costs. Macroeconomic
6The Eurostat Labour Force Survey provides information on the industry, education, and occupa-
tion of immigrants, but aggregates the country-of-origin information. While observing immigrants in
EU15+4, we can only see if they come from NMS8 (2004 entry) or NMS2 (2007 entry). Even if the
detailed origin information were available, though, it would likely be noisy and the labour force sample
would have small numbers in the specific country-industry-year cell.
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controls (GDP, FDI, unemployment, interest rates) come from the Worldbank statistical
database.
1.5 Econometric Specification
The aim of the empirical analysis is to test the predictions of our model. We thus
want to establish how the exogenous increase in the emigration influences TFP, person-
nel costs, training, and the capital/labour ratio of firms. For identification, we exploit
legislation changes, which generate exogenous variation in emigration. In this section,
we first present the baseline reduced-form regressions of firm outcomes on legislation
changes. The latter are summarised by the Free Movement variable described in Section
1.5.3 below. We then present the specification for the 2SLS regression. As there is no
disaggregated country- and industry-specific emigration data for Eastern Europe, we do
not explicitly use the Free Movement variable as the instrument for emigration. Instead,
to estimate the treatment effects (LATE), we conduct 2SLS regressions with a measure
of skill shortages, which are reported on the industry level. The 2SLS coefficients thus
capture the effect in industries, where emigration created binding skill shortages.
1.5.1 Baseline Model: Reduced Form
The reduced-form empirical specification is described below:
Yfict = β1FMict−l + β2Xfict + β3Iict + β4Jit + β5Cct + τt + νf + fict (1.4)
where Yfict are different performance measures of a firm (f) in industry (i), country (c) and
year (t). FMict−l indicates the Free Movement variable. We include it in equation (1.4)
with a lag of length l. β1 is the reduced-form effect of the legislation change on a firm-level
outcome. Xfict is a set of time-varying firm controls, such as age and capacity utilization.
Iict includes country-specific industry controls such as total investment, average mark-up
(ratio of revenues to costs), and inward FDI. These variables account for variation due
to other shifters of labour demand within an industry of a particular country, namely,
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technical change or higher competition. Jit are controls that are common to all countries
such as industry-specific total sales and skill shortages. Cct is a vector of macroeconomic
covariates, accounting for country-wide changes: the GDP growth rate and FDI inflows.
All monetary variables are in natural logarithms. τt are time dummies. νf represent firm
fixed effects, and fict is the error term. In the baseline empirical model, we consider
only within-firm variation. Such a specification allows us to take care of firm unobserved
time-invariant heterogeneity (as initial management ability or quality of business ideas)
and other constant characteristics of a firm’s location or industry-specific production
technologies.
The focus of this project is to estimate the effect of emigration on firm total factor
productivity. We compute firm productivity in several ways: using a TFP-index and a
semi-parametric approach as in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The latter method allows
us to overcome the simultaneity bias between firms’ inputs and unobserved productiv-
ity shocks. For details regarding the TFP calculation, we refer to the Appendix A.3.
As alternative measures of productivity, we consider firm profits: EBIT
Assets
calculated as
the ratio of earnings before interest and tax over assets. Using a number of different
productivity measures ensures that the effects we find are not driven by measurement
issues.
To understand if our additional model predictions for firms’ adjustment hold, we look at
several other outcome variables and use the same regression equation. In particular, we
are interested in the effects on the capital/labour ratio, the personnel costs, and training.
1.5.2 Two Stage Least Squares Model with Skill Shortages
Due to a lack of disaggregated migration data, we cannot directly test the relevance of
the Free Movement variable for actual emigration rates from NMS. Instead we can go one
step further in the causality chain and check if the EU15+4 labour mobility laws explain
the increase in skill shortages as reported by NMS firms. The first-stage regression takes
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the following form:
SHict = γ1FMict−l + γ2Iict + γ3Jit + γ4Cct + τt + κic + uict (1.5)
SHict is the industry-country-year measure of skill shortages. γ1 is the coefficient of
interest and reflects the marginal contribution of the Free Movement variable, given
industry- and country-specific time-varying covariates (Iict, γ3Jit, Cct), and time dummies
(τt). By including industry-country fixed effects κic, we identify the Free Movement effect
only from within-industry variation in the propensity to emigrate.
We run a second-stage regression, similar to (1.4), but instead of the Free Movement
variable, use the instrumented measure of skill shortages. The coefficient βˆ1 thus captures
the productivity effect of skill shortages caused by the transitional provisions. It is
identified only for industries where the legislation changes created binding skill constraints
for firms.
1.5.3 Construction of the Free Movement Variable
In our model, we analyse an exogenous increase in the turnover rate due to emigration.
In the data, this corresponds to the opening of the EU15+4 labour markets for NMS,
which induced emigration and therefore increased the turnover rate. These openings are
captured by the Free Movement (FM) variable. We construct it directly by aggregating
information about EU15+4 labour mobility laws. We use it as the main explanatory
variable in our baseline empirical specification and as the instrument for skill shortages
in the 2SLS regression.
A country-industry-year cell makes up one observation. Industries are represented at the
NACE two-digit level. The main period under consideration is from 2000 to 2014 (from
the accession of NMS8 countries to the termination of all transitional provisions applied
to NMS2). First, for each observation we construct a set of 15 dummies Dccjit, with each
dummy corresponding to one of the EU15+4 countries, cj. A dummy takes the value of 1
if according to the legislation of an old EU member, its corresponding industry i is open
to labour migrants from a given new member state c. For example, the UK completely
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opened up its labour market for the NMS8 group in 2004. Therefore UK dummies for
all industries for all NMS8 countries equal 1 starting from 2004. In contrast, France held
the transitional provisions for the 2004-entrants until 2008. Prior to 2008, the French
government applied a special job scheme, which allowed for free labour market access
only in construction, tourism, and catering. France dummies for NMS8 industries take a
value of 0 until 2008, except for the three mentioned sectors. Figure A.1 in the Appendix
shows how the legislation dummies enter our dataset.
One of the limitations of the legislation dummies is low industry-level variation. Austria,
Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, for instance, did not explicitly specify which
industries are open to labour migrants from new member states, but rather allowed for
special job schemes in sectors that experienced skill shortages. The dummies also do
not capture different capacities of EU15+4 markets to absorb migrants. To account
for this, we multiply the legislation dummies Dccjit by a measure of skill shortages in a
given industry of a jth EU15+4 country. For this, we use the share of firms (in destination
industries) reporting to be constrained by the labour factor. These data are available from
the EU Commission Business Survey. This modification controls for implicit legislation
changes and for differences in labour market conditions across and within industries in
old EU members.7 Easiness to find a job, which increases in sectors experiencing skill
shortages, can be another important criteria for worker mobility. A possible concern
with such a modification is that skill shortages in the old EU member states might not
be fully exogenous to firm productivity in NMS countries, due, for example, to common
technology shocks. We can control for this by including industry-specific time dummies
or an average measure of skill shortages in a given industry for all EU members. Another
concern is that labour demand could increase in EU15+4 industries, which after the
EU enlargement had become more competitive relative to their rivals from new member
states. In this case, however, one would expect to see negative tendencies in NMS firm
performance already prior to the outflow of workers. We can also control for higher
product-market competition by including a mark-up measure.
7This allows to capture, for example, a decrease in demand for foreign labour force during and after
the economic crisis in 2008-2009. At this time, many labour markets were already open for NMS citizens,
but effective job possibilities were limited. De-jure, only Spain reacted to the worsening of economic
conditions by reintroducing restrictions for Romanian citizens in 2011.
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To summarise the set of 19 dummies in a single measure, we apply special weights that
reflect how strongly the opening of a particular EU15+4 labour market affects the citizens
of a given new member state. It is reasonable to assume that labour migrants, for
example, from Estonia were more sensitive to the opening of the Finnish labour market
than the Portuguese one. One approach is to use bilateral distances between the two
largest cities of each source and destination country as a measure of proximity: the
shorter the distance, the larger is the weight for a corresponding EU15+4 labour market.
The legislation information is summarised in one variable:
FMcit =
19∑
j=1
wc,cj ·Dccjit (1.6)
FMcit is the value for one observation (source country-industry-year). Dccjit denotes
the legislation dummy for openness of the labour market in a jth old EU member’s
corresponding industry for the citizens of a given source country in a given year and wc,cj
denote the weights. To ensure the comparability of different versions of Free Movement
variables, we standardise them to be in the range [0;1]. Figure 1.1 illustrates the variation
in the Free Movement variable across industries of NMS.
To investigate the plausibility of our identifying assumption, we check if firms’ outcomes
prior to 2004 predict changes in the legislation over 2004-2014. We also run several
placebo tests. We report the results in Section 1.7.
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Figure 1.1: Variation in the Free Movement Variable
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Notes: This graph shows the variation in the instrument. We compare different industries (y-Axis) in different countries
(x-Axis) in 2005 and 2008. The darker the shading, the stronger these industries in these countries have been exposed to
emigration.
1.6 Empirical Results
This section presents and discusses the empirical results and compares them with the
model’s predictions. All regressions include firm fixed effects and thus capture within-
firm variation in performance as a response to changes in an industry’s exposure to
emigration.
1.6.1 Reduced Form Regressions
Table 1.2 presents the reduced form estimations: we regress firm outcomes directly on the
Free Movement (FM) variable. We use a one-period lag for the Free Movement variable
to account for some inertia between the legislation change and the migration decisions.
All dependent variables are in natural logarithms, and the Free Movement variable is in
the range from 0 to 1. The coefficients may be interpreted as the log point (' percent)
change in dependent variables when the FM increases from 0 (no free labour mobility
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Table 1.2: Free Movement Effect on Firm Performance, Reduced Form, Amadeus Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFP index TFP LP ROA Pers. costs C/L
L.FMict -0.273*** -0.234*** -0.0344** 0.270*** 0.172
(0.0696) (0.0619) (0.0141) (0.0628) (0.106)
Mark − upict 0.212*** 0.186*** 0.0906*** -0.133*** -0.0824**
(0.0526) (0.0350) (0.0165) (0.0279) (0.0404)
L.log_investmentict 0.00178 -0.00707 -0.00556*** 0.00521 0.0243**
(0.00680) (0.00500) (0.00203) (0.00792) (0.0106)
L.log_FDI_inwardict -0.00125 2.82e-05 -0.000435 0.00242 0.00502**
(0.00143) (0.00114) (0.000509) (0.00148) (0.00219)
Log_total_salesit 0.00350 -0.00910 0.000439 0.0516*** 0.00880
(0.0100) (0.00913) (0.00262) (0.00851) (0.0126)
Mean skill sh.it 0.0763 0.160 0.175*** 0.0702 -0.0866
(0.158) (0.117) (0.0384) (0.115) (0.169)
L.log_FDIct 0.0123*** 0.0108*** 0.00231*** 0.00819*** 0.0113***
(0.00248) (0.00226) (0.000617) (0.00175) (0.00229)
D.log_GDPct 1.520*** 1.301*** 0.179*** 0.397*** 0.130
(0.163) (0.142) (0.0443) (0.0996) (0.135)
Observations 546,661 322,938 542,500 529,567 529,567
Number of firms 108,413 71,652 107,585 105,572 105,572
R2 0.074 0.040 0.053 0.105 0.122
Dummies f y f y f y f y f y
Clusters 2660 2521 2630 2618 2618
Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of the free movement. All specifications are estimated with firm fixed
effects and time dummies. Dependent variables: TFP index, TFP LP - TFP estimated with the Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) procedure, ROA - return on assets, Pers. costs - personnel costs per employee, C/L - capital-labour ratio. L.FM -
Free Movement variable (distance-weighted, interacted with skill shortages in destination industries), 1 year lag. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered on country-industry (NACE 4-digit) level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
within EU for workers qualified to work in a particular industry) to 1 (maximum exposure
to free labour mobility in our sample).
For the main sample of firms, the effect of free movement on productivity is negative,
which confirms the prediction of our model. The result is robust to different measures of
productivity, to the exclusion of outliers (firms with sales below the 1st and above the
99th percentiles), and to the exclusion of firms that entered the market after 2002.
The maximum annual increase in the value of the FM variable in our sample is equal
to 0.52 (for certain industries in Romania in 2007), while on average NMS industries
experienced a maximum annual increase of 0.25. We can use this information to give a
quantitative interpretation of our result. One year following the maximum increase in
labour mobility, a firm’s TFP drops by 0.25 · 0.234 = 0.059 or 5.9 log points. Given an
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average TFP of 29,500 EUR (estimated with the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method),
this translates to annual losses of 1,725 EUR per firm.
We can also see that firms adjust to emigration by increasing personnel costs. In our
dataset, personnel costs include wages and other employee-related costs. We are thus not
able to compare this aggregate data directly with our model predictions. However, the
observed increase in personnel costs is consistent with more hiring and training expenses
due to worker turnover. The annual increase in the Free Movement value of 0.25 would
lead to 0.25 · 0.27 = 0.0675 or 6.75 log point increase in personnel costs per employee.
With average annual employee costs of 7,840 EUR, this leads to additional 530 EUR per
worker. The change in the capital/labour ratio is positive, but imprecisely estimated.
To confirm our results and to analyse additional variables, we perform the same regres-
sion using firm-level data from the BEEPS survey. Table 1.3 presents the reduced form
estimates. BEEPS contains only a limited number of firms with available panel data.
Therefore, in the reported specification we pooled firm observations together, adding
firm-level covariates: lagged sales, capital, quadratic terms for firm age and lagged num-
ber of employees, share of foreign capital, share of export in sales. All regressions are esti-
mated with country·year (c·y), country·industry(c·i), and industry·year(i·y) fixed effects.
The remaining variation in dependent variables should come from country-industry-year
changes in the value of the Free Movement variable. As with the Amadeus data, we
find a negative effect of the EU labour market opening on firm TFP. Furthermore, we
report significant increases in the share of trained employees by firms in industries, which
have potentially experienced higher labour emigration. Combining this with our model
predictions, it suggests that firms train more people as they increase their hiring due to
turnover.
One assumption we are making to bring the model to the data is that the Free Movement
variable affected average turnover in NMS industries. Using Eurostat LSF data, the
results in Table 1.4 are in line with our hypothesis: industries exposed to higher labour
mobility experience a decrease in average tenure (which corresponds to higher turnover).8
The estimates are robust to the inclusion of country-specific time trends. To check for
8Tenure can be expressed as 1/Turnover
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Table 1.3: Free Movement Effect on Firm Performance, Reduced Form, BEEPS Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFP index Wage Train New product
L.FMict -0.541*** 0.772 1.706*** -3.589
(0.083) (0.620) (0.577) (2.772)
log_lag_lfict -0.0501 -0.211*** 0.0630*** 0.0201
(0.118) (0.0347) (0.0170) (0.0159)
log_lag_salesfict 0.215** 0.225*** 0.0218** -0.0144*
(0.107) (0.0221) (0.00945) (0.00831)
% foreignfict -0.187 0.462*** 0.179*** 0.115
(0.207) (0.118) (0.0637) (0.0717)
export_sharefict -0.0135 0.0620 -0.105* -0.0681
(0.198) (0.100) (0.0589) (0.0707)
Observations 1,344 5,432 5,078 2,179
R2 0.971 0.227 0.243 0.247
Dummies cy ci iy cy ci iy cy ci iy cy ci iy
Robust yes yes yes yes
Clusters 296 591 574 290
Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of free movement on firm performance using BEEPS data. All
specifications are estimated with country·year (c·y), country·industry(c·i), and industry·year(i·y) fixed effects. The
variable Train represents the share of trained workers in the total workforce. Additional firm-level covariates include
lagged sales, capital, quadratic terms for firm age and number of employees, share of foreign capital, share of export in
sales. L.FMict represents the sum of legislation dummies, weighted by distance to a given old EU member-country and
interacted with skill shortages in destination industries. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on country-industry
level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
the presence of pre-trends, we add a one-period forward of the Free Movement variable
(column 3), which turns out to be insignificant, as expected.
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Table 1.4: Free Movement Effect on Tenure, Reduced Form, Eurostat Data
(1) (2) (3)
Mean tenure Mean tenure Mean tenure
F.FMict -0.268
(0.320)
L.FMict -0.858*** -1.052*** -1.842***
(0.144) (0.219) (0.272)
L.log_investmentict -0.110*** -0.0899** -0.107**
(0.0389) (0.0390) (0.0422)
log_total_salesict 0.0261 0.00509 -0.00460
(0.0907) (0.0883) (0.0943)
L.log_FDIct -0.172*** -0.148*** -0.166***
(0.0336) (0.0320) (0.0394)
D.log_GDPct -1.200 -0.141 -3.564**
(0.904) (0.870) (1.424)
Observations 1,873 1,873 1,564
Number of idc 314 314 312
R2 0.142 0.136 0.208
Dummies ic y ic y ic y
Clusters 314 314 312
Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of free movement on average tenure. All specifications are estimated
with industry·country fixed effects and time dummies. L.FM - Free Movement variable, 1 year lag. In specification 1, we
use only distance-weighted FM dummies. In specifications 2 and 3, FM dummies are interacted with skill shortages in
destination industries. In specification 3, we add a forward lag of the FM variable to check for the absence of pre-trends.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on country-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.6.2 Heterogeneity
In the main specification, we analyse the effect of free movement for the full sample
of firms. To check for heterogeneous effects, we estimate specification 1.4 for different
sub-samples of firms.
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 show the results for foreign-owned and innovating firms. The estimated
effect of free movement on firm TFP is smaller compared to the full sample and loses its
statistical significance. At the same time, the estimated coefficients for personnel costs
and capital/labour ratios suggest that these firms adjust much stronger to the increased
emigration opportunities of their workforce. Foreign-owned firms increase their personnel
costs significantly more. They might be able to offer wage increases to retain workers
and training to newcomers to teach firm-specific human capital. Patenting firms seem to
adapt in particular through increasing the capital/labour ratio. These firms might also
be able to provide an interesting work environment and have retention initiatives to keep
their essential research staff. There is also evidence that innovating firms benefit from
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Table 1.5: Free Movement Effect on Firm Performance, Reduced Form, Foreign-Owned
Companies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFP index TFP LP ROA Pers. costs C/L
L.FMict -0.0571 -0.124 0.0191 0.396*** 0.395***
(0.0796) (0.0805) (0.0269) (0.0642) (0.110)
Mark − upict 0.105*** 0.143*** 0.0480*** -0.0509 -0.0546
(0.0339) (0.0357) (0.0136) (0.0399) (0.0446)
L.log_investmentict 0.0127* -0.0108 -0.00692* -0.0115 -0.0274**
(0.00768) (0.00798) (0.00375) (0.0110) (0.0140)
L.log_FDI_inwardict 4.88e-06 0.000242 -0.000519 0.00119 0.00414
(0.00170) (0.00182) (0.000606) (0.00139) (0.00260)
Log_total_salesit -0.0114 -0.0245* -0.00649 0.0509*** 0.0302*
(0.0119) (0.0130) (0.00538) (0.0121) (0.0171)
Mean skill sh.it -0.103 0.178 0.0425 0.0712 0.0603
(0.139) (0.154) (0.0647) (0.149) (0.204)
L.log_FDIct 0.00938*** 0.00639* 0.000382 -0.00195 -0.00690*
(0.00292) (0.00347) (0.00165) (0.00301) (0.00394)
D.log_GDPct 0.809*** 0.791*** 0.0941 0.196 0.200
(0.145) (0.172) (0.0650) (0.134) (0.175)
Observations 56,960 34,354 56,580 55,730 55,730
Number of firms 10,415 6,846 10,361 10,308 10,308
R2 0.021 0.019 0.016 0.088 0.044
Dummies f y f y f y f y f y
Clusters 1683 1489 1668 1670 1670
Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of the free movement effect on firm performance. The sample is
restricted to firms with foreign capital. All specifications are estimated with firm fixed effects and time dummies.
Dependent variables: TFP index, TFP LP - tfp estimated with Levinsohn-Petrin procedure, ROA - return on assets,
Pers. costs - personnel costs per employee, C/L - capital-labour ratio. L.FM - Free Movement variable (distance-weighted,
interacted with skill shortages in destination industries), 1 year lag. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on
country-industry (NACE 4-digit) level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
reverse knowledge flows and increased research networks through their former employees
(Braunerhjelm et al., 2015; Kaiser et al., 2015).
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Table 1.6: Free Movement Effect on Firm Performance, Reduced Form, Firms with
Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFP index TFP LP ROA Pers. costs C/L
FM -0.0702 -0.0883 -0.104*** 0.256* 0.604***
(0.127) (0.109) (0.0363) (0.144) (0.132)
Mark − upict 0.0460 0.125*** 0.0103 -0.0768 -0.0220
(0.0380) (0.0385) (0.0126) (0.0563) (0.0638)
L.log_investmentict -0.0156 -0.0245* -0.00272 0.0251** 0.0440**
(0.0121) (0.0139) (0.00479) (0.0117) (0.0184)
L.log_FDI_inwardict -0.000839 -0.00584*** -0.000692 0.000865 -0.000384
(0.00184) (0.00203) (0.000740) (0.00213) (0.00277)
Log_total_salesit -0.0147 -0.0304 0.00435 0.00534 0.00906
(0.0180) (0.0189) (0.00715) (0.0162) (0.0252)
Mean skill sh.it 0.0703 0.284 0.0201 0.239 -0.110
(0.154) (0.193) (0.0644) (0.166) (0.226)
L.log_FDIct 0.00130 0.00194 0.00176 0.0128*** 0.0151***
(0.00351) (0.00450) (0.00167) (0.00292) (0.00398)
D.log_GDPct 0.383 0.263 0.0656 -0.00291 -0.474*
(0.253) (0.252) (0.0700) (0.250) (0.274)
Observations 20,526 13,276 20,507 19,694 19,694
Number of firms 2,812 2,165 2,812 2,769 2,769
R2 0.113 0.037 0.120 0.128 0.266
Dummies f y f y f y f y f y
Clusters 843 729 843 832 832
Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of the free movement effect on firm performance. The sample is
restricted to firms with patents. All specifications are estimated with firm fixed effects and time dummies. Dependent
variables: TFP index, TFP LP - tfp estimated with Levinsohn-Petrin procedure, ROA - return on assets, Pers.
costs - personnel costs per employee, C/L - capital-labour ratio. L.FM - Free Movement variable (distance-weighted,
interacted with skill shortages in destination industries), 1 year lag. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on
country-industry (NACE 4-digit) level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
34
Firms Left Behind
1.6.3 Skill Shortages Due to Emigration: 2SLS Regressions
The reduced form regressions represent the “intention-to-treat” effect. Furthermore, it is
of interest to estimate the effects for those firms that were effectively constrained by the
outflow of skilled workers. We consider skill shortages as an indicator for this problem.
If changes in EU15+4 labour mobility legislation indeed induce higher emigration rates
of the qualified workforce, we will observe increasing skill shortages as reported by firms
in NMS. The measure of skill shortages is described in Section 1.4.
Table 1.7 shows the OLS results of different firm outcomes regressed on skill shortages.
We find that only one measure of TFP is significantly negative, while for other measures
the association appears to be zero or even positive. We believe that these OLS results
are upward biased due to reverse causality and omitted variable bias. For instance, those
firms that experience a positive shock are likely to be more productive and thus need more
labour. They are consequently more likely to report skill shortages. In the following, we
perform a 2SLS analysis, which confirms the upward bias of the OLS regression.
Table 1.8 presents 2SLS estimates with the Free Movement variable serving as an in-
strument for skill shortages. Comparable to the reduced form estimations, we estimate
the reported models using the distance-weighted instrument. The first-stage details (FM
coefficient with the standard error) are presented below the main regression results.9
The measure of skill shortages (share of firms in an industry, reporting to be constrained
by labour) ranges from 0 to 1. The coefficient of interest thus represents the log point
change in the dependent variables when skill shortages increase by 1 unit (or 100%). A
one percentage point increase in skill shortages caused by the EU15+4 labour market
opening thus leads to a 1.6-3.1% drop in firm TFP (depending on the measure) and a
3.0% increase in personnel costs. Comparable to the reduced-form estimates, innovating
and foreign-owned companies do not experience significant decreases in TFP, but raise
their personnel costs and increase their capital intensity.
9The reported first-stage coefficients might differ slightly from those reported in Table A.2, since
some industry-year observations were dropped due to missing firm-level data.
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Table 1.7: Skill Shortages and Firm Performance, OLS Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFP index TFP LP ROA Pers. costs C/L
L.skill sh. -0.0183 -0.0751*** 0.0287*** 0.0964*** -0.181***
(0.0300) (0.0258) (0.00856) (0.0323) (0.0482)
Mark − upict 0.336*** 0.302*** 0.120*** -0.0254 0.0132
(0.0817) (0.0537) (0.0205) (0.0297) (0.0474)
L.log_investmentict 0.00636 -0.00531 -0.00668*** 0.00391 0.0238**
(0.00698) (0.00573) (0.00198) (0.00704) (0.00955)
L.log_FDI)ct -0.00158 -0.000693 -0.000471 0.000983 0.00242
(0.00153) (0.00119) (0.000351) (0.00128) (0.00200)
Log_total_salesit -0.00339 -0.0161 -1.11e-06 0.0504*** 0.00719
(0.0109) (0.0107) (0.00232) (0.00819) (0.0123)
Mean skill sh.it -0.0205 0.106 0.158*** 0.128 0.0451
(0.160) (0.124) (0.0365) (0.110) (0.167)
L.log_FDIct 0.0141*** 0.0130*** 0.00213*** 0.00772*** 0.0117***
(0.00269) (0.00245) (0.000669) (0.00199) (0.00246)
D.log_GDPct 1.549*** 1.294*** 0.239*** -0.0605 -0.285*
(0.171) (0.148) (0.0370) (0.0940) (0.163)
Observations 501,277 291,346 497,393 486,190 486,190
Number of firms 88,370 54,965 87,651 86,960 86,960
Dummies y f y f y f y f y f
Robust yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 2377 2210 2345 2361 2361
Notes: The table presents estimations of the skill shortages effect on firm productivity. All specifications are estimated
with firm fixed effects and time dummies. Dependent variables: TFP index, TFP LP - tfp estimated with Levinsohn-Petrin
procedure, ROA - return on assets, Pers. costs - personnel costs per employee, C/L - capital-labour ratio. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered on country-industry (NACE 4-digit) level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.8: Skill Shortages as the Consequence of the Free Movement, 2SLS Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFP index TFP LP ROA Pers. costs C/L
L.skill sh. -3.071* -1.635*** -0.281 3.042** 2.127
(1.631) (0.595) (0.187) (1.315) (1.872)
Mark − upict 0.330*** 0.308*** 0.119*** -0.0106 0.0247
(0.106) (0.0647) (0.0230) (0.0594) (0.0670)
L.log_investmentict 0.0298 0.00582 -0.00426 -0.0161 0.00814
(0.0216) (0.0101) (0.00263) (0.0179) (0.0224)
L.log_FDI_inwardict -0.00338 -0.00171 -0.000652 0.00275 0.00381
(0.00331) (0.00193) (0.000475) (0.00271) (0.00362)
Log_total_salesit 0.0102 -0.00712 0.00135 0.0361* -0.00400
(0.0226) (0.0140) (0.00370) (0.0211) (0.0200)
Mean skill sh.it 0.977* 0.654*** 0.260*** -0.826** -0.702
(0.562) (0.231) (0.0665) (0.403) (0.706)
L.log_FDIct 0.0311** 0.0238*** 0.00384** -0.0100 -0.00219
(0.0136) (0.00705) (0.00150) (0.0116) (0.0147)
D.log_GDPct 1.375*** 1.236*** 0.221*** 0.211 -0.0718
(0.237) (0.162) (0.0510) (0.249) (0.240)
Observations 501,277 291,346 497,393 486,190 486,190
Number of firms 88,370 54,965 87,651 86,960 86,960
Dummies y f y f y f y f y f
Robust yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 2377 2210 2345 2361 2361
fs_coef 0.0988 0.147 0.0981 0.0985 0.0985
fs_se 0.0423 0.0463 0.0424 0.0435 0.0435
Notes: The table presents estimations of the skill shortages effect on firm productivity. All specifications are estimated
with firm fixed effects and time dummies. Dependent variables: TFP index, TFP LP - tfp estimated with Levinsohn-Petrin
procedure, ROA - return on assets, Pers. costs - personnel costs per employee, C/L - capital-labour ratio. L.FM - Free
Movement variable (distance-weighted, interacted with skill shortages in destination industries), 1 year lag. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered on country-industry (NACE 4-digit) level. Firststage_coef is the first-stage
coefficient of the instrument and Firststage_se is the standard error.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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We include a number of covariates to switch off demand-driven changes in the reported
measure of skill shortages. Country GDP growth rates and FDI inflows (GDPct, FDIct)
control for general country-specific shocks. Lagged investment (investmentict) accounts
for country-industry specific increases in skill shortages due to the expansion of existing
companies or new entries. The measure of average skill shortages in a given industry in
EU15 countries (Mean skill shit) controls for industry-specific labour demand shocks,
which are common across all EU members.
For all the specifications, we report the coefficients from the first-stage regressions (where
we regress skill shortages on the Free Movement variable). A complete opening (from
FM=0 to FM=1) of one industry in all EU15+4 labour markets results in a 10% increase
in skill shortages for firms in the corresponding industry in the NMS. The free move-
ment coefficient is statistically significant, and the F-test rejects the null hypothesis of
insignificance.
1.7 Robustness
1.7.1 Exogeneity Assumption
The identification of the skill shortages effect builds on the exogeneity assumption of the
constructed instrumental variable. Variation in the Free Movement variable comes from
changes in legislation, bilateral distances, and skill shortages in destinations. All three
components are determined on the industry level for old EU member states and hence
should be exogenous to country-industry-year productivity shocks or changes in other
unobservables in new EU member countries. As a robustness check for the validity of
our IV approach, we ran the first-stage regression (1.5) on another variable, which also
varies at the country-industry-year level, but, in contrast to skill shortages, should not
systematically react to changes in EU labour mobility legislation. In the EU Business
Survey, apart from skill shortages, firms also report on financial constraints. Table A.3
presents first-stage regression results with financial constraints as a dependent variable.
While for skill shortages all four IV modifications returned statistically significant coef-
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ficients, only one of them is weakly correlated with reported financial constraints. This,
however, is not the modification we use in our regressions. This result reassures that
the constructed IV captures labour supply shrinking due to emigration instead of other
contemporaneous shocks.
1.7.2 Using Different Lags of the Instrument
In our main specification, we have looked at the effects of emigration on firm performance
one year after the respective labour market opening. We have chosen a one-year lag
because we expect the effects appear with a certain delay, for instance due to the decision
making process to migrate, the migration preparation process and the notice period. In
the following, we are looking at simultaneous effects as well as the effects up to three
years before and after the sector opening.
Figure 1.2 shows firm TFP that is regressed on lagged (1, 2 and 3 year lag), simultaneous
and forwarded (1, 2 and three year forward) FM values. One can see that the forwarded
values are always insignificantly different from zero. This is reassuring for us, as we
do not want the future sector openings to affect current firm outcomes (for instance
due to anticipation). The Free Movement variable gains significance during the year of
the opening but is only borderline significant. The effect becomes stronger and more
significant after one year and then remains at this lower level during the following two
years.
Figure A.2 in the appendix shows other firm outcomes that are regressed on lagged (1, 2
and 3 year lag), simultaneous and forwarded (1, 2 and three year forward) FM values.
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Figure 1.2: Annual Treatment Effects of Free Movement on Firm TFP
Notes: Dependent variable - firm TFP, estimated with Levinsohn-Petrin procedure. The displayed coefficients correspond
to the number of years before and after the largest increase in the Free Movement variable for a given industry. Year,
industry, and country-fixed effects are included. Errors are clustered at the country-industry level.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper uses firm- and industry-level panel data to evaluate the effect of skilled em-
igration on firm productivity. To overcome the endogeneity problem, we exploit the
natural experiment of the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007. We argue that the gradual
and industry-specific opening of the EU and EFTA labour markets to citizens from new
member states throughout 2004-2014 has created exogenous variation in the emigration
rates experienced by NMS. We show that an emigration-driven reduction in labour sup-
ply resulted in lower total factor productivity for firms in NMS. We also document an
increase in personnel costs and training expenditures. This confirms the predictions of
our model. Furthermore, we find that innovating and foreign-owned firms increased their
personnel costs by more and experienced smaller drops in productivity. These firms have
been more successful in circumventing the loss in TFP.
Our results are important both for firms and for policy-makers. Being aware of the
problem helps firms to react timely and in an adequate way. Firms can benefit from active
human resource strategies, focusing, for instance, on providing training and retention
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measures. For policy makers, the effects of migration ‘are not a matter of fate, [but] to
a large extent, they depend on the public policies adopted in the receiving and sending
countries’10. The prevalence of skill shortages, for instance, justifies the need to invest in
the skills of their local labour force and to mitigate search frictions. A skill upgrading of
the local labour force can in the short term be addressed by providing specific training
courses by public institutions and in the long term by adjusting the education system
to labour market needs. Knowing that those skilled people are needed can justify the
investment. An increase in local human capital might also happen in the long term due
to increased incentives to invest in education, which rise with the prospect to emigrate
(Beine et al. (2001)).
While the outflow of skilled workers leads to deteriorating firm performance in the short
term, emigration can also create opportunities and countries can experience brain gain
if they put the right policies in place. One possibility for brain gain is return migration.
If companies and politicians in the new EU member states succeed in bringing back
their skilled workers after some time abroad, then firms could benefit from even more
experienced workers. These workers can create knowledge spillovers and bring their firms
closer to the technological frontier. Another opportunity is to attract workers from other
EU member states. An efficient labour agency, and especially harmonised EU-wide labour
agencies, could inform workers within the EU of all EU-wide job vacancies. This might
encourage unemployed workers in other EU states to search for a job in countries and
industries that experience shortages. By attracting workers from other EU countries and
incentivising return migration, firms in new member states could also reap the benefits
of labour migration in an enlarged Europe.
This paper does not take General Equilibrium effects or aggregate effects at the European
level into consideration. It might well be that while emigration reduces firm productivity
in the source country, the better allocation of workers and jobs increases efficiency and
welfare at the European level. We leave these questions for further research.
10Docquier and Rapoport (2012).
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Knowledge Remittances:
Does Emigration Foster Innovation?∗
2.1 Introduction
Remittances, the money international migrant workers are sending back from the coun-
try of employment to their home country, represent an important source of income for
developing countries and hence constitute a direct benefit of emigration.1 Furthermore,
apart from financial contributions, skilled migrants can “send” back the knowledge they
have acquired while working in other countries. This remittance of knowledge has the
potential to increase innovation in the origin countries and bring them closer to the tech-
nology frontier, thus mitigating the negative effects of the loss of human capital due to
emigration.
The number of highly educated foreigners in the OECD area now exceeds 31 million,
accounting for 45 percent of the increase in the foreign born population over the last
decade (OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries, 2016). The number of
skilled migrants has especially increased within Europe since many members of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) have introduced
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Thomas Fackler und Nadzeya Laurentsyeva.
1Russell (1986).
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free movement for citizens of the partner countries. Given the strong increase in labour
mobility and raising concerns in countries experiencing net outflows of skilled people, it is
important to understand the consequences of migration. Should firms and policy-makers
think and act in the context of a “global war for talent” or can the international mobility
of skilled individuals make everyone better off, in particular, by stimulating cross-border
knowledge flows?
In this project, we establish a causal link between labour mobility, knowledge flows, and
innovation activities. By exploiting changes in the European labour mobility legislation
as a quasi-experimental setting, we evaluate the effect of skilled emigration on innovation.
We find that the emigration of skilled individuals increases patenting in source countries
and argue that knowledge remittances can explain this positive effect. Using data on
patent citations and migration flows from 32 European countries, we find that emigration
increases cross-border knowledge flows. Industries that are exposed to a higher mobility of
their workers start to cite patents from the emigrants’ destinations more frequently than
before. The international mobility of skilled workers seems to enlarge R&D networks and
promote the transfer of tacit knowledge. In this way, migration enables a faster diffusion
of knowledge from more to less technologically advanced countries and helps the latter
to catch up.
We embed these results within the following conceptual framework. We assume a know-
ledge production function, where innovation (measured by the number of patents) is
produced with the inputs of capital and labour and a certain production technology.
Emigration leads to a reduction in labour and thus has a direct negative effect on in-
novation production. However, there might also be an indirect effect, which has often
been overlooked in this discussion. International migration can increase the flow of ideas
and knowledge across borders. Migrants might share knowledge about new technolo-
gies, processes, and products with their former colleagues and friends at home. This
increases the stock of knowledge in the source countries and, through the recombination
of ideas, positively affects innovation. The production technology thus improves and
patent production can grow even if the available skilled labour is reduced. Our con-
ceptual considerations thus suggest that migration has a negative direct and a positive
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indirect effect on patenting levels in source countries. Although we cannot disentangle
these effects with our data, we provide empirical evidence on the total effect.
The main challenge in the empirical analysis is the endogeneity of migration flows. This
could be due to reverse causality or omitted variables. To establish causality, we construct
an instrumental variable (IV) for migration, using changes in labour mobility laws within
Europe. These laws are adopted and enforced by the destination countries and hence can
be treated as exogenous to economic conditions in migrants’ source countries.
The aim of our estimations are twofold. Combining several data sources, we do not only
establish a link between emigration and innovation in the source country, but also shed
light on the effect on knowledge remittances, potentially driving innovation. We start
by analysing the effects of international labour mobility on total patenting activity in
source countries. The IV estimate suggests that a one percent increase in the number
of emigrants increases patent applications by 0.64 percent in the following two years.
This result is statistically significant at the one percent level and robust to controls, fixed
effects, and varying lags. The effect is quantitatively more pronounced when we consider
only the flows of migrants with patenting potential.
We complement the analysis of innovation activity by looking at the convergence in
patenting between migrants’ origin and destination industries. We limit the sample
to pairs where the destination is more technologically advanced than the origin and
analyse whether the difference in patenting levels changes with migration flows. This is
a highly policy-relevant question, especially in the context of the European Union: Some
countries may block the initiatives aimed at enhancing within-EU labour mobility by
arguing that the outflow of skilled people will further augment the asymmetries between
richer and poorer member states. Contrary to this argument, though, our results show
that patenting differences between origins and destinations decrease in the number of
emigrants. Hence, emigration can promote convergence to the innovation level of more
advanced economies.
To establish the channel for the positive impact of emigration on innovation, we link
emigration to reverse knowledge flows, that is the transfer of knowledge from migrants’
destinations back to their origins. While skilled emigrants do not patent in their home
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country anymore, they can stimulate knowledge and technology diffusion, thus improving
the production technology in the origin country. Common to the innovation literature,
we use cross-border patent citations as a proxy for knowledge flows. The regression
analysis relates the number of citations to a particular destination country with the
number of migrants that currently work there. We find evidence that knowledge flows
from destination to origin indeed increase with migration: the 2SLS regressions yield an
elasticity of knowledge flows to emigration equal to 0.59.
Our project relates to two broad strands of the literature. The first one investigates the
effects of labour mobility on innovation. Several papers have established a positive effect
of migration on patenting in destination countries. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) use random
visa allocations to find causal effects for the US. Bosetti et al. (2015), Parrotta et al.
(2014), Ozgen et al. (2014) and Niebuhr (2010) focus on European countries and establish
cultural diversity as one of the main channels to generate new ideas and innovation. The
effect of migration on source countries received less attention. Kerr (2008) and Choudhury
(2015) find that source countries benefit from knowledge flows and return migration
and consequently increase patenting and innovation. Kaiser et al. (2015) provide firm-
level evidence by looking at worker mobility within Denmark. They find that hiring
new knowledge workers increases a firm’s patenting activity. Interestingly, the former
employers of these workers also increase patenting, which can be explained by reverse
knowledge flows. Braunerhjelm et al. (2015) conduct a similar analysis with a matched
employer-employee dataset from Sweden and also show that both the receiving and the
sending firms benefit from the mobility of knowledge workers. The effects are stronger
for interregional mobility. We contribute to this literature by providing causal evidence
that emigration leads to an increase in patenting. We thereby confirm what Kerr (2008)
and Choudhury (2015) showed for China and India in a very different context and using
another methodology. As we have comparable patenting data for source and destination
countries, we can extend this result and show that emigration leads to a catch-up process.
The second strand of the literature analyses the determinants of knowledge flows. Starting
with the seminal contribution by Jaffe et al. (1993), these studies have established that
knowledge is localised beyond the effects of agglomeration. Later studies focused on
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international knowledge spillovers (Hu and Jaffe, 2003; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999),
showing that knowledge takes time to cross country borders. Thompson and Fox-Kean
(2005) challenge the approach by Jaffe et al. (1993) and point out that intra-national
localization effects are not robust to a finer technology classification. However, even with
their more conservative estimations, the international localization remains significant.
Singh and Marx (2013) investigate whether advances in communication technologies and
lower costs of travelling reduce the localisation of knowledge over time. While they find
evidence for a reduction in the significance of state borders in the US, their results show
that the effect of international borders has even strengthened over time. Few studies
so far analysed the impact of international migration on cross-border knowledge flows.2
Kerr (2008), for instance, studies the role of skilled immigrants in the U.S. and finds
that immigrants form ethnic scientific networks that enhance the technology transfer to
source countries.
We extend this literature on knowledge flows to the European context using an identi-
fication strategy that allows for a causal interpretation. We build a unique dataset by
merging comparable migration data for 32 European countries with European patent
data and find evidence for knowledge flows. Due to our unique European enlargement
setting, we are able to estimate causal effects of labour mobility independently of other
integration events by exploiting different opening times for trade, FDI and migration. We
find that the positive effect of mobility on knowledge remittances is particularly high for
migrants with patenting potential and is robust to a variety of specifications and samples.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section describes a conceptual framework
to guide our empirical analysis. Section 3 outlines the data, followed by Section 4 that
presents the empirical specification and describes the instrument. Section 5 discusses the
results. Section 6 suggests knowledge flows as the channel. Section 7 provides robustness
checks and Section 8 concludes.
2Prior literature on the international knowledge flows has focused on trade, foreign direct investment
and R&D accessibility (MacGarvie, 2005, 2006; Peri, 2005).
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2.2 Conceptual Considerations
This paper analyses the effects of emigration on innovation in source countries. As there
are two opposing effects, our storyline becomes clearer if we support it with some con-
ceptual considerations. The considerations are based on a classical knowledge production
function as introduced by Griliches (1979) and further developed by Jaffe (1986) and Jaffe
(1989). We augment the knowledge production function with emigration. The concept
illustrates two opposing effects: a reduction in knowledge production due to a decreasing
skilled labour force vs. an increase due to a better production technology induced by
knowledge flows and technological spillovers.
We assume a simplified knowledge production function of the form
Y = Af(K,Ls). (2.1)
K is a measure of relevant capital available for research and development such as laborato-
ries and equipment. Ls stands for skilled labour and A measures total factor productivity
(efficiency of knowledge production). In our case A describes how well labour and cap-
ital can be combined to produce the knowledge output Y and captures factors that are
not explicitly modelled, such as the knowledge stock on which researchers can build. To
measure the output Y , we refer to patents, as is common to the literature.
The direct effect of emigration, in this setting, is a reduction in Ls. Due to the outmigra-
tion of skilled people, less workers are available for the production of innovation in the
source country. The innovation output Y should thus decrease.
However, there is a second indirect effect of emigration that works through the total
factor productivity A. After emigration, workers send back knowledge to their home
countries. For instance they may transmit technological information and ideas back to
their previous employer through communication with former colleagues. This employer
becomes better at producing innovation, which is reflected in an increasing A.
Theoretically, it is unclear whether the negative direct or the positive indirect effect
prevails. This depends on several other characteristics such as the industry, the technol-
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ogy, and the innovation process. Consequently, it is even more important to gain this
knowledge from a rigorous empirical assessment of the question. Using patent data as a
measure of innovation output Y and controlling for various other factors corresponding
to K and components of A that are unrelated to the stock of knowledge, our empirical
specification is able to identify this net effect.
2.3 Data Description
We create a unique dataset by merging comparable migration data for 32 European
countries with European patent data. The dataset has four dimensions: origin region3,
destination country, industry (two-digit, NACE Rev. 2), and year. The dependent
variables of interest are the number of patent applications (by origin-industry-year) as
a proxy for innovation and the number of cross-border citations (by origin-destination-
industry-year) as a proxy for knowledge flows. The main explanatory variable is the
annual number of emigrants from a given origin currently employed in a given destination
industry.
The ideal migration dataset would contain precise data on migration flows, disaggregated
by origin and destination (countries and employing industries), skill level, and occupation.
In the absence of such a dataset, we use the second-best data from Eurostat Labour
Force Surveys (2000 - 2014). These are harmonised surveys, which take place annually
in all EU countries, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland and cover around 5% of national
populations. The surveys provide demographic information on individuals, including
their current country of residence, region of origin (EU15+4, NMS10, NMS2 or Other),
3Here and in the following text “region” refers to the region to which Eurostat’s LFS data aggregate
migrants’ origin countries: EU15+4 (EU15 and EFTA), NMS10 (new member states in 2004), NMS3
(Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia) and all other countries. The fact that the EU3 region consists of
Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU in 2007, and Croatia, which followed only in 2013, adds
further imprecision, as we cannot tell from the data how many emigrants from this region came from
Bulgaria and Romania and were able to take advantage of the EU’s right to free movement already.)
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education level, occupation, and currently employing industry.4 We thus obtain the stock
of migrants by year, region of origin, destination country, and destination industry. In
addition, we can use the information by education level (university degree, vocational
degree, or below) and by occupation (two-digit, ISCO) to identify the stock of migrants
with patenting potential.5 The available dataset has several limitations. We can only
observe the region of migrants’ origin instead of the country. This means that we cannot
differentiate between different 2004 accession countries but have to treat them as one
region (NMS10). Similarly we have to treat Romania and Bulgaria as one region (NMS2).
Furthermore, as we do not observe the origin industry of a migrant, we assume that it is
the same as the current industry at the destination. Besides, we cannot identify flows of
return migrants. These limitations result in high observational noise and might bias our
estimations towards zero.
To construct the instrument for migration flows we use changes in the European labour
mobility legislation. We obtain the relevant information from the Labour Reforms
database, prepared by the European Commission, which we complement with informa-
tion from national legislations of the destination countries. Our baseline dataset covers
the years from 2000 to 2012, this period encompassed several changes to European labour
mobility as described in more detail in Subsection 2.4.2.
The data on innovative activity and knowledge flows come from the EPO’s Worldwide
Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT, 2014 Autumn Edition).6 We are able to assign
patents to industries (two-digit NACE Rev. 2) via the International Patent Classification
4EU15+4 include 15 pre-2004 EU member countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom)
+ 4 EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland). NMS10 include countries that joined
the EU in 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta,
and Cyprus) and NMS2 include countries that joined the EU in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania).
5We assign a dummy called patenting potential to migrants working in occupations "Managers" and
"Professionals" (ISCO codes: 11, 13, 21, 22, 23, 25, 31, 32, 35).
6Patents and patent citations are imperfect measures for innovation and knowledge flows and have
been criticised for example by Duguet and MacGarvie (2005). Yet, these are the best proxies, which are
available over long periods of time and comparable across the countries we study.
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(IPC) of patents.7. We then aggregate patent applications by country, industry, and
year and patent citations by patenting country, cited country, industry, and year. In
our dataset, patenting country corresponds to the origin country of migrants, while cited
country corresponds to their current destination. To assign patents to countries, we use
the PATSTAT information about the location of patent inventors and applicants, which
are usually the organisations employing the inventors. Since a patent can have several
inventors, it may be assigned to multiple countries if it is the result of an international
collaboration. In these cases, we assign a share of the patent to each country that is pro-
portional to the share of co-inventors from that country. The causes and consequences of
such collaborations have been studied by Kerr and Kerr (2015). Through this assignment
of patents to the inventors’ countries it is possible to link a patent with the location of
all the patents that cite it.
Figure 2.1 motivates the subsequent econometric analysis: cross-border patent citations
(a proxy for knowledge flows) significantly increase following the introduction of free
labour mobility between a pair of countries. This figure mirrors the response of migra-
tion flows to changes in labour mobility regulation within Europe (Figure B.1 in the
Appendix).
We complement the dataset with several important control variables: bilateral industry-
specific FDI flows (provided by Eurostat), GDP and bilateral trade flows (from CEPII).
By combining these different data sources, we can draw conclusions about the effects of in-
ternational migration on patenting in the origin countries and establish reverse knowledge
flows as the channel, while controlling for possible fixed and time-varying confounders.
7In order to assign four-digit IPC classes to industries, we use the concordance table provided by
Eurostat in Appendix 1 of the publication "Patent Statistics: Concordance IPC V8 - NACE REV.2",
published in October 2014 and last accessed on 21 November 2016.
https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/a/d1475596-1568-408a-9191-426629047e31/2014-10-16-Final%
20IPC_NACE2_2014.pdf
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Figure 2.1: Cross-Border Patent Citations, Annual Treatment Effects of Free Labour
Mobility
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Notes: Annual treatment effects on cross-border citations in patent applications around the introduction of free movement
(1965-2014). The regression includes year and country-pair fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the citing country
level.
Source: PATSTAT, European Commission, own calculations.
2.4 Econometric Specification
In our empirical analysis we first provide causal evidence for the effect of emigration
on patenting in origin countries. Second, we link this effect to the increase in knowledge
flows. We obtain the elasticities of patenting and cross-border citations to migration using
OLS and 2SLS approaches. In the latter, the variation in migration flows is generated
only by the exogenous changes in labour mobility laws over 2000-2012. Our baseline
regressions include the sample of all patenting European countries. Besides, we provide
separate estimates for a sub-sample of Eastern European countries, which were affected
the most by the changes in labour mobility over the analysed period.
2.4.1 Baseline Regressions
Patenting in Origin Countries
We start by analysing the effects of emigration on total patenting in the origin countries.
For this, we aggregate the data at the origin, industry, and year level. Because we do
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not have detailed country-of-origin data, we use the region of migrants’ origin: EU15+4,
NMS10 and NMS2. The dependent variable is the number of patent application in a
specific origin, industry, and year. The explanatory variable is the number of emigrants
from a specific region that work in the same industry but in other European countries.
We estimate the following fixed-effects regression:
Yoiy = β1Moiy−l + β2Xoiy + φy + φoi + oiy (2.2)
where o denotes the region of origin, i the two-digit industry, and y the year. Yoiy is
the log number of patent applications in a given region and industry. Moiy−l is the log
number of emigrants from an origin region, currently working in a given industry.8 l
stands for the lag between migration and patenting. The coefficient β1 captures the
elasticity of patenting to migration. Xoiy contains time-varying controls: a dummy for
EU membership, trade inflows, and FDI inflows. φy and φoi denote time and origin-
industry fixed effects. oiy is the error term. The identifying variation thus comes from
the within origin-industry changes in the number of emigrants and patent applications.
To account for a possible endogeneity bias, we complement the OLS estimations with the
2SLS results, where we instrument migration with changes in labour mobility legislation.
We describe the instrument in more detail in Section 2.4.2 below.
Patenting Asymmetries between More and Less Advanced Countries
We go one step further and analyse whether migration increases or, on the contrary,
lowers patenting asymmetries between more and less advanced economies. On the one
hand, agglomeration effects and the resources available for research could lead to richer
destinations specializing even more on their comparative advantage, thus hindering con-
vergence. If we assume that skilled migrants move from less innovative to more innovative
places, labour mobility can increase patenting asymmetries despite some positive effects
on the origin. On the other hand, through the migrants working abroad, industries at
origins can get access to the frontier knowledge from more advanced economies. This can
8Here and in all other specifications, before taking logs we add 1 to each observation. This transfor-
mation ensures that we do not lose observations with zero values.
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increase innovation efficiency in origin industries and can allow a faster catch-up process
with the technology leaders. Hence, patenting asymmetries between destinations and
origins of migrants might decrease. We empirically evaluate the effect of migration on
patenting asymmetries with the following regression:
log(Pdiy
Poiy
) = β1Modiy−l + β2X1oy + β3X2dy + β4X3odiy + φy + φodi + odiy (2.3)
The level of observation is origin-destination (od) pair, industry (i), and year (y). The
dependent variable log(Pdiy
Poiy
) is the log difference in patent applications between the
destination and origin industries. The main explanatory variable is Modiy−l - the log
number of migrants from origin o working in industry i in destination d. l stands for
the lag between migration flows and patenting. The coefficient β1 shows whether the
patenting asymmetries increase or decrease in migration. In this specification we can
also control for time-varying origin- and destination-specific effects (X1oy, X2dy, X3odiy):
the total number of patents at origin, the total number of patents at destination, the
total number of patents in a given industry, a within EU dummy (equals one when
both origin and destination are EU members), the ratio of GDP per capita between
destination and origin, bilateral industry-level FDI, and trade flows. φy and φodi denote
time and origin-destination-industry fixed effects. doiy is the error term. The coefficient
β1 is thus identified solely through the variation in the number of emigrants within
an origin-destination-industry. General changes in patenting at origin and destination
cannot confound the results. As with specification 2.2, we estimate OLS and 2SLS
regressions.
Knowledge Flows
Further, we investigate one potential channel behind the effect of migration on innovation:
knowledge flows. One speaks of knowledge flows whenever a researcher or an inventor
builds on the work done by others to create ideas or to solve a specific technological
problem. A common way to track knowledge flows is to use citations data (Jaffe et al.,
1993). This approach assumes that a citation to a particular patent or a publication
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reflects the usefulness of the knowledge contained therein for further work. To determine
the effect of migration on knowledge flows we estimate the following empirical model:
Yodiy = β1Modiy−l + β2X1oiy + β3X2diy−l + β4X3odiy + φy + φodi + odiy (2.4)
As in specification 2.3, the level of observation is origin-destination (od) pair, industry
(i), and year (y). The outcome of interest Yodiy represents the log number of cross-border
citations. Modiy−l is the log number of migrants from origin o working in industry i at
destination d. l stands for the lag between migration flows and patenting. We focus on
reverse knowledge flows, i.e. knowledge flowing from destination to origin countries of
migrants. Hence, Yodiy represents citations to patents from destination countries by new
patents at origin.9 For example, YPL/BEiy counts citations by Polish patents in industry
i, filed in year y, to existing Belgian patents. It proxies the knowledge flows from Belgium
to Poland. MPL/BEiy−l represents the number of Polish migrants in Belgium, currently
working in industry i. The coefficient β1 captures the elasticity of citations to migration.
In our example, it shows the percent change in the number of citations from Poland to
Belgium if the number of emigrants from Poland to Belgium increased by 1 percent.
To avoid mechanic effects from the general increase in patenting at origin or destination
industries, we control for the number of patent applications in the origin industry (X1oiy)
and for the lagged number of patent applications in a destination industry X2diy−l. X3odiy
denote other controls: a within EU dummy (equals one when both origin and destination
countries are EU members), the total number of patents in a given industry, the bilateral
FDI, and trade flows. φy and φodi denote time and origin-destination-industry fixed
effects. doiy is the error term. We again run both OLS and 2SLS regressions.
2.4.2 Instrument for Migration Flows
Even though we control for many observable factors and have a number of fixed effects in
the baseline OLS regressions, an endogeneity problem might still arise. Estimates could
be biased, for instance, if reduced patenting at the origin forces inventors to leave. To
9We consider citations in patent publications and date patents with their application filing date.
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avoid this problem, we use changes in the labour mobility laws in Europe as a source of
exogenous variation for migration flows.
The freedom of movement for workers is a policy chapter of the acquis communautaire
of the European Union and represents one of the four economic freedoms: free move-
ment of goods, services, labour and capital. According to the Article 45 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the EU, “freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.” In practice,
it means that there are no restrictions (such as quotas on foreign workers) or additional
bureaucratic procedures (such as obtaining a work permit or a permission from the local
authorities) related to the employment of foreign citizens. This right primarily concerns
the citizens of the EU and EEA member states who, starting from 1958, have gradually
introduced free labour mobility towards their partner countries.10
In our project, we exploit two episodes of changes in the free labour mobility in Europe.
First, in 2004 all EEA countries introduced free movement for the citizens of Switzerland.
Switzerland responded with a symmetric measure in 2007.11 Second, a special scheme
has been in force following the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007. For up to seven years
after the accession, old EU members could restrict the access to their labour markets
for citizens of new member states. While some countries kept the restrictions for the
whole period, some provided easier labour market access only in certain industries, and
some opened up their entire labour markets directly upon the accession. When imposing
restrictions the countries had to apply them to the whole group of NMS from the same
entry year. Therefore, they could not target labour mobility laws at the citizens of
some particular states. Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland applied the
transitional provisions towards the accession countries in the same way. These labour
mobility laws created variation in the migration flows between European countries on the
country, industry, and year level. Table B.1 in the Appendix provides an overview of the
10Norway and Iceland exert this right since 1994. Liechtenstein exerts this right since 1995, but
imposes a permanent quota for all EEA citizens.
11However, as a result of the "Against mass immigration" initiative, Switzerland is scheduled to impose
permanent quotas on residence/work permits for citizens of all EEA countries except Liechtenstein,
starting from 2017.
55
Knowledge Remittances
precise opening dates of countries and industries. Importantly for the identification, these
changes to labour mobility did not coincide with other integration events (free movement
of capital and goods).
Figure 2.2 shows the spikes in migration from NMS during the initial opening in 2004,
when countries such as the UK, Sweden, and Ireland opened their labour markets and
in 2011 when all transitional provisions for the 2004 accession countries where abolished
and Germany, for instance, fully opened its labour market.
Figure 2.2: High-skilled Migration in Europe
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Notes: The graph shows the share of high-skill migrants (born in other European countries) in the EU15 population.
Source: Eurostat.
We can thus instrument real migration with exogenous labour mobility legislation. The
first-stage regression takes the following form:
Modiy = γ1FModiy−1 + γ2FModiy−2 + γ3FModiy−3 + γ4Xodiy + νy + νodi + uodiy (2.5)
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FModiy−l is an indicator variable, which is equal to one if a specific industry i in a
destination country d is open for labour migrants from a country o in a given year y. We
include a one, two and three year lag to allow for the delayed effect. In our sample this
indicator changes only for origin and destination pairs with either Switzerland or new
EU member states. As these migration flows might be different, we show separate results
for migration from only Eastern Europe in every case. Xodiy, νy, and νodi are the same
controls and fixed effects as used in the baseline OLS specifications. When using the
instrument for the patenting regressions (specification 2.2), we aggregate the values of
the free movement variable by origin, industry, and year.12 In this case, the FM variable
can be interpreted as the exposure of a given origin-industry (oi) to free labour mobility
of its workers.
When constructing the free movement dummies, we take into account the fact that many
old EU members did not explicitly specify which industries are open to migrants from
the NMS, but rather allowed for special job schemes in sectors that experienced labour
shortages. In case of such implicit exceptions, we set the free movement dummy equal
to 1 and multiply it by a measure of labour shortages in a given industry of an old EU
member state. As such measure, we use the share of firms (in the destination industries)
reporting to be constrained by the factor labour. These data are available from the
European Commission Business Survey. To account for possible endogeneity (arising,
for instance, when labour shortages are reported in industries that grow faster in all EU
countries), we control for the overall number of patent applications in a given two-digit
industry (aggregate over all European countries).
2.5 Results
In this Section, we first show the effects of migration on total patenting at the origin.
Second, we provide evidence that emigration can reduce patenting asymmetries between
less and more advanced economies. We show OLS as well as 2SLS results. First-stage and
12For each origin region we have 31 free movement indicators corresponding to 31 possible destinations.
We aggregate them to one measure by using proximity weights (the inverse log distances between the
two largest cities of two countries.)
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reduced form regressions are provided in the Appendix. Our baseline sample includes
all patenting European countries. In addition, we show separate estimations for the
sub-sample of Eastern European countries.
2.5.1 Migration and Patenting
This Section shows that the emigration of labour increases overall innovation, measured
by the number of patent applications per year in a region. As the migration data only
allow us to estimate the effect of emigration at the region level, we aggregate the free
movement variable by industry and region of origin: EU15+4, NMS10, and NMS2. The
aggregated FM measure approximates the number of countries to whose labour markets
an inventor in a certain industry and region of origin had access to and is normalised to
be between 0 and 1, where 1 corresponds to full access to all EU15+4 countries.
The first three columns of table 2.1 show the baseline OLS regressions and the last three
columns show 2SLS regressions, which use the labour mobility legislation as an instrument
for migration.13 Columns 1 and 4 estimate the relationship between the overall number
of emigrants and the number of patent applications from inventors in that region. These
regressions show that workers’ migration to other EU member states has a significant
and positive effect on patenting in the regions of origin. As both variables are measured
in logarithms, the coefficient can be interpreted as the elasticity: the effect in the IV
estimation in column 4 suggests that a one percent increase in the number of emigrants
in an industry causes patent applications in the region of origin to increase by 0.6 percent.
The 95% confidence interval for the elasticity is between 0.37 and 0.91. If we consider the
average number of emigrants in the year 2004 (2459 emigrants) and the average number
of patent applications 2 years later (255 applications) for new EU member states per
industry, this implies that about 1 to 2 additional applications result from 25 additional
13Note that the right to free movement was not symmetric due to a one-sided transition period, e.g.
workers of old EU member states have been able to move to new EU member states as a rule earlier than
the other way round. Thus the instrument varies also with the direction of migration and we observe
variation in emigration and patenting over time for pairs of origin region and industry. We cluster on
the origin-industry level to account for autocorrelation in the regressions in table 2.1. When we consider
asymmetries and citations, there is additional variation depending on the destination country, such that
we cluster on the origin-destination-industry level.
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Table 2.1: Patent Applications and Migration, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents cit. weighted Patents
L2.Migrants 0.0994*** 0.0949** 0.637*** 0.903***
(0.0259) (0.0420) (0.139) (0.199)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.0572 1.175***
(0.0420) (0.332)
in EU -0.262*** -0.298*** -0.296*** -0.112 -0.0729 -0.406**
(0.0903) (0.0752) (0.0844) (0.157) (0.205) (0.164)
L2.Trade flow 1.634*** 2.535*** 2.124*** -0.679 -0.945 3.325***
(0.348) (0.432) (0.342) (0.607) (0.877) (0.724)
L2.FDI inflow 2.03e-05** 3.15e-05** 2.10e-05** 1.16e-05 1.84e-05 2.34e-06
(9.82e-06) (1.22e-05) (8.06e-06) (2.07e-05) (2.90e-05) (1.12e-05)
Observations 383 383 383 383 383 383
Region industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 53 53 53 53 53 53
F 6.517 11.29 7.285
Notes: The regressions in this table estimate the relationship between the migration flow out of a country and innovation
in that country. The first three columns are estimated with OLS and the last three column use a 2SLS estimation with
our instrument based on free movement legislation. The dependent variables are the number of patent applications in an
industry and origin region in a year or, in columns 2 and 5, the citation-weighted patent applications (i.e. patent applications
+ forward citations to these patents). Patent application numbers and citation-weighted counts, number of migrants and
trade flows are taken in natural logarithms (more precisely, for variable x we use log(x+ 1) to include observations where
x = 0). The sample includes all EU members and countries in the European Free Trade Association. All specifications
include year and region-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the region-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
emigrants.14 Note however, that this number only includes migrants in industries that
were matched to the patent data, i.e. in which there is patenting. Furthermore, the
number of patent applications in 2006 we have used for this calculation already includes
the additional applications, such that the number of additional patents is likely to be
lower. Despite the noise and the level of aggregation in our data the regressions are able
to reject that there is a negative effect.
The second and fifth columns of table 2.1 use citation-weighted patents as the treatment
variable, i.e. the number of patent applications plus the number of citations to these
patents in a region, industry, and year. The number of later patents building on and
therefore citing a patent is often used as a measure of quality.15 The citations for more
recent cohorts in our sample are subject to truncation, which is controlled for through
14One percent of 2459 emigrants is about 25 and 0.37% (0.91%) of 255 applications is 0.94 (2.32).
15The relationship between citations and the social value of an invention has been documented in a
case study on Computed Tomography scanners in Trajtenberg (1990). A more recent study by Moser
et al. (2016) finds a robust correlation between citations of hybrid corn patents and the improvement in
yield reported in field trial data.
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year fixed effects. As the coefficients are similar, we conclude that the quality of patenting
has not deteriorated. Thus, merely a higher propensity of inventors in origin regions to
file patents as a result of European integration does not seem to be the driver of the
effect. Of course, the number of later patents citing a patent (forward citations) is only a
rough measure of quality and may be affected by emigrants spreading information about
their home countries’ latest technologies abroad as well. Nonetheless, a higher number
of forward citations would likely be associated with a greater benefit of source countries’
innovations, since they indicate that more follow-on innovation built on them.
Columns 3 and 6 differ from the other regressions in table 2.1 in the migration variable,
which here includes only emigrants with patenting potential. Whereas the OLS regression
shows a smaller and insignificant partial correlation, the coefficient in the IV regression
is larger than the corresponding coefficient for all migrants in column 4.
The OLS estimate is likely to be downward biased due to omitted variables and reverse
causality. If there is an omitted variable bias in the OLS regressions that is negatively
correlated with emigration and positively with patenting levels, then the OLS estimate is
downward biased. This is very likely and could be driven, for instance, by management
quality. A good manager might lead to a good work and research environment. This
results both in high patenting levels and low emigration from this firm and consequently
biases the OLS estimate downward. Moreover, we might encounter reverse causality in
the OLS regressions. If higher patenting levels lead to less migration, then we observe
a negative relationship between the two variables that goes in the other direction. As a
consequence, the OLS estimator is smaller than it should be and thus downward biased.
Tables B.2 and B.3 in the Appendix provide the first stage results and the reduced form
that complement the 2SLS results analysis. One can see that the instrument is highly
relevant in the first stage and that the overall effect of the three lags for the free movement
variables sum up to a positive effect.
Table B.4 in the Appendix provides the same table with the restricted sample of NMS10
countries (2004 accession years). Due to the level of aggregation in the migration data,
the 2SLS effects are not significant. Importantly we find no evidence of a significant
negative effect, which would be expected if the loss of human capital dominated.
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2.5.2 Migration and Convergence
While the results of the previous Section suggest that emigration can positively affect
innovation at the origin, this Section investigates whether this positive effect is enough
to reduce patenting asymmetries between less and more advanced economies or whether
international migration still benefits knowledge production at destination countries more.
This analysis is relevant for policy discussions about benefits and costs of free labour
mobility in Europe. Furthermore, the results in this Section serve as a robustness check
for the effects found above. When analysing asymmetries we use all four dimensions of our
dataset: origin, destination, industry, and year, and can therefore control for unobserved
origin- and destination-specific time-varying changes, which could bias our estimates of
patenting elasticity to migration in Section 2.5.1.
To have a clear direction of migration flows from less to more advanced economies, we re-
strict the sample to the origin-destination pairs, where destinations are EU15+4 countries
and origins are new EU member states. In addition, in our baseline sample we consider
origin and destination pairs with Switzerland as a destination and other EU15+4 coun-
tries as origins. We also show the results for migration from Eastern Europe only, and
the results are consistent. For each industry and year, we construct an asymmetry mea-
sure as the log difference between the amount of patent applications at destinations and
origins.
On average, destination industries file more than three times the amount of patent appli-
cations compared to origins. As expected, the patent quality of the former is also higher.
We then regress the asymmetry measure on the number of migrants. Table 2.2 presents
OLS (columns 1-3) and 2SLS (columns 4-6) results. The OLS coefficient of migration is
slightly positive, but is not statistically significant. This may be caused by the bias due
to higher migration outflows from more problematic industries. Another reason is that
once we move to the more disaggregated level, we introduce more noise in the migration
data (more missing and zero observations). This especially concerns already disaggre-
gated migration data by skill and occupation. 2SLS estimates, however, suggest that
emigration allows origin industries to catch up to the patenting level of destinations: a
one percent increase in the number of migrants reduces patenting asymmetries by 0.30
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percent (column 4 and 5 in 2.2). The coefficient for migrants with patenting potential
is much larger in magnitude, but is imprecisely estimated (see column 6). Overall, the
regressions’ results fit the framework of a patent production function with decreasing
returns to skilled labour: a marginal increase in patent production at destination (due
to the immigration of skilled labour) is smaller than the marginal increase in patenting
at origins (due to the increase in patenting efficiency).
Table B.6 in the Appendix presents the results from the same specifications but estimated
on a restricted sample with new EU member states as origins and EU15+4 as destinations
(thus excluding emigration from EU15+4 to Switzerland). The obtained coefficients are
slightly smaller in magnitude, but still significant. Table B.7 in the Appendix shows
the reduced form results, where instead of migration figures we use the bilateral free
movement dummies. One of the drawbacks of our migration data is the large amount
of missing observations, which could be either due to the effective absence of migrants
or to misreporting.16 This raises external validity issues to our estimations in terms of a
generalisation to all European countries. Therefore, the most interesting results of Table
B.7 are in columns 5 and 6 where we present the coefficients from the regressions over
the whole sample of origin and destination pairs. The number of observations increases
multiple times, yet the coefficients for the free movement dummies are very close to
the estimates from the baseline sample. Moreover, most coefficients are more precisely
estimated due to improved power: we note that EU membership, higher bilateral trade
flows and FDI also help the convergence.
While interpreting the regression coefficients, we implicitly assume that migrants stay
within the same industry. This is reasonable, as for skilled migrants the losses associ-
ated with changing the industry are substantial. Hence, they are more likely to seek
employment in the same sector in the destination countries. If the assumption would not
hold for some industries, how would this affect our estimations?17 Suppose there are two
industries: L and M in Poland and Belgium. The Polish migrants from industry L move
16For example, due to missing migration data we have to drop all observations with Germany as a
destination country.
17There are pairs of NACE industries, between which inventors may indeed be likely to move, for
example between “26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products” and “27 Manufacture
of electrical equipment”.
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Table 2.2: Convergence in Patenting Levels and Migration, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
log(
Pdiy
Poiy
) log(
Pdiy
Poiy
) log(
Pdiy
Poiy
) log(
Pdiy
Poiy
) log(
Pdiy
Poiy
) log(
Pdiy
Poiy
)
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents cit. weighted Patents
L2.Migrants 0.0319 0.0376 -0.305** -0.334**
(0.0223) (0.0276) (0.146) (0.158)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.117** -1.831
(0.0575) (2.212)
Patents, origin -1.220*** -1.391*** -1.206*** -1.207*** -1.376*** -1.419***
(0.0762) (0.0817) (0.0753) (0.0883) (0.0946) (0.281)
Patents, dest 1.066*** 1.105*** 1.069*** 1.058*** 1.096*** 1.021***
(0.0713) (0.0908) (0.0717) (0.0777) (0.0978) (0.0894)
Within EU 0.00806 -0.0884* 0.0109 0.0194 -0.0759 -0.0180
(0.0483) (0.0531) (0.0487) (0.0520) (0.0572) (0.0635)
GDPd/GDPo -0.173 0.400 -0.197 -0.188 0.384 0.173
(0.316) (0.367) (0.319) (0.338) (0.394) (0.530)
L3.Trade flow -0.0791 -0.0236 -0.0718 -0.0281 0.0326 -0.113
(0.0629) (0.0799) (0.0622) (0.0679) (0.0867) (0.0827)
L3.FDI flow 0.000575 -0.000443 0.000380 -0.000116 -0.00120 0.00254
(0.00668) (0.00668) (0.00671) (0.00783) (0.00786) (0.00926)
Observations 2,946 2,946 2,946 2,864 2,864 2,864
R-squared 0.486 0.551 0.486 0.424 0.500 0.325
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 582 582 582 500 500 500
F 83.92 122.8 76.50
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Patentsdest/Patentsorigin. Number of migrants, number of
patents (in origin and destination countries), GDP ratio between destination and origin, FDI, and trade flows are in natural
logarithms. The sample includes all EU and EFTA members. All specifications include year and origin-destination-industry
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
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to Belgium to work in industry M . Empirically, we observe MBE/PL/M/y to increase.
The inflow of the skilled Polish workers in the Belgian industry M raises its innovation
activities (or in the worst case, does not affect them). The performance of the Polish
industry M is likely to remain unchanged. The asymmetry measure log(PBE/M/y
PPL/M/y
) either
increases or at most stays the same, which goes in the opposite direction of the reported
effect. We thus might underestimate the magnitude of the effect.
2.6 The Channel: Knowledge Flows
Having established that emigration leads to an increase in patenting, we want to analyse
one potential channel in more detail: knowledge flows. This Section shows that migrants
stimulate knowledge flows from their new destinations to their countries of origin.
Table 2.3 presents the baseline OLS and 2SLS results. The dependent variable is the log
count of citations by patents in the origin to the destination country. This dependent
variable proxies the knowledge flows due to emigration. In the baseline estimations, we
allow for two-year lags between the time of migration and the citations in the patent
applications. The results are similar for a one-year lag but slightly weaker. Importantly,
given the structure of the dataset, we can account for origin-industry and destination-
industry shocks. A possible threat to identifying the coefficient of interest would arise if
destination industries, which experienced a positive patenting shock, started to attract
more workers from other countries. A higher supply of patents from this destination would
also mechanically increase the amount of citations to this country. We can control for such
an effect by including the number of patent applications in the destination industry (with
a three year lag).18 In a similar way, we control for the number of patent applications in
the source country. The migration effect is identified from the within origin-destination
variation in the migration stocks and the count of cross-border citations. Since both
dependent and explanatory variables are in natural logs, the coefficient represents the
elasticity of cross-border citations to the number of migrants.
18As a rule of thumb, it takes about three years for a patent to be granted.
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Table 2.3: Citations to Destination Industries, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
L2.Migrants 0.0334* 0.0269 0.799*** 0.588***
(0.0170) (0.0167) (0.213) (0.225)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.0638* 2.916
(0.0348) (2.302)
Patents, origin 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.174*** 0.192***
(0.0237) (0.0238) (0.0268) (0.0310)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0435*** 0.0431*** 0.0427*** 0.0219
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0158) (0.0236)
Within EU -0.0501 -0.0471 -0.0698* 0.0468
(0.0378) (0.0379) (0.0416) (0.0845)
L3.Trade flow 0.00665 0.0119 -0.104* 0.00902
(0.0392) (0.0390) (0.0617) (0.0440)
L3.FDI flow 0.00780 0.00711 0.0126** -0.0134
(0.00493) (0.00495) (0.00570) (0.0203)
Observations 7,299 7,287 7,287 7,136 7,124 7,124
R-squared 0.080 0.095 0.095
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 1322 1320 1320 1159 1157 1157
F 20.29 22.20 14.98
Notes: The dependent variable is number of citations from a region and industry to another country per year. Citation
counts, number of migrants, total number of patent application in origin and destination industries, FDI and trade flows
are taken in natural logarithms. The sample includes all EU and EFTA members. All specifications include year and
origin-destination-industry level fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
In the first column, we regress the citations on the overall number of migrantsModiy, year,
and origin-destination-industry fixed effects; in column 2 we add additional time-varying
controls; in column 3 we use the number of migrants with patenting potential as the main
independent variable. OLS results suggest a positive association between migration and
cross-border citations. The estimated coefficient for migrants with patenting potential is
robust to all controls and is twice as large compared to the overall migration stock.
Columns 4 to 6 of table 2.3 show the 2SLS results that yield quantitatively larger elas-
ticities than the OLS. A one percent increase in emigrants induces a 0.59 percent growth
in cross-border citations to their origins. Table B.8 in the Appendix summarises the
results for the sub-sample where new EU member states are origins and EU15+4 are
destinations. Despite the reduction in the sample size, the main 2SLS coefficients remain
positive and significant. The reduced form regressions (Table B.9 in the Appendix) are
also consistent. When we estimate the reduced form for the whole sample of origins and
destinations, the free movement coefficients gain significance and quantitatively remain
almost identical to those from the baseline sample. This indicates that some of the in-
65
Knowledge Remittances
significant results in the baseline regressions (as, for example, the imprecise coefficient
for migrants with patenting potential) are mainly due to power problems with noisy
migration data.
Previous research has emphasised the role of communication between moving researchers
and their former colleagues at the previous employers (e.g. Braunerhjelm et al., 2015;
Kaiser et al., 2015). To test whether the channel they have found for inventors moving
between firms within a country is also the primary channel of international knowledge
flows in our setting, we exclude the inventor’s network. To do this, we exclude citations
between inventors and all employers (applicants) and other inventors they are listed
with on a patent application at any point in time. Table 2.4 reports the results for
the restricted sample. While the coefficients change slightly, they remain positive and
significant. Thus only a small part of the effect seems to be driven by the inventors’ close
network. Knowledge flows that this method could not capture include, for example, if a
student at an Eastern European university moves on to work in Western Europe, filing
patents for the first time and citing her professors’ research. However, the sizable effect
that remains suggests that wider spillovers play an important role.
Citations are not always added by the inventor himself but can also be added by the
examiner. One worry might thus be that examiners become more aware of research
done in other European countries and that they consequently are more likely to add
citations from these countries. Alternatively, the effect might be driven by the fact that
more patents are filed at the European Patent Office, where examiners may be more
likely to add references to foreign patents than at the national offices.19 This concern is
addressed by Table B.11, which shows the results only with citations that were added by
the applicant (rather than the examiner or a third party) according to PATSTAT and
we can see that there are no qualitative changes.20
19The latter concern is also addressed in table B.10, where only citations among patents filed with
the USPTO are included, such that European institutional changes should not affect the results.
20In unreported regressions, we limit citations further to only include those that are marked in PAT-
STAT as applicant-added and, additionally, where citing and cited patents are both priority patents filed
at the USPTO. The results are qualitatively similar despite the fact that only less than 1% of citations
remain.
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Table 2.4: Citations to Inventor’s Network Excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
L2.Migrants 0.0346** 0.0276* 0.797*** 0.631***
(0.0171) (0.0167) (0.197) (0.203)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.0464 3.878*
(0.0314) (2.355)
Patents, origin 0.174*** 0.175*** 0.155*** 0.177***
(0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0262) (0.0358)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0353*** 0.0350*** 0.0344** 0.00732
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0150) (0.0247)
Within EU -0.0496 -0.0471 -0.0711* 0.0787
(0.0355) (0.0356) (0.0403) (0.0867)
L3.Trade flow 0.0296 0.0350 -0.0893 0.0312
(0.0389) (0.0387) (0.0597) (0.0484)
L3.FDI flow 0.00982** 0.00925* 0.0150*** -0.0179
(0.00481) (0.00482) (0.00569) (0.0224)
Observations 7,299 7,287 7,287 7,136 7,124 7,124
R-squared 0.077 0.091 0.091
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 1322 1320 1320 1159 1157 1157
F 19.18 19.85 10.82
Notes: In this table, citations within the network of the inventor are excluded, i.e. citations from applicants and inventors
with whom the cited inventor has patented at any point in time. The dependent variable is the number of citations from a
region and industry to another country in a year. Citation counts, number of migrants, total number of patent application
in origin and destination industries, FDI and trade flows are taken in natural logarithms. The sample includes all EU and
EFTA members. All specifications include year and origin-destination-industry level. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the origin-destination-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
There are a number of ways for the knowledge flows to occur in practice. One possibility
is that emigrants increase the awareness of new knowledge or technologies. This could
happen, for example, if emigrants inform their former colleagues or if they meet at con-
ferences. Another possibility is that researchers in the source countries are aware of new
knowledge or technologies but need to learn how to use the tacit knowledge embedded
in them. A close contact among former colleagues might spur the transfer of tacit know-
ledge. Additionally return migration can increase innovation in source countries. Often,
emigrants return to their home countries after several years abroad and create start-ups
or contribute to innovation in other ways.21
21Our time frame of analysis is more likely to reflect the increasing awareness of new technologies or
the transfer of tacit knowledge.
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2.7 Robustness
To confirm the validity of the results, we conducted a number of robustness checks. We
find that the increase in patenting activities as a result of emigration is not driven by
different pre-trends or institutional changes in the European patenting system.
One way to check the validity of the results is to examine pre-trends. If our results
are valid, the coefficient of interest should be zero if we regress citation patterns on
future labour market openings. Figure 2.1 in Section 2.3 shows the annual treatment
effects for the regression of cross-border citations on the free movement variable. We
look specifically at bilateral citations during the time period 15 years before and 15 years
after free movement between two countries has been established. The data we use for
this graph are based on patent applications over the 50 year period from 1965 to 2014.
The regression includes year dummies and country-pair fixed effects to take out trends.
The figure shows that there is no significant change in cross-border citations in the years
prior to the establishment of free labour mobility.22 This is reassuring and increases the
credibility of our results. It becomes clear that the effect only starts to gain momentum
at the time of the introduction of free movement and builds up over the following years.
One might also worry that the institutional framework of registering patents has changed
in the EU, especially in the context of EU enlargement and the European Patent Con-
vention. We thus restrict the sample to patents that have been registered at the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Table B.10 in the Appendix shows the
results. While we have fewer observations, the qualitative results remain the same. The
results thus do not seem to be driven by institutional changes in Europe.
22Note that this graph uses country-level data, such that the free movement indicator only switches
to 1 once all sectors are open. Some of the (insignificant) increase before time 0 may thus be due to
the partial openings during the transition periods, which we exploit in the main part of the paper for
identification.
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2.8 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper analyses the effects of emigration on patenting levels in source countries. We
find that countries that experience emigration increase their level of patenting. We further
suggest that this has led to a catch-up process that brought origin countries closer to the
technology frontier. We also find that the international mobility of people has increased
technology and knowledge spillovers as evidenced by cross-border patent citation in the
respective countries. Specific channels that could have fostered the knowledge spillovers
are the transfer of tacit knowledge, the increased and improved network of inventors and
return migration.
One policy recommendation that directly follows from these findings is that the EU could
benefit from further facilitating migration within Europe. As there are no more legal
barriers to free labour mobility, hindering factors are mostly language and administrative
barriers. The EU could reduce these barriers by ensuring the recognition of foreign
qualifications and the promotion of language courses at all age levels. In this way, the
EU can exploit the full potential of migrants both for destination and source countries.
Another policy implication is to ease skilled migration to Europe from outside the Eu-
ropean Union. This could be achieved by easing the access to European labour markets
and the recruitment of highly qualified foreign workers. While the Blue Card has been
a step in this direction, its scope could be increased to obtain a higher impact and ad-
ministrative barriers should be reduced. For those skilled migrants that are already in
Europe, for instance skilled refugees, labour market restrictions should be lifted to ease
labour market integration. If these people can be integrated fast into qualified positions
without a loss in human capital, the innovation system would greatly benefit.
We have shown in this paper that source countries can benefit from emigration through
knowledge flowing back into the country. These benefits of knowledge flows can be
maximised by facilitating research networks with emigrated inventors, for example by
organising conferences in the origin countries. Furthermore, governments can design
programmes to actively keep the diaspora engaged and by encouraging and facilitating
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return migration. Return migrants bring back the newly gained knowledge and many
times create their own start-ups which can foster development in the countries of origin.
While this paper establishes that knowledge flows mitigate the negative consequences of
emigration, further research is needed to shed light on the precise way these knowledge
flows are created and characterised. Do migrants possess tacit knowledge that flows with
people but cannot be transferred by other means? Or do migrants enlarge the R&D
network and create better awareness of technologies in other countries? Do migrants
have a competitive advantage in negotiating licensing fees with their country of origin?
These open questions may guide further research in order to better understand how to
increase knowledge flows and maximise their benefits.
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Chapter 3
The Labour Market Integration of
Refugees in Germany:
Evidence from a Field Experiment
3.1 Introduction
The number of asylum seekers that arrived in OECD countries in 2015 is unprecedented
since World War II (OECD, 2016). In Germany, the largest refugee receiving country
in the EU in terms of absolute numbers, 890,000 refugees arrived in 2015 and a further
220,000 came between January 2016 and October 2016.1 The vast majority applied for
asylum (442,000 asylum requests in 2015, 665,000 from January until October 2016).2 In
2015, on average fifty percent of asylum requests were accepted for asylum or temporary
protection. Thus, around half of the refugees are likely to stay in Germany and are
now seeking employment.3 Their labour market integration is challenging due to at least
1Source: BAMF (2016)
2The application typically happens a few months later due to processing delays. Data on asylum
requests and outcomes are from the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees: BAMF (2015),
BAMF (2016). Many people who arrived in 2015 only applied for asylum in 2016 due to delayed
appointments. Only 60,000 refugees have left Germany voluntarily or forcefully in 2015.
3Around 300,000 asylum seekers or recognized refugees have registered as looking for work with the
Federal Employment Agency. (Source: Federal Employment Agency 2016.) We denote asylum seekers
as those refugees that have not yet finalized the asylum process.
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two overarching reasons: a potential lack of skills and frictions in the labour market.
A lack of job related skills, including language, qualifications, degrees and task specific
human capital have hindered refugees’ labour market integration. Additionally, matching
frictions, a subobtimal network, residency requirements or legal barriers may be larger
than for natives or other migrants. While both a lack of skills and frictions pose a barrier
in practice, it is essential to separately investigate the role of each, as they lead to quite
different policy implications.
In this paper, we design a randomized controlled trial to evaluate the role of matching
frictions for the employment prospects of refugees. In a first step, we conduct personal
interviews with approximately 3004 job-seeking refugees in Munich and collect data on
their job search behaviour, their job expectations and experiences, their education, skills
and social integration. We then provide all participants with a German CV and basic
job search information. In a second step, we randomly select half of the participants
and add them to the database of an NGO, which sends CVs directly to employers. Pre-
liminary results show that around 39 percent of refugees have indeed been able to find
employment. However, most of them are doing internships or have low-skilled positions.
Missing language skills and a lack of information about the application process seem to
be important factors preventing a more successful and faster labour market integration.
The labour market success of refugees depends crucially on their education and qualifica-
tion levels. In the public debate, two methods have been used to proxy the characteristics
of refugees in order to predict their labour market integration. The first approach is to
rely on previous migration inflows. This might be misleading, since both the refugees
as well as the institutional environment are likely to be different for the most recent
wave. For example, since 2014, asylum seekers are able to obtain a work permit three
months after arrival, compared with at least nine months waiting time before 2014. A
second approach commonly used is to proxy the education levels of refugees arriving in
Germany with the average education level of their country of origin. This approach does
not account for the fact that the refugees arriving in Germany are likely to be systemati-
cally different from those left behind. Additionally, representative education surveys have
4Simple power calculations have shown that we need at least a sample of 300 refugees if we want to
detect a treatment effect of 10%.
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typically been conducted before the war but current refugees have had several years of
war exposure since the last education survey. Consequently, the characteristics of recent
refugees and their labour market integration outcomes might be very different from past
experiences or simple estimations, and it is hard to predict precisely how.
First survey results by Brücker et al. (2016) of 2,349 refugees in Germany show that the
education and qualification levels vary strongly by country of origin. There is some indi-
cation that refugees from countries such as Syria, that until recently have been peaceful
and allowed for an uninterrupted education path, typically have much higher education
levels than refugees from enduring war countries such as Afghanistan, Somalia or Er-
itrea. Registration figures from BAMF (Rich, 2016) show that approximately 20 percent
of refugees have university or college education, while a further 22 percent have completed
upper secondary education. Less than seven percent have no schooling. These figures are
in line with our descriptive results on refugee characteristics.
Bevelander (2016) provides an overview of the recent research dealing with the labour
market integration of refugees. He finds that most studies agree that refugees’ labour
market integration lags behind that of other migrants both in terms of unemployment
and wages. Using data from several countries, Chiswick and Miller (1994), Cortes (2004),
Constant and Zimmermann (2005), Jaeger (2006), Aydemir (2011) and Dustmann et al.
(2016b) compare short-term labour market outcomes of immigrants arriving with differ-
ent visa types. They conclude that refugees perform worse than migrants that arrive
via student, employment or family reunion visas. Yet, there is evidence that shows that
refugees succeed in catching up in the long term. Keller (2016) finds that refugees in
Germany catch up with other immigrants in terms of employment after approximately
12 years and in terms of wages after around 17 years. This might be due to the long-term
residency perspective refugees take. As refugees often cannot return to their country of
origin and can obtain permanent residency relatively fast, it is worthwhile to invest in hu-
man capital in the first years after arrival.5 Cortes (2004) finds that refugees outperform
other migrant groups in the United States due to initially higher investments in human
capital. Dustmann and Görlach (2016) and Adda et al. (2014) also illustrate that the
5This is even exacerbated if refugees are not allowed to work directly upon arrival.
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expected residency duration positively affects human capital investment decisions and
thus labour market outcomes.
There are at least four additional reasons why refugees are different from other groups
of migrants.6 First, refugees entered the destination countries for humanitarian reasons
in contrast to an employment, study or family reunification visa. They were not chosen
by the immigration office due to their high skills, their study or employment prospects
or family network. At the same time, refugees did not necessarily chose to leave their
country or prepare for migration. While they may have chosen their particular country of
destination, the movement was mostly due to so-called push factors. Second, refugees face
stricter labour market regulation. In Germany, most refugees are allowed to work three
months after arrival but in certain municipalities only with an additional priority review
and an approval by the foreigners office. This restriction does not apply to migrants
arriving on an employment, student or family reunification visa. Third, most refugees
are randomly allocated to a specific municipality and are required to live there until they
finish their asylum process and until they have a stable job that makes them independent
of welfare benefits. In many cases this prevents them from connecting to immigrant
networks.7 Fourth, numerous refugees are suffering from war and flight related stress,
trauma and/or depression. Depending on their war experiences and family ties to war
zones, they might be psychologically unable to accept a job offer. For instance, Alpak et
al. (2015) find that one third of Syrian refugees experience post-traumatic stress disorder,
Couttenier et al. (2016) show that refugees in Switzerland who experienced war crimes
are more likely to engage in violent behaviour. The above factors can explain why
refugees face a lack of skills or matching frictions on the labour market.8 Consequently, as
suggested by Dustmann et al. (2016b), specific proactive policies could promote refugees
labour market integration.
6Dustmann et al. (2016b) and Keller (2016) summarise several of those reasons.
7Battisti et al. (2016) show that 54 percent of migrants in Germany find their first job through their
network.
8As mentioned above, in the long run, this might be different if refugees invest more in human capital
and thus catch up.
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Several studies, mainly in Scandinavia, have evaluated specific policies targeting the
integration of asylum seekers into the labour market. Clausen et al. (2009) analyse
the effect of different integration policies on the job search duration for refugees and
family reunification migrants. Using administrative data from Denmark and a timing-
of-events duration model, they find that wage subsidies are the most effective policy
to integrate newly arrived refugees into the labour market. They further find that an
improvement in language skills significantly improves refugees’ labour market entry. Also
using Danish data, Rosholm and Vejlin (2010) look at how incentives influence the extent
to which refugees take up work. They find that lowering income transfers for refugees only
increases their labour force participation two years after having obtained residency. They
provide evidence which shows that during the first two years, refugees have very few job
opportunities. After having learned the language for two years, however, they are more
likely to enter the labour market if their benefits are cut. Andersson Joona et al. (2015)
evaluate a Swedish labour market reform that aimed at supporting refugees in finding
employment faster. Using a difference-in-difference design around the introduction of the
reform, they do not find any significant short-term results of increased support by the
Public Employment Agency. While these three studies focus on refugees, they evaluate
a different policy than the one we examine and they also do not use our methodology of
a randomized controlled trial.
We believe that this paper makes two main contributions to the existing literature. First,
we provide a thorough evaluation of a job matching service for refugees through a ran-
domized controlled trial. Using a clean identification strategy is important in this context,
since comparing refugees who voluntarily decide to access services of an NGO with other
refugees would create a selection problem. We show that refugees do not know where to
look for work and that this friction can be alleviated by a job matching service. This
suggests that policies targeted at facilitating labour market entry may be effective. Sec-
ond, we provide new data and descriptive statistics on newly arrived refugees and their
short-term labour market and integration outcomes. This evidence covers the largest
inflow of refugees into Germany since World War II. Furthermore Germany is one of the
largest refugee receiving countries in the developed world. We thus study a large and
very relevant case of refugee labour market integration. The feasibility of refugee labour
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market integration is a large controversy in German and European politics and is likely
to have severe consequences for politics (Dustmann et al., 2016b).
The paper is structured as follows. The subsequent Section provides background infor-
mation about the legal framework for refugees to access the labour market in Germany.
Section 3 explains the experimental set-up and Section 4 describes the collected data.
Section 5 provides preliminary results of the follow-up and outlines the next steps. Sec-
tion 6 outlines limitations of this study and Section 7 concludes and provides policy
recommendations.
3.2 Institutional Framework
The word ‘refugee’ is commonly used to denote an individual that his left her country of
origin and seeks shelter from persecution or war in a third country. The term is typically
used in a broad sense, comprising different categories of refugee statuses with important
implications for their labour market access. The following section will provide a short
overview of the German asylum system and in particular the labour market access of
refugees. The first differentiation one has to make is between an asylum seeker and
a recognised refugee or someone with a temporary residence permit. In Germany, the
asylum process typically takes between four months and two years and during the process
different rules apply than afterwards.9 During the asylum process, most refugees have
general labour market access but are subject to several restrictions.
Since 2014, asylum seekers are allowed to start working three months after arrival in Ger-
many. This is typically the time when they live in the initial reception centres in the state
to which they were allocated by a certain distribution rule (“Königsteiner Schlüssel”).
After three months, they are supposed to move into a new accommodation, so-called
community accommodation, which are located in the same state but might be in a dif-
ferent municipality. After this move, asylum seekers register with their new municipality
and receive a general work permit. Due to space constraints, many times refugees end up
9The duration of the asylum process strongly varies by nationality and date of arrival. For Syrian
nationals, for example, it is on average much faster and takes less than six months.
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staying in the initial reception centres for up to six months and may receive their work
permit later. Asylum seekers from safe countries of origin are excluded from receiving
general work permits. A second restriction is that asylum seekers need the approval of
the Foreigners Office (“Ausländerbehörde”) before any specific employment starts. This
approval can be requested with a simple form and it takes on average two to three weeks
to obtain. The Foreigners Office checks that an adequate wage is paid (“salary review”)
and that there is no EU citizen that could be hired instead (“priority review”). The
third restriction is that work for temporary employment agencies and self-employment
are not permitted for asylum seekers. For asylum seekers who have been in Germany
for more than 15 months, the priority review and the prohibition to work for temporary
employment agencies is dropped.10 To summarize, working is possible for most asylum
seekers after three months and after undergoing bureaucracy.
There are three possible outcomes for an asylum application: refugees either receive
asylum status, a form of temporary protection or a rejection. Recognised refugees or
asylum seekers with temporary protection have unlimited access to the labour market
and are treated like German nationals in terms of employment laws.11 Rejected asylum
seekers lose their right to work and face deportation.
3.3 Experimental Set-up
Our experimental set-up can be divided into three stages: the CV preparation stage (first
stage), the treatment stage (second stage) and the follow-up stage (third stage). The
difference between the treatment and the control group is made during the second stage;
through randomisation 50 percent of participants receive the additional job-matching
treatment. The first and second stage have started in May 2016 in Munich and are
ongoing until May 2017. The follow-up stage begins six months after the CV preparation
10In the framework of the new Integration Law, some of these restrictions are no longer applied in
certain municipalities. In Munich all restrictions are still in place.
11In 2016, 63 percent have received some form of protection and residency permit. For the non-
European top 10 source countries, this percentage varies from 4 percent for Pakistan to 98 percent for
Syrian nationals. Source: BAMF (2016).
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stage and is conducted from November 2016 to November 2017.12 Figure 3.1 provides
a graphical overview of the timeline of the experiment. The first stage (CV preparation
stage) is illustrated in green, the second stage (treatment stage) in red and the third
stage (follow-up stage) in blue.
Figure 3.1: Timeline of the experiment
CV and first
wave of survey
E-mail with
CV and job
search info
Randomisation
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3.3.1 General Information About the Partner NGO
To conduct the experiment we collaborate with a Munich-based NGO that assists job-
seeking refugees. The NGO was founded in 2015 and currently counts six employees
and about 20 part-time volunteers. It is financed through donations, and in 2016 it
had a budget of 50,000 Euros. The NGO conducts weekly CV preparation sessions in
central Munich and advises job-seekers about basic legal and cultural specificities of the
German labour market. In addition, it organises a number of support activities, including
CV photo-shoots, e-mail set-up classes or social activities. The NGO has established a
network of local partners including the Federal Employment Agency, the Chamber of
Commerce, other initiatives for refugees, and social workers. Through its network, the
NGO receives information about open vacancies and, when applicable, forwards CVs of
suitable refugees to employers. During the time of the experiment, our research group
12The experimental design was approved by the Ethics commission of the Economics faculty of the
University of Munich.
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has participated in all regular CV preparation sessions of the NGO and has organized
(on behalf of the NGO) a number of additional ones at different locations in and around
Munich.
3.3.2 Participants
The participants of the experiment are job-seeking refugees who come to the CV prepa-
ration sessions of the NGO. In addition, three eligibility rules apply to ensure that the
participants qualify to enter the German labour market. First, they have to possess a gen-
eral work permit. Asylum-seekers usually obtain work permits three months after arrival
in Germany. This excludes refugees from “safe origin countries” (Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo, Ghana, and Senegal). Consequently,
the NGO cannot effectively support them in the job search and they are thus excluded
from our analysis.13 Second, refugees in our sample must be able to communicate in a
language spoken by the members of the NGO or our research team. These languages
include Arabic, Dari, English, Farsi, French, German, Italian, Kurdish and Russian and
cover around 98 percent of the refugees that come to CV sessions.14 Third, participants
must be 18 years of age or older. The NGO does not include under-age refugees in its
target group as it is probably better for them to attend an educational institution. Ad-
ditionally, the age restriction is necessary for us to obtain the participation consent.15
We are aware that these restrictions imply that our sample is not representative of the
refugee population at large. We believe that this was to some extent unavoidable, given
that we need participants to voluntarily take part in the session and be willing and quali-
13At the time of writing, there is an active debate whether Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia should be
declared as “safe origin countries” or not. There is no political consensus yet and we have not excluded
these nationalities. However, the number of refugees from these countries in Munich has been very small
and so far none of our participants are nationals of any of these countries.
14So far, we have met five candidates, whom we had to send away because they only spoke Urdu
or Pashto. These were probably rather low educated refugees that would not have a good chance to
integrate into the German labour market and who would need to focus on German classes first.
15To comply with the data protection laws of Bavaria, every participant needs to sign a data protection
agreement (available in Appendix C.5). Refugees below the age of 18 cannot legally sign the data
protection agreement.
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fied to enter the German labour market. We also believe, however, that this is the natural
population for evaluating a job matching programme.
3.3.3 Set-up of the Experiment
First Stage: CV Preparation
The first stage of the experiment consists of CV preparation sessions, which are jointly
organized by the NGO and our research team. The regular sessions take place once a
week in the centre of Munich. The participants can easily reach the location by public
transportation. We have organized several additional sessions in a support centre for
refugees (provided by Caritas) and in big refugee camps in Munich. The NGO advertises
the sessions through social workers, Facebook, word of mouth, and partner organisations.
The main incentives for the refugees to come to these sessions are receiving a CV in Ger-
man (that they can then forward to employers or to the job centre), as well as acquiring
information on their job-search process. The standard NGO’s procedures apply for all
sessions. The flyer for these sessions and some pictures can be found in Appendix C.1
and C.2.
During the CV preparation sessions, the interviewers (the volunteers of the NGO and
our research team) conduct one-to-one interviews with job-seeking refugees to collect the
information needed to prepare their CVs. After collecting the CV data, the interviewers
ask questions from a baseline survey to determine the job-search behaviour, salary ex-
pectations, and job preferences of the participants. Additionally, the interviewers ask the
participants about their family circumstances, their perceptions of integration, and their
progress in studying German. The complete baseline survey can be found in Appendix
C.2.
In general, it then takes the NGO around two weeks to process the collected information
and to prepare the CV. The finished CV includes a participant’s personal picture and
copies of the work permit and certificates, if available. The NGO sends out the CV to
all participants as a pdf attachment by e-mail around two weeks after their session. If
participants do not have an e-mail address, the NGO sends it to them as pdf attachment
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via the text messaging application “WhatsApp” and, if possible, to the responsible social
worker. The pdf attachment is accompanied by an e-mail text, which outlines that “there
is a chance that we match” the candidate with a possible employer, but “while we do our
best to support” in the job search, “we cannot guarantee that we can find” a suitable
employer, this is why we highly encouraged the candidates to keep searching for a job on
their own. In addition to this text, advice is sent on how to search for work in Germany.
The NGO recommends every participant to register with the federal employment agency
and search on websites that publish vacancies such as monster.de and stepstone.de. The
NGO also advises the refugees to continue to learn German as this would greatly improve
their chances of finding a job. The complete e-mail text can be found in Appendix C.6.
Second Stage: Treatment
During the treatment stage, we randomly assign the participants to either the treatment
or the control group. For the treatment group (50% of the participants), we add the CVs
to the NGO’s database of potential job candidates. During May-November 2016, through
this process an additional 150 CVs have been added to the database, which initially com-
prised around 100 candidates. This database is searched for suitable candidates every
time a vacancy arrives and up to five suitable CVs are sent directly to the firm. The
vacancies are received through the network of the NGO, which includes a partnership
with the Federal Employment Agency and the Chamber of Commerce. In addition to
the available offers, the NGO employees look for other vacancies that would fit the partic-
ipants in the database on websites and through their network. Once the NGO identifies
a potential match, it informs the participant about the vacancy and sends the CV to
the employer. It is important to note, that while this intervention reduces the matching
frictions between employers and job-seekers, it does not affect the skill set of participants
in any way. Both control and treated participants can take part in other activities orga-
nized by the NGO or, upon request, receive information support (for example, about the
interview or the hiring process).
To determine which candidates are allocated to the treatment and the control group,
we randomise for each session separately, thereby insuring that for each session we have
the same number of participants in the treatment and in the control group. For every
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session, participants are ranked by a random number generator and the upper 50 percent
of participants are allocated to the treatment.16 As the sessions take place at different
locations and time and individuals in the same session are more likely to be similar,
we believe that this procedure helps us in having people with similar characteristics in
the treatment and in the control group. Therefore this provides a useful (albeit weak)
stratification. People who attend the regular CV sessions are likely to differ from those
who get interviewed directly in their camp, participants from different camps might have
access to varying degrees of support services through local social workers, etc. Moreover,
it is logistically impossible to reach and to interview all potential participants within a
short time span. This means that a single randomisation of all candidates would not
be feasible. We conduct this session-based individual randomization every two weeks,
so that the NGO receives new CVs twice a month. We thereby guarantee a stable flow
for the NGO and ensure that the treatment starts at about the same time after the first
meeting with the participants.17. Table C.1 in the Appendix provides a balance table on
personal and labour market characteristics to provide evidence that the randomisation
has worked well and created two comparable groups.
Third Stage: Follow-Up
During the last stage, we contact all participants of the treatment and the control group
after six months to ask them about their labour market status and to update our in-
tegration measures. Our research team contacts the candidates preferably by phone or
alternatively by WhatsApp, Facebook messenger, E-mail or through an additional con-
tact person, who was previously indicated. Refugees that found a job are asked about the
details of their new work and how they obtained it. Refugees that have not found a job
are asked about their job search behaviour and their challenges. All refugees are addi-
tionally asked the same questions about integration outcomes and perceptions and their
progress in studying German and some additional questions. The follow-up questionnaire
can be found in Appendix C.3.
16If the number of candidates is odd, the additional person is randomly allocated to the control or
the treatment group.
17On average, every week we meet with 15 new job-seekers during the CV preparation sessions.
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics of Baseline Characteristics
This section presents descriptive statistics of the personal characteristics of the partici-
pants, their job search behaviour, expectations and perceptions of integration. All this
information was collected during the first stage, when questions related to the CV were
asked and the baseline survey was administered. There is currently very little information
available about the characteristics of recently arrived refugees in Germany. In particu-
lar, there is only one report by Brücker et al. (2016) on education levels, labour market
history, expectations and integration of the recent refugee wave. Their report documents
interview answers of 2,349 refugees in Germany. The results are largely in line with our
descriptive statistics and there are no contradictory findings. However, one has to keep
in mind that our study has low numbers of observations and possibly a selected sample
(see Section 6.1), so it is difficult to extrapolate this information to the population of
recent refugees in Germany.
3.4.1 Personal Characteristics
Table 3.1 shows gender, age, marital status, percentage of participants with at least
one child, number of months spent in Germany, average years of education and work
experience for the different countries or regions of origin. It also shows the percentage
of refugees who have at least some university education and the percentage of refugees
who have no formal schooling. Countries of origin with more than forty observations are
listed separately (Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria). Other African18 and Asian19 countries
are grouped together.
Most of the participating refugees are young unmarried men without children. The
majority arrived in 2015 and, on average, has been in Germany eight months at the time
of our baseline survey. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of educational attainments for
the whole sample. Yet, there is substantial heterogeneity across countries. In line with the
18Other African country include: Congo, Eritrea, Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda.
19Other Asian countries include Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, Palestine, Turkey and the United Arab
Emirates.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics by Country
Afghanistan Nigeria Syria r_Africa r_Asia Total
Male 0.947 0.941 0.980 0.887 0.956 0.941
(0.225) (0.237) (0.143) (0.320) (0.208) (0.236)
Age 24.10 49.29 31.75 26.52 29.99 34.17
(5.461) (195.1) (9.254) (7.550) (8.201) (106.1)
Married 0.211 0.188 0.388 0.226 0.356 0.260
(0.411) (0.393) (0.492) (0.423) (0.484) (0.439)
At least one child 0.158 0.224 0.306 0.302 0.378 0.263
(0.368) (0.419) (0.466) (0.463) (0.490) (0.441)
Months since arrival 7.622 5.836 10.76 6.830 7.905 7.528
(7.163) (6.730) (8.383) (6.837) (4.604) (7.023)
Years of education 10.98 9.706 13.76 9.811 10.96 10.86
(3.720) (4.005) (4.333) (5.141) (4.497) (4.515)
Years of work exper. 5.211 6.694 9.224 5.943 9.156 7.076
(5.287) (5.073) (8.260) (6.109) (6.742) (6.358)
Attended university 0.281 0.0824 0.633 0.208 0.356 0.280
(0.453) (0.277) (0.487) (0.409) (0.484) (0.450)
No formal education 0.0351 0.0471 0 0.0943 0.0444 0.0450
(0.186) (0.213) (0) (0.295) (0.208) (0.208)
Observations 57 84 49 54 45 289
Notes: This table shows the gender, age, marital status, percentage with at least one child, number of months in Germany,
average years of education and work experience, percentage of refugees who have at least some university education and
the percentage of refugees who have no formal education. Countries of origin with more that 45 observations are listed
separately (Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria). Other African country include: Congo, Eritrea, Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Tanzania and Uganda. Other Asian countries include Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, Palestine, Turkey and the United Arab
Emirates.
findings of Brücker et al. (2016), refugees from countries, which until recently had a well
functioning educational system, for instance Syria, have relatively high levels of education.
The average years of education for Syrian refugees is 13.8 years and everyone has finished
primary school. Figure 3.3 shows the percentage of refugees that have started university
and those that have graduated for different countries of origin. While 63 percent of
Syrians have attended university, only 27 percent have graduated. This difference can be
explained by a lot of young men, whose university education was interrupted by the war.
Countries that had war for more than a decade, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, have much
worse educational attainments.
Participants from African countries are less likely to have attended university. In particu-
lar, Nigeria has a very low tertiary education rate of around eight percent. Furthermore,
the percentage of participants with no formal education is highest for African countries.
We attribute this to the high poverty rates and the ongoing conflicts in some of the
countries such as Congo, Eritrea, Nigeria, Mali and Somalia.
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Figure 3.2: Education attainment of the whole sample
Notes: This figure shows the education attainment of the whole sample.
Figure 3.3: University attainment by country of origin
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of individuals that have some university (orange) and that have graduated from
university (green).
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3.4.2 Job Search Behaviour and Expectations
Moreover, we asked refugees about their job search behaviour and about their expec-
tations of working in Germany. The descriptive statistics provide interesting insights
about the challenges refugees face during the search and about their expectations of
labour market integration.
Around half of the refugees had already actively looked for employment before attending
the CV preparation session. Figure 3.5 and Table 3.2 shows that the most common way
to search for work is to ask employers directly (23 percent), for instance by going to their
shop or restaurant. Almost the same percentage is relying on friends (21 percent) or
their social worker (18 percent). About a quarter of refugees have registered as looking
for work at the Federal Employment Office and 17 percent are actively using the Federal
Employment Agency to find work. Surprisingly, relatively few of the refugees surveyed
(17 percent) are searching for work online. There is, however, a large heterogeneity across
nationalities. While almost 50 percent of Syrians are using the Internet during their job
search, less than 12 percent of refugees from Afghanistan or Nigeria are searching for
work in the Internet. This is probably due to both the unavailability of computers for
refugees and their limited information about online job searches and applications. Figure
3.4 shows what refugees perceive as their difficulties during the job search. More than a
quarter (27 percent) of refugees indicated that they do not know where to search for a
job. This is the second largest difficulty after the language barrier (52 percent).
Another challenge is the unavailability of school, university or vocational certificates. A
majority (69 percent) of participants do not have the original certificate of their highest
degree with them in Germany. This percentage is lower for participants that have at-
tended university (29 percent) and graduated from university (33 percent). In all three
cases, the unavailability of original documents will be an administrative challenge for the
further academic or professional career of refugees.
On average, refugees expect a monthly net wage of 1,330 Euros. A majority (65 percent)
would be willing to work for less than the minimum wage. This again varies tremendously
by country of origin. Refugees from Afghanistan have the highest expected net wage with
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Figure 3.4: What difficulties refugees have during their job search
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of individuals that name these difficulties during their job search.
Figure 3.5: How refugees look for work
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of individuals that have used the named job search strategies during their job
search.
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1,775 Euros, whereas refugees from Nigeria expect only 1,177 Euros. Syrians expect a
net wage of roughly 1372 Euros. It is interesting to note that the initial reaction of most
refugees to this question is “I do not know”. Due to language barriers, unfamiliarity
with the system of online job search and applications and unfamiliarity with the German
labour market in general, refugees seem to have difficulties to look for work without
support.
Table 3.2: Search Behavious by Country
Afghanistan Nigeria Syria r_Africa r_Asia Total
Searches at Arbeitsagentur 0.158 0.176 0.224 0.130 0.156 0.169
(0.368) (0.383) (0.422) (0.339) (0.367) (0.375)
Searches in Internet 0.0702 0.106 0.490 0.111 0.111 0.166
(0.258) (0.310) (0.505) (0.317) (0.318) (0.372)
Searches with social worker 0.0877 0.212 0.224 0.167 0.222 0.183
(0.285) (0.411) (0.422) (0.376) (0.420) (0.387)
Searches by asking in shops directly 0.211 0.235 0.367 0.0185 0.333 0.228
(0.411) (0.427) (0.487) (0.136) (0.477) (0.420)
Searches with friends 0.228 0.153 0.429 0.130 0.133 0.207
(0.423) (0.362) (0.500) (0.339) (0.344) (0.406)
Difficulty: Language 0.579 0.482 0.633 0.352 0.622 0.524
(0.498) (0.503) (0.487) (0.482) (0.490) (0.500)
Difficulty: Don’t know where to search 0.263 0.200 0.306 0.296 0.356 0.272
(0.444) (0.402) (0.466) (0.461) (0.484) (0.446)
Observations 57 85 49 54 45 290
Notes: This table shows job search behaviour and the difficulties during the job search. It indicates what percentage of
participants are using the Federal Employment Office, the internet, the social workers or friends to look for work and
what percentage asks directly in shops. It also shows, what fraction of participants indicates that language is a difficulty
during the job search and what fraction of participants does not know where to search. Countries of origin with more
that forty observations are listed separately (Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria). Other African country include: Congo, Eritrea,
Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda. Other Asian countries include Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, Palestine,
Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.
The descriptive statistics provide some preliminary evidence that both missing skills,
mainly language skills, and frictions in the labour market hinder refugees labour market
integration. The friction that 27 percent of refugees mention is that they “do not know
where to search”. This friction is alleviated for the treatment group as CVs are sent
directly to suitable employers. The randomised controlled trial thus evaluates if such
search and matching frictions can be alleviated for refugees through the services provided
by the NGO.
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3.4.3 Perceptions of Integration
Although the integration of refugees is a key policy objective, there is neither a unique
definition of integration, nor a clear way of measuring it (Ager and Strang, 2008).20
In practice, integration has different facets and this paper uses a number of different
questions to proxy integration.21 We first look at the answers for individual questions by
nationality and then we form an index of these questions to have one integration measure.
The questions we use to proxy integration are the following:
• Did you make new friends in Germany?
– Multiple answer options: Yes, from Germany; Yes, from my country; Yes,
from other countries; No.
• Do you already feel at home in Germany?
– Answer scale from 0 to 4, 0 meaning not at all and 4 meaning completely.
• Have you ever been invited to the house of a German?
– Answer options: Yes or No.
• What activities do you do outside of the community accommodation?
– Multiple answer options: Study/German; sports; meeting friends; shopping;
or other activities.
• Level of German as assessed by interviewer
– Answer options: Absolute Beginner, A1, A2, B1, B2, C1.
Table 3.3 shows the percentage of refugees from a certain country answering yes to these
questions. For the second question, we consider the answer to be yes, if the candidate
answered 4 or 5. For the fourth question we consider the answer to be yes, if he does at
20The economic literature has sometimes used the earnings gap between natives and foreigners to
measure integration. However, as earnings typically take more than a decade to assimilate for refugees
and most of our participants are not working yet, this project focuses on other outcomes with a more
short-term view and a stronger focus on the integration into the German society.
21The inspiration for some questions was taken from the European Social Survey and the Longitudinal
Survey of Immigrants to Canada. The questions were then adapted to the specific context of refugees in
Germany.
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least two activities outside his community accommodation and for the last question we
consider the level A2 or above (which corresponds to basic German knowledge).
Table 3.3: Integration by Country
Afghanistan Nigeria Syria r_Africa r_Asia Total
Integration Index 2.060 1.850 2.939 2.100 2.044 2.153
(1.047) (0.907) (1.073) (1.046) (1.127) (1.083)
Return intention 0.289 0.280 0.429 0.241 0.267 0.298
(0.411) (0.398) (0.408) (0.409) (0.434) (0.412)
friends_Germany 0.298 0.476 0.796 0.593 0.467 0.516
(0.462) (0.502) (0.407) (0.496) (0.505) (0.501)
Feel at home 3.439 3.583 2.898 3.222 3.200 3.311
(0.866) (0.795) (1.159) (1.058) (0.991) (0.982)
invited 0.263 0.226 0.633 0.352 0.422 0.356
(0.444) (0.421) (0.487) (0.482) (0.499) (0.480)
active 2.211 1.619 2.510 1.722 2.022 1.969
(1.206) (1.029) (1.063) (0.899) (0.988) (1.088)
German 0.368 0.107 0.429 0.167 0.111 0.225
(0.487) (0.311) (0.500) (0.376) (0.318) (0.418)
Observations 57 84 49 54 45 289
Notes: This table shows the integration index and the individual components by country. The integration index is described
in details in subsection 3.4.3 of this paper. German friends indicates the percentage of people indicating that they have
German friends. Feel at home is a subjective measure ranging from 1 to 5, 5 being the highest. Invited is an indicator
measuring if the person has ever been invited to the house of a German. Active means that the person does at least
two leisure activities and German means that the person has at least reached level A2. Additionally, return measures the
desire to return to ones country if it was safe. Countries of origin with more that forty observations are listed separately
(Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria). Other African country include: Congo, Eritrea, Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania and
Uganda. Other Asian countries include Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, Palestine, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.
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To take the analysis one step further, we build an integration index using these questions.
The index covers the range from zero to five and takes the value of five if the person is
fully integrated. A value of five is obtained, if one individual fulfils all five criteria:
• He has German friends (binary)
• He feels at home (on a scale from 0 to 4)
• He has been invited to the house of a German (binary)
• Number of activities he does outside the community housing (on a scale from 0 to
4)
• His level of German is at least A2 (binary)
If only one criterion is fulfilled, the individual obtains a value of 1 in the integration
index, if two criteria are fulfilled the value 2, etc. The variable feel at home and number
of activities is divided by 4, so that it ranges between 0 and 1. Of course, the aggregation
of various questions to one index comes at a cost: the index depends on the questions
and cut-offs one selects. As expected, the individual components are correlated as shown
in Table C.2 in the Appendix. Yet, it is useful to have a comprehensive measure of
integration covering various different aspects.
This index can be correlated with individual characteristics such as education, age, gender
or total time spent in Germany. Figure 3.6 shows the correlation between the integration
index and education. As expected, there is a clear positive relationship between education
and integration. One interesting observation is that the variation seems to be coming from
individuals with either minimal or considerable education, while integration outcomes are
very heterogeneous for intermediate levels of education. Refugees also seem to need time
for integration. It is reassuring to see that the more time a refugee spends in Germany,
the more developed his integration is (Figure 3.7).
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Figure 3.6: Correlation between Integration and Education
Notes: The Integration Index is measures as described in Section 3.3. One dot equals one participant.
Figure 3.7: Correlation between Integration and Time in Germany
Notes: The Integration Index is measures as described in Section 3.3. One dot equals one participant.
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3.4.4 Multivariate Regressions Results for Integration
While the graphs show us a positive association between integration and education or
duration of stay respectively, it is important to conduct regression analysis in order to
control for observable factors. To determine the effect of different explanatory variables
on integration we estimate the following empirical model:
Integi = β0+β1Educi+β2Monthsi+β3Engi+β4Syri+β5Afgi+β6Nigi+β7Xi+i (3.1)
where the index i denotes an individual. Integi is the outcome of interest - the Integration
Index or different measures of integration respectively. Educi is the years of education,
Monthsi denotes the months spent in Germany, Engi the level of English, and Syri,
Afgi and Nigi are country dummies for the largest nationalities that occur in our sample.
Xi includes additional controls, in particular if the individual is married and if he has
children.
Table 3.4 shows the results of ordinary least squares regressions22, where the integration
index is regressed on the years of schooling. For each additional year of schooling, the
integration index increases by about 0.06 points. This means that the integration index
of a participant that has some university experience (e.g. 14 years of schooling) is 0.6
points higher than of someone who has just finished primary school. The amount of
time spent in Germany also has a positive and significant effect on integration. This
makes sense, as refugees are more likely to have improved their German language skills
or have German friends. Furthermore, a good level of English is beneficial for integration.
Keeping other observables constant, Syrian nationals seem to be better integrated than
other participants. One explanation could be their considerably faster asylum process
and their protection rate of 98 percent. This in turn allows them to participate in
government support programmes and language courses much faster than participants
from Afghanistan, Nigeria or other countries.
22The integration index is measured with two digits after the comma. It takes 60 different realisations,
which is a justification to use OLS instead of Ordered Probit regressions. Ordered Probit regressions
have been estimated for robustness and lead to exactly the same results in terms of magnitude and
significance.
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Table 3.4: Integration by personal characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated
Years of education 0.0708∗∗∗ 0.0799∗∗∗ 0.0592∗∗∗ 0.0626∗∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0131) (0.0136) (0.0144)
Months since arrival 0.0533∗∗∗ 0.0459∗∗∗ 0.0475∗∗∗
(0.00872) (0.00951) (0.00902)
Good English 0.333∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗
(0.122) (0.125)
Syria 0.609∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.184)
Afghanistan 0.0977 0.0118
(0.180) (0.182)
Nigeria -0.158 -0.175
(0.135) (0.140)
Additional Controls X
Observations 283 283 283 283
R2 0.0842 0.202 0.254 0.274
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions of the integration index on years of education, months since arrival, level of
English and a Syria, Afghanistan and Nigeria dummy. Additional controls are age, age squared, being married and having
at least one child. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
It is interesting to see how the manifold personal characteristics influence the five com-
ponents of the integration index differently. Table 3.5 illustrates that higher education is
positively associated with having German friends, doing activities outside one’s home and
speaking good German. The time spent in Germany appears to be most important for
being invited to the house of a German, doing activities outside ones’ home and speaking
good German. A good level of English is positively associated only with the likelihood
of having German friends.
Given the structure of the data, the possibility exists that different observations are
not independent from each other. Candidates that arrived in Germany at the same
time, have the same education level or come from the same country might be correlated.
Table C.3 in the Appendix shows regression results equivalent to Table 3.4 column 4
(including all controls). It shows that all significance levels are robust to different ways of
clustering (with the exception of the English language coefficient that becomes significant
for country level clustering).
It is important to keep in mind that in this section of the paper, we do not make any
causal statements. Results of these simple OLS regressions might be biased due to reverse
causality or omitted variable biases. The causal part of the paper is provided only by the
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Table 3.5: Different integration outcomes by personal characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
German friends Feel at home Invited Active Level of German
Years of education 0.0199∗∗∗ -0.00734 0.0168∗∗∗ 0.0597∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗
(0.00676) (0.0152) (0.00615) (0.0153) (0.00521)
Months since arrival 0.00746 -0.0118 0.0189∗∗∗ 0.0382∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗
(0.00468) (0.00764) (0.00339) (0.00978) (0.00403)
Good English 0.123∗ -0.0728 0.136∗∗ 0.0513 0.0399
(0.0657) (0.135) (0.0568) (0.135) (0.0520)
Syria 0.203∗∗ -0.314 0.189∗∗ 0.359∗ 0.213∗∗∗
(0.0855) (0.208) (0.0917) (0.199) (0.0809)
Afghanistan -0.210∗∗ 0.168 -0.0574 0.270 0.187∗∗
(0.0860) (0.174) (0.0828) (0.197) (0.0757)
Nigeria -0.0619 0.313∗∗ -0.109∗ -0.150 -0.0250
(0.0747) (0.141) (0.0637) (0.148) (0.0534)
Controls X X X X X
Observations 283 282 283 283 283
R2 0.168 0.0695 0.191 0.183 0.190
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions of different integration measures on years of education, months since arrival, level
of English and a Syria, Afghanistan and Nigeria dummy. Additional controls are age, age squared, being married and
having at least one child. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
results from the randomised controlled trial. We still think, however, that these regression
results are of interest as they provide first insights for a new and under-researched topic.
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3.4.5 Other Results
There are a number of other factors that are not directly linked to job search or integration
but are nonetheless interesting to understand the labour market integration of refugees.
These are the return intentions and the willingness to move within Germany or Europe,
the experience of xenophobia and the reason for choosing Germany as the destination
country.
A majority (62 percent) of refugees in the sample do not want to return to their country
once it is safe. Less than one quarter (22 percent) want to return and 16 percent do
not know. With 27 percent, the intention to return is highest amongst Syrian refugees.
Almost all refugees (89 percent) would like to live in Munich at least for some years if
they are given the possibility to stay and work in Munich. The majority (74 percent)
would, however, be willing to move within Germany or Europe if they were offered a job
there. This shows that from the point of view of the refugees, they hope to stay if given
the opportunity.
When it comes to the behaviour of natives towards refugees, 75 percent of refugees report
that they have never felt being treated with less courtesy or respect because they are
refugees. Another 22 percent have felt this way sometimes and only three percent have
had this experience often or all the time. This is the subjective feeling of the refugees
and it might have ramifications on their integration and return intentions.
Germany has received many more asylum seekers than other European countries. There
are a number of institutional, geographic and other reasons for this. If one asks the
refugees directly why they chose Germany as opposed to Italy, France or the UK, the
most common answer is safety (52 percent), followed by a good reputation (39 percent),
job opportunities (24 percent) and asylum possibilities (24 percent). Nine percent chose
Germany due to relatives residing in Germany.23 In comparison with labour migrants,
the majority of refugees have thus not chosen Germany due to job related reasons. This
confirms our conjecture that refugees may be less prepared for employment in Germany.
23Respondents could chose up to three answers.
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3.5 Results of First Follow-up (Pilot)
The following results come from a pilot follow-up survey that we conduct in October 2016.
It is comprised of 56 refugees we initially met in March and April for the CV preparation
stage.24 We contact them by phone six months later to question them about their current
labour market status.25 If they found work, we ask them about the details of their work,
how they found it and how satisfied they are with different aspects of their work. If they
did not find work, we ask them about their search behaviour and experience. There is
also the possibility that they are currently neither working nor looking for work and in
this case we ask them about the reason for being out of the labour force. In addition,
we ask about perceptions of integration, German language progress and in general about
their life in Germany.26 This pilot sample has not been randomised as we did not have
the approval of the ethics commission in April and we were still experimenting with the
baseline survey.27 For this reason everyone of the pilot sample has received the treatment
and has thus been added to the database of the NGO.
3.5.1 Labour Market Outcomes
Of the 56 follow-up surveys conducted, 20 participants have found work, 34 participants
are currently not working but would like to work and two participants are not looking
for work as they are in full-time German language classes. Among those 20 refugees who
have found work, seven found the work through the NGO, six with the help of friends
or relatives, three through a social worker and two with the help of their teacher. Only
two refugees have found work by themselves, one through the internet and one by asking
in a shop directly. This seems to suggest that matching frictions matter. At the same
24This Section provides some initial ideas about the kind of analysis that is feasible once we have
collected the follow-up data for the real sample of around 500 refugees. At this stage it is difficult to
draw significant conclusions due to the small sample size.
25We have no opportunity to independently verify the obtained information, except in a few cases in
which the NGO is in contact with the employer. We assume that the obtained information is correct as
the refugees have very little incentives to lie and can benefit from obtaining an updated CV.
26The complete follow-up survey can be found in the Appendix.
27It is not possible to systematically analyse the baseline survey for this pilot group as we were still
adapting and improving the survey during the pilot in March and April.
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time, it also highlights the importance of a randomised controlled trial for generating a
credible counterfactual. It is interesting that none of the refugees found work through
the Federal Employment Agency.
How the refugees have found their work seems to be correlated with the kind of work they
found. While most refugees that have found their work without the NGO are now working
in the cleaning industry (four candidates) or in a restaurant (four candidates), refugees
that have found their work through the NGO have positions that mostly match their
education and experience in: administration, agriculture, accounting, engineering, IT,
child care and in a theatre. The treatment thus does not only determine the probability
of a match but also the match quality.
Of those twenty working refugees, half found employment in a regular job, while 25
percent are doing an internship and a further 25 percent are doing part-time work. Three
salaries are above the minimum wage and two contracts are longer than one year. With
regards to work satisfaction, 77 percent of workers are happy with their colleagues and
61 percent are happy with their tasks at work. However, only 23 percent are happy with
the salary. Half of the working refugees feel overqualified for the work and 68 percent are
looking for better work.
Of the 34 refugees who are currently actively looking for work, 17 people had no contact to
employers, ten had unsuccessful informal meetings or job interviews and three people had
job offers, which they did not accept due to the low wage, being overqualified and missing
documents respectively. Four people have worked but ended the work relationship. Two
have quit due to a low salary, one contract ended and one person was dismissed.
3.5.2 Integration Outcomes
Table 3.6 shows the different components of the integration index by working status.
We are using the same questions as in the baseline survey and the same explanations as
outlined in Section 4.3. One can clearly see that working refugees score higher on the
integration index. They are more likely to have German friends and more likely to have
been invited to the house of a German. Moreover, they have a higher level of German and
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are less likely to wish to return to their home country. They also do less leisure activities
outside their house, probably due to time constraints and, surprisingly, refugees that
work feel less at home.
Table 3.6: Integration by working status
No Not looking Yes Total
Integration Index 2.682 1.075 3.050 2.737
(1.293) (0.318) (0.978) (1.221)
Germann friends 0.467 0 0.688 0.521
(0.507) (0) (0.479) (0.505)
Feel at home 4.367 3.500 4 4.208
(0.718) (0.707) (1.095) (0.874)
Invited 0.333 0 0.438 0.354
(0.479) (0) (0.512) (0.483)
Active 2.033 1.500 1.750 1.917
(1.098) (0.707) (1.065) (1.069)
German 0.500 0 0.688 0.542
(0.509) (0) (0.479) (0.504)
Return intention 0.233 0 0.188 0.208
(0.430) (0) (0.403) (0.410)
Observations 34 2 20 56
Notes: This table shows the integration index and the individual components by working status. The integration index
is described in details in subsection 3.4.3. German friends indicates the percentage of people indicating that they have
German friends. Feel at home is a subjective measure ranging from 1 to 5, 5 being the highest. Invited is an indicator
measuring if the person has ever been invited to the house of a German. Active means that the person does at least two
leisure activities and German means that the person has at least reached level A2. Additionally, return measures the desire
to return to ones country if it was safe.
Two caveats apply. First, this Table does not capture a causal relationship between work
status and integration, due to possible omitted variable bias and/or reverse causality. It
is currently not possible to determine if the fact that one found work helps the integration
process or if those refugees that are better integrated are the ones that find work. Given
the design of the randomised controlled trial, we will be able to disentangle this and
draw causal statements once we have the follow-up result of the randomised participants.
Second, the very low number of observations of the pilot makes it impossible to obtain
statistically significant differences. Comparing Table 3.6 with Table 3.3, one can see that
refugees that are asked six months later have a higher integration index (2.74 compared
with 2.42). This is in line with the regression result that indicate that time spent in
Germany has a positive effect on integration outcomes.
Figure 3.8 illustrates that working refugees not only have a higher average integration
index but also the variance is smaller.
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Figure 3.8: Integration by Work Status
Notes: The Integration Index is measures as described in subsection 3.4.3. The box plot shows the mean, the 25/75
percentile and the minimum/maximum of the integration index for those not working, not looking and those who are
working.
3.5.3 Next Steps
This project is ongoing and expected to last at least until the end of 2017. The CV
preparation and baseline surveys are planned to run from May 2016 until May 2017 and
we aim at 500 participants in total. The follow-up survey is conducted six months after
the respective CV preparation session and is thus running from November 2016 until
November 2017. While this paper is being written, we have just started the first follow-
up surveys. This follow up survey is being conducted on the phone by our multilingual
research team; in the same way as outlined for the trial survey. It is possible to conduct
further waves of the follow up survey to track refugees for a longer period of time and
also investigate medium and long term labour market and integration outcomes.28
The analysis of the data can be divided into two parts. First, we investigate labour
market outcomes and, in particular, we test the hypothesis whether participants in the
treatment group have better labour market outcomes in the short term than the control
group. Evidence of positive effects would suggest that matching frictions between German
employers and job-seeking refugees exist. The employment of refugees thus does not
only depend on the skills they possess, but also on their possibility to be considered
28The actual implementation of additional follow up surveys will depend on attrition and funding.
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by employers who are trying to fill a vacancy. Overcoming these frictions may then
facilitate labour market integration of refugees in Germany. The main outcome variables
will be employment status, duration and wages. Once the main effect is established,
it is important to understand what drives the result. The treatment may modify the
outcomes of participants by 1) creating awareness of job opportunities, 2) reducing search
time, 3) enhancing match quality or 4) serving as a referral to the employer. Identifying
the channel(s) is relevant for policy-making. Therefore, we additionally investigate a
number of supplementary variables. These include: the number of applications sent,
search strategies, time until the first interview, number of job interviews, job match
quality and job satisfaction.
Second, we are interested in integration outcomes. We aim to test, whether earlier
(and/or better) employment leads to enhanced integration outcomes in the short term.
The treatment status can hereby serve as an instrumental variable for employment. The
key outcome variables will be the components of the integration index. Additionally,
we can study their housing conditions and report stress, happiness and optimism levels.
Detailed statistical model specifications can be found in the pre-analysis plan in the
Appendix and has been uploaded on the American Economic Association’s registry for
randomized controlled trials.
3.6 Limitations
3.6.1 Selection
The refugees that are taking part in our experiment are not representative of all refugees
living in Germany for several reasons: our eligibility criteria, their motivation to come to
our sessions and a focus on refugees residing in Munich. This selection has implications
for external validity. An expansion of the programme or a different setting might lead to
different results. However, it does not impact the internal validity of the experiment as
we randomize over equally selected participants.
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First, our sample is selected due to our eligibility criteria, we only work with refugees
that have a work permit. This excludes all refugees from safe countries of origin. We
argue that this is the relevant group to study for labour market integration. Refugees
from safe countries of origin are legally excluded from the labour market and thus cannot
benefit from job matching support. We had to reject around three percent of candidates
due to this restriction (all coming from Senegal). For legal reasons, we also have to
focus on refugees aged 18 or above.29 This is the relevant target group as refugees below
the age of 18 are typically recommended to attend an educational institution and only
refugees aged 18 or above are encouraged to integrate into the labour market. We had to
send away around two percent of candidates due to this restriction. Our last eligibility
criterion excluded participants that did not speak any of the languages our team speaks.
This has excluded around four percent of participants.
The second reason why our sample is selected is that the refugees who came to us are
likely to be different from those who did not, and these differences are likely to matter for
most of the outcomes that we are interested in. One obvious difference is motivation. It
takes extra effort to come to our CV preparation sessions and we expect our candidates
to be positively selected on motivation. These highly motivated refugees are likely to
be also highly motivated to learn German, search more intensively for a job and to go
to other support institutions. Other reasons for a selected sample might be educational
background, extroversion, foreign language ability or psychological well-being. Further-
more, in our way of reaching candidates, we are focusing on refugees living in communal
accommodation. By targeting this group, we exclude those that have the means to sup-
port themselves or who have already a network of family or friends. We thus focus on
the ones asking for support, which is a very policy relevant group of refugees.
We can make a rough estimation of the percentage of all refugees in Munich that take
part in our experiment. There have been around 12,000 refugees in Munich at the end
of 2015. If we restrict this to men of working age, then we have a pool of potential
candidates of 6,000. Further subtracting refugees without a work permit and from safe
29In 2015, 31 percent of arriving refugees in Germany were below 18 years old.
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countries of origin restricts the pool to around 5,000.30 We thus have a participation rate
of around seven percent of relevant and eligible candidates in Munich.31
3.6.2 Attrition
We are aware that sample attrition could be high when working with this population. We
concentrate our efforts on obtaining contact details that do not change over time. Besides
obtaining their e-mail address and phone number, we also ask if we can contact them
via WhatsApp or Facebook. One advantage in this respect is that we provide everybody
with some support (CV in German). The treatment group is rather easy to follow up
with. As the NGO offers additional support activities, the control group also had an
incentive to stay in touch with us. Sample attrition may thus be lower than for a simple
survey, where the individuals have no gain in remaining in the sample.
3.6.3 Non-Compliance
There are two form of non-compliance we need to be aware of. The first case happens
if participants who have been allocated to the control group receive the treatment. This
case can be excluded as the experiment design does not make it possible for the control
group to be added to the database. Refugees are not aware of the internal organisation
of the NGO and can not push for their CV to be included. The second case happens if
the participants of the treatment group do not receive the treatment. This could happen
if the NGO matches treated participants but they do not attend job interviews or accept
the position. This happens, for instance, if refugees attend full time German classes or if
they get an asylum rejection. Due to our follow up interview, we can identify these cases
in the data (It has been the case for two candidates in the pilot follow up). This will bias
our estimates towards zero.
30There are around 4,000 asylum seekers registered with the Munich branch of the Federal Employ-
ment Agency.
31Numbers are taken from the Munich municipality. Estimations are only rough approximations.
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3.6.4 Spillovers
Spillovers could occur if a candidate from the treatment group finds work and then
recommends his friend, who is in the control group, to his employer. If this person then
gets hired, he has received spillovers from the treatment group. The best we can do in
this situation is to observe the spillover.32 These spillovers are interesting in themselves
and can be analysed further. As spillovers trigger a positive effect for the control group,
this would bias our effect towards zero.
3.6.5 Displacement Effects
One worry in labour market experiments is that participants of the treatment group
obtain jobs that might have been filled by the control group in the absence of the ex-
periment. If there is a limited number of jobs and both control and treatment group
are competing for these jobs, then this is a valid concern. Crepon et al. (2013) find that
displacement effects are particularly strong in labour markets with high unemployment.
We think that displacement effects are of limited importance in the context of our ex-
periment for two reasons. First Munich has a very low unemployment rate and the 150
people in our treatment group seem small given the large number of vacancies in Munich.
Second, most companies indicated that they would be willing to hire additional people if
they have the required German and technical skills. So the amount of vacancies does not
seem to be the limiting factor. However, if one thinks about expanding the programme
in terms of size or in location, then one would need to take general equilibrium effects
into consideration.
3.6.6 Ethical Concerns
Doing experiments with a vulnerable group of people is a sensitive issue and we needed
to ensure that we do not harm anyone participating in our experiment. It was critical to
32We ask the name of the company in the follow up survey and we also ask how the person has found
the work.
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make sure that people in the control group are not put in an unfair position and we did
not deprive them from finding a job. We ensured this in two ways. First, we collected
many more CVs than the NGO could match to the available vacancies. The NGO is
newly established, has less than 10 full-time staff and thus limited capacity. We made
sure that at any time they had more suitable CVs than open positions. Thus, they were
already working at full capacity with the treatment group. Second, the participants in
the control group will be added to the database one year later. Through this phased-in
design we ensured that everyone receives the treatment in the end, timing being the only
difference. Furthermore, we provided both the control and the treatment groups with a
CV in German and valuable information on the job search in Munich and we made sure
to communicate to the control group in a way that they did not expect a guaranteed
job from the NGO. We also guaranteed compliance with the recommendations from the
Ethics commission of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Munich.
To ensure that we follow data protection requirements of the Bavarian government and
the university, we had a consent declaration of every participant that specified that we
were allowed to use their data for research purposes (see appendix B). This form is in
accordance with Bavarian Data Protection Law. We treated the data in a pseudonymised
way and made sure that no confidential data is distributed to third persons. In particular,
we saved the personal identification in a separate place and only merged it for follow-up
purposes.
3.7 Conclusions and Policy Implications
To conclude, this paper has provided new insights into the labour market integration
of recently arrived refugees in Germany. Apart from missing language skills, job search
and matching frictions seem to be a major concern, as refugees do not know where to
search and only rarely use the internet in their job search. The most successful strategies
to find a job were matching services provided by an NGO and a network of friends
and relatives. As the majority of job-seeking refugees, however, have not found a job
after six month, there seems to be scope for more support. We currently conduct the
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described randomized controlled trial to provide a more causal analysis and evaluation
of the usefulness of matching services.
More educated refugees and refugees who have stayed in Germany for a longer time are
better integrated into the society. Additionally, refugees who work are better integrated
on average. The results from the experiment will show if there is a causal relationship
between finding work and integration outcomes.
Beside the better support that is needed to promote the labour market integration of
refugees, there are several labour market regulations that need to be removed to guaran-
tee a free and efficient labour market entry for refugees. These labour market regulations
include the residency requirement, the priority rule, the prohibition of temporary em-
ployment agencies and the prohibition of self employment during the asylum process. In
the framework of the new German Integration Law (“Integrationsgesetz”), the residency
requirement was made stricter and the priority rule and the prohibition of temporary
employment agencies were lifted in most German cities but kept in most Bavarian cities
including Munich due to political reasons.33
First, most refugees are randomly allocated to a certain municipality and are required to
live there during and also after the asylum process as long as they are receiving social
benefits. Many times refugees also are reallocated to different municipalities during their
asylum process. This residency requirement reduces the possibility of finding employment
as the search radius is restricted. While it is theoretically possible to make a transfer
request once a refugee has found work in another municipality, practically speaking this
is extremely very difficult due to a long lasting process and severe bureaucratic hurdles.
Godoy (2016) and Aslund and Rooth (2007) show that refugees in Sweden and Norway,
who have randomly been allocated to areas with bad labour market outcomes for im-
migrants, experience persistent reductions in wages and employment. Dustmann et al.
(2016a) shows that the acceptance of refugees by the local population is higher in urban
areas.
33The priority rule and the prohibition to work for temporary employment agencies are still in place
in: Bavaria (only: Aschaffenburg, Bayreuth-Hof, Bamberg-Coburg, Fuerth, Nuremberg, Schweinfurt,
Weiden, Augsburg, Munich, Passau, Traunstein), in Northrhine Westphalia (only: Bochum, Dortmund,
Duisburg, Essen, Gelsenkirchen, Oberhausen, Recklinghausen) and in the entire Mecklenburg-Hither
Pomerania.
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Second, the priority rule is making it difficult for firms to hire asylum seekers. The
priority rule regulates that a firm can hire asylum seekers only if they cannot find a
suitable German, EU, EEA citizen or recognized refugee to fill the position. This priority
review is conducted by the foreigners office before the hiring process and typically takes
several weeks. This creates a burden for the firm as it increases hiring time, effort and
uncertainty. A German-wide removal of the priority review would make it easier for firms
to hire asylum seekers and thus increase their success on the labour market.
Third, asylum seekers are allowed to work for temporary employment agencies only 15
months after arrival in Germany. This is preventing refugees from utilising an important
stepping stone into the labour market. Jahn and Rosholm (2013) and Jahn and Rosholm
(2014) find that temporary employment agencies facilitate immigrants labour market
entry as it reduces information asymmetries, allows a firm to screen a worker at little cost
and provides the refugee with contacts, on-the-job language training and country specific
human capital. The studies further confirm that immigrants benefit in the long term
from their temporary employment experience as they earn higher wages and have a higher
employment probability in regular employment. Temporary employment agencies thus
have the potential to ease refugees labour market integration and remaining restrictions
should be lifted.
Fourth, an additional restriction asylum applicants face is the prohibition of self employ-
ment. Once an asylum request is accepted, this prohibition is lifted but significant entry
barriers such as regulations, permits and financial constraints remain. This limits the
potential labour market integration of refugees as, according to our baseline survey, 49
percent have experience being self employed before arriving in Germany. A majority (72
percent) of our surveyed refugees could imagine being self employed in Germany but have
not tried this step so far. Caliendo and Kuenn (2011) for example show that start-up sub-
sidies in Germany had long-lasting positive effects on wages and employment, especially
for low educated unemployed. Thus there is the possibility of improving refugees labour
market integration by reducing barriers to self employment. Further research is neces-
sary to evaluate what policies are most effective to stimulate successful self employment
of refugees.
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Chapter 4
Household Behaviour in Times of
Political Change:
Evidence from Egypt∗
4.1 Introduction
“Enough is enough! We want change. Enough of this man ruling all these years. We
don’t want inherited rule. This is a state, not a kingdom.”
From the Guardian 1/25/2011, quote of an Egyptian student in Tahrir Square, Cairo.
On 11 February 2011 long lasting protests and demonstrations in Egypt led to President
Mubarak stepping down after 30 years in power. This paper exploits this major polit-
ical change in Egypt to analyse how households respond to and cope with a politically
unstable environment. Social unrest and instability is not uncommon in many countries
and analysing how these sporadic yet recurrent events affect households is critical in
understanding development.
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Almedina Music.
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To study the effects of the outbreak of the Egyptian Revolution we rely on two datasets.
We combine the representative Egypt Household Income, Expenditure and Consump-
tion Survey with survey rounds in 2009, 2011 and 2013 with the Wiki Thawra dataset,
a unique statistical record of all individuals arrested, injured or killed during political
protests throughout the country. This unique dataset allows us to measure not only
exposure to violence but also exposure to varying intensities of the revolution. Our key
assumption is that, while everyone is aware of the casualties and violence occurring dur-
ing demonstrations and protests through various media channels, individuals are more
sensitive to casualties in their area of residence because of the increased perception that
they themselves or relatives and friends could be affected. Using a difference-in-difference
estimator and comparing affected and less affected households, we study several dimen-
sions along which households may respond to the political change and unstable environ-
ment: 1) household income and expenditure; 2) education related investment choices by
child’s education level and gender; 3) health expenditure; and 4) household savings. We
also analyse heterogeneous effects along income levels and location (rural/urban) of the
household.
Our findings show that the political change and unstable environment had sizeable ef-
fects on household behaviour in Egypt, even after controlling for a set of socio-economic
variables. While we do not identify strong effects on overall income and expenditures, we
observe that households increase education spending as a percentage of total expenditure
indicating an increased preference for education after the political change. Specifically,
households increase overall education expenditures by 11 percent and this increase seems
to be driven by households with sons enrolled at the higher education level. Educa-
tion expenditures for daughters remain unaffected indicating a gender bias and a strong
preference for the education of sons. We do not observe expenditure effects on children
at primary school level and only weak results for the secondary education level. Fur-
thermore, households living in close proximity of violent events decrease their health
expenditures by 23 percent, and this result is mainly driven by households with a high
income level. Affected households also save a larger share of their income after the out-
break of the revolution. This result is particularly driven by high-income households. We
test the validity of our findings by conducting a range of robustness checks (excluding
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Cairo, constructing different measures of political instability) and placebo tests to which
our estimates remain robust.
We further explore some channels that could explain our results. We interpret the increase
in savings and decrease in health expenditure as precautionary behaviour due to an
uncertain environment. To explain the increase in education expenditure we look into two
additional data sources: election outcome data of the 2012 presidential election and the
Arab Democracy Barometer Survey. We find that the increase in education expenditures
is particularly prominent in areas where households were in favour of a regime change.
We argue that after the fall of Mubarak those households had a positive outlook towards
the future, with better labour market prospects, and therefore invested more in their
sons’ education.
Our research is related to several strands of the literature. Cross-country analyses at the
macro-level have shown that political instability and civil unrest are barriers to economic
development in terms of growth, investment and saving rates (Alesina and Perotti, 1996;
Alesina et al., 1996; Barro, 1991; Yiannis P. Venieris, 1986).1 There is also a growing
literature on the micro-level effects of violence on non-income variables in the context of
developing countries generally identifying negative effects on variables of interest. For
example, Akresh et al. (2011) and Leon (2012) show negative effects on educational
attainment in post-conflict Rwanda and Peru respectively. Shemyakina (2011) looks
at the 1992-1998 conflict in Tajikistan and finds that exposure to violence leads to a
lower likelihood of being enrolled in school, especially for girls. There is also research
showing negative effects on health outcomes e.g. in Burundi (Bundervoet et al., 2009),
Cote d’Ivoire (Minoiu and Shemyakina, 2012) and Colombia (Camacho, 2008). Thirdly,
this paper is also related to the literature investigating whether violence changes the
perception of risk and economic decisions. Aaberge et al. (2014) find that, in line with
a precautionary savings model, households save more following a political shock in the
context of China.
1Existing research shows that episodes of social unrest and their associated market disruptions, even
if short-lived, may have long-term consequences, especially in low-income countries where individuals
lack savings, insurance, and other formal means of coping with shocks. (See for example Frankenberg
et al. (2003) on household responses to the Asian Financial Crisis in Indonesia, McKenzie (2003) on
Mexican Peso Crisis, and Stillman and Thomas (2008) on the 1996-1998 economic crisis in Russia)
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Callen et al. (2014) investigate the relationship between violence and economic risk pref-
erences in Afghanistan and identify a preference for certainty with more exposure to
violence. Large adverse shocks can thus alter savings and investments decisions, and po-
tentially have long-run consequences - even if the shocks themselves are temporary. Dupas
and Robinson (2012) study the economic and social consequences of a post-election cri-
sis in Kenya and find that in addition to lost income, workers engaged in riskier health
behaviour. On the other hand, Voors et al. (2012) examine the impact of exposure to
conflict on social, risk and time preferences and find that individuals exposed to violence
display more altruistic behaviour towards their neighbours, are more risk-seeking, and
have higher discount rates.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, and most importantly, we analyse a
major and unanticipated intense political crisis which has had significant effects in many
countries in the Middle East, including Egypt, a country that has not been extensively
researched by the literature. While previous literature has shown that civil war has
devastating effects on affected communities, our contribution is to show that violence and
unrest, a milder and more common form of conflict, can also have important significant
effects on the behaviour of households. Our unique dataset allows us to analyse the effects
of violence and political change on a geographically disaggregated level with detailed
information on the intensity of the events. Second, we add to the literature on the
response of households to shocks by exploring the relation between violence and political
change, education and health expenditure as well as savings. We offer an innovative
and new interpretation of a surprising result - the increase in education expenditure of
affected households - although this result needs to be observed with caution due to a
small sample size. Third, this paper contributes to the large literature on risk-coping
and decision making after large and traumatising aggregate shocks. We contribute to
this literature by showing the effects of violent demonstrations and protests on savings
behaviour in the context of post-revolution Egypt.
The paper is organised in the following way: Section 2 provides an overview of the
outbreak of the Egyptian Revolution and the economic and political context in Egypt.
Section 3 describes our data and presents descriptive statistics and Section 4 describes
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the empirical identification strategy. Section 5 discusses results and Section 6 provides
a heterogeneity analysis. Section 7 shows robustness checks and Section 8 discusses our
channels. The final Section concludes.
4.2 Egypt and the 25 January Revolution
4.2.1 Context: The 25 January Revolution
On 17 December 2010, a 26-year old Tunisian man set himself on fire after abusive police
confiscated his unlicensed vegetable cart, his only source of income. This desperate
act of protest inspired a movement that swept the country and ignited calls for reform
throughout the region. On 25 January 2011, Egyptians from a range of socio-economic
and religious backgrounds came together by the thousands to launch a massive pro-
democratic movement throughout the country and demanded the overthrow of President
Hosni Mubarak. The sparks behind the outbreak were various political and legal issues,
including police brutality, lack of free elections and freedom of speech, corruption and
economic issues such as high unemployment and low wages2. Eighteen days of mass
protests forced Hosni Mubarak to resign in February 2011, after three decades in power.
Following Mubarak’s resignation, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) as-
sumed presidential powers. Parliamentary elections in 2012 saw an overwhelming victory
for the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party. In June 2012, Mohammed
Morsi (Muslim Brotherhood party) was elected president with 52 percent of votes. Pub-
lic opposition to Morsi began to build in November 2012, when he issued a decree granting
himself far-reaching powers, and were fuelled by the passage of what some considered an
Islamist-leaning draft constitution. Morsi was deposed by the military in June 2013 after
thousands of protesters took to the streets and he was replaced by an interim govern-
ment. Security forces then launched a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, killing
almost 1,000 people at two pro-Morsi sit-ins in Cairo and Giza. In December 2013, a
2See archives of numerous newspaper articles including in Al Jazeera, The Economist, France 24,
Reuters etc.
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constituent assembly finished drafting a new constitution to replace the 2012 charter.
Since then, Egypt has been polarised between supporters of the interim government and
the military on one side, and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and those who fear
the authorities have become too repressive on the other side. We have summarised the
key dates of the Egyptian Revolution below:
• 25 January 2011: Outbreak of the Egyptian Revolution forcing President Mo-
barak to resign.
• 18 June 2012: First elections held since President Hosni Mobarak stepped down.
The Muslim Brotherhood Party represented by Mohammed Morsi wins the election.
• 3 July 2013: Mohammed Morsi is desposed by the military and replaced by an
interim government.
• 8 June 2014: Abdel Fattah El-Sisi (previously head of the Egyptian Armed Forces)
is sworn into office as President.
• Since: Occasional demonstrations and protests.
Figure 4.1: Death occurrence per month
picsdeath_over_time_picture.png
4.2.2 Context: Egypt
With over 83 million inhabitants, Egypt is the largest country in the Middle East and
North Africa. From the mid-2000s to 2011, the Egyptian economy has been growing at a
strong pace. Since 2011, the macroeconomic picture has deteriorated due to unresolved
political tensions. The GDP growth rate in Egypt averaged 3.69 percent from 1992 until
2014, reaching an all time high of 7.30 percent in the first quarter of 2008 and a record low
of -4.30 percent in the first quarter of 2011. In terms of the Human Development Index
(HDI) of Egypt, reported by the United Nations to measure the progress of a country,
Egypt scored 0.682 points in 2013, leaving it in 104th place in the table of 178 countries
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published. Egypt is divided into 27 governorates and each governorate has a capital. The
governorates are further divided into regions or districts.
Egypt is going through a demographic phase marked by a significant portion of young
people in the population that is projected to increase in the next decade. With past high
rates of population growth, the current age structure is heavily weighted towards the
young: one-third of the population is under the age of 14, and another third is between
the ages of 15 and 29. While this age structure can be advantageous to a country,
the pressure to provide employment opportunities is enormous. This paper focuses on
changes in education and health expenditure as well as savings following the outbreak of
the Egyptian Revolution in January 2011. It is useful to start by briefly providing basic
information concerning the education and health system in Egypt.
The adult literacy rate of 67 percent does not reflect the historically high primary school
enrolment and completion rates, calling into question the efficacy of primary education.
The school system consists of six years of primary school education (age 6-12), three
years of preparatory school (age 13-15) and three years of either general or vocational
secondary school (age 16-18). Compulsory schooling ends after the 9th grade. Those
students who graduate from the general secondary school can enter university (roughly
30 percent per cohort). Upper secondary education and higher education are heavily
oriented towards academic university degrees, instead of towards the skills demanded
in the labour market. At all levels of the education system, parents can chose whether
they wish to send their children to the public education institutions or to higher quality
but also more expensive private institutions. According to the Ministry of Education,
the share of public expenditures on education is about 12.5 percent, close to that of the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, which calls
for efficiency improving.
Egypt manages a complex social security system, including employment services, social
insurance (health, pension, and unemployment) and social assistance (food and fuel subsi-
dies and cash transfers). The system faces significant challenges, in particular high youth
unemployment, a large informal sector, and costly untargeted subsidies, which are a large
burden on the budget. In Egypt, the health care system provides health care services
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through three channels. These channels are: the public sector, the private sector and the
civil society. While the government provides basic and emergency care through public
hospitals, many times Egyptians need to pay for better or special treatment. Health care
costs can cause financial hardship directly via health care payments, and indirectly due
to lost income resulting from the inability to work. Some households may use savings,
borrowing or selling assets to cope with health shocks. Other households with limited
resources may have no option but to cut their spending on necessary goods to cover their
health expenses. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO) database, the
share of the government in total health spending declined from 41.7 percent in 2010 to 37
percent in 2011 putting more burden on households. So-called out-of-pocket payments
account for about 60 percent of total health spending.
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Findings of this paper rely on two main data sources: the Egypt Household Income, Ex-
penditure and Consumption Survey (HIECS) collected by the Central Agency for Public
Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS) and “Wiki Thawra”3 an independent statistical
database of the Egyptian Revolution, collected by the Egyptian Center for Economic and
Social Rights.
4.3.1 The Household Survey
The Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey (HIECS) is administered
by the CAPMAS and made available by the Economic Research Forum4. The survey was
conducted every five years until 2009 and is now implemented every two years. In this
study, we use three rounds of the HIECS: 2008-2009, 2010-2011 and 2012-2013 (in short
2009, 2011, and 2013). Survey samples are nationally representative and stratified by
governorate, and urban and rural substrata. The original full samples of the 2009 survey
3http://wikithawra.wordpress.com/
4www.erf.org.eg
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included 48,000 households, but starting from 2011 the survey includes a smaller sample
of 16,000 households. The households are selected via a multi-stage random process from
a master sample constructed from the 2006 population census. The survey period of each
HIECS extends over a 12 months period, starting from July and ending in June of the
following year. Households were observed for two continuous weeks to collect information
on food expenditure.
The HIECS is one of the largest household surveys and has been used extensively for
the study of poverty and living standards in Egypt. The survey includes information on
various aspects of a household’s income, expenditure and consumption. The CAPMAS
provides researchers with access to only 50 percent of observations of the HIECS. Also,
the household questionnaire contains much more detailed questions on all sorts of expen-
ditures but not all responses have been published by the institutions. The quality of the
Egyptian household survey data has been assessed by the World Bank (2014), a study
that carried out a number of quality tests on the data related to income and expenditure.
The study did not find relevant problems related to measurement, data input and item
non-response.
4.3.2 Revolution Intensity
The Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights’ project “Wiki Thawra” aims to
provide neutral documentation of Egypt’s revolution. Thawra is Arabic and means “rev-
olution”. Wiki Thawra aggregates a large quantity of material, including videos, news
clips, official and human rights reports, and lists those killed, injured and detained since
25 January 2011. With a comprehensive and detailed inventory of those killed during
protests, Wiki Thawra tracks recent events from the outbreak of the January 25 Rev-
olution to the ouster of former President Mohamed Morsi in 2013. According to Wiki
Thawra 1983 individuals have been killed in protests and demonstration from 25 Jan-
uary 2011 to 30 June 2013 throughout the country. The database contains information
on each victim including the day of death, event, exact place of death as well as personal
information such as age, profession, address etc. Reputable NGO’s such as Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch and others are relying on the data of Wiki Thawra.
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We have combined the two datasets at the governorate level (see Table 4.1). The Wiki
Thawra database would allow a more disaggregated analysis as we can observe the address
of each individual included in the database. The household questionnaire does include
information at district level, but this data is neither publicly available nor available upon
request. Table 4.1 provides the population number by region and shows the fraction
of death occurrences by population, sorted by death occurrences as a fraction of the
population size in each region. The significance of a given number of deaths in a domestic
disturbance or a civil war clearly depends to some extent on the size of the population.
Thus, the number of deaths are measured in per capita, not in absolute, terms. As
expected, Cairo witnessed the highest number of death occurrences in total numbers.
However, some small regions (North Sinai, Port Said, South Sinai, Suez) appear to be
more strongly affected when the population size is taken into account. We can see that
only the Red Sea region has not experienced any death occurrences.
Table 4.1: Death occurrence by governorate between January 2011 and June 2013
Region Population Number of deaths Per 10,000 inhabitants
North Sinai 395,000 118 2.9873
Port Said 628,000 144 2.2929
South Sinai 159,000 20 1.2578
Suez 576,000 61 1.0590
Cairo 8,762,000 650 0.7418
New Valley 208,000 15 0.7211
Alexandria 4,509,000 150 0.3326
Ismailia 1,077,000 32 0.2971
Matrouh 389,000 11 0.2827
Giza 6,979,000 183 0.2622
Faiyum 2,882,000 65 0.2255
Asyut 3,888,000 81 0.2083
Qalyubia 4,754,000 90 0.1893
Beni Suef 2,597,000 28 0.1078
Beheira 5,327,000 52 0.0976
Gharbia 4,439,000 38 0.0856
Monufia 3,657,000 25 0.0683
Minia 4,701,000 27 0.0574
Damietta 1,240,000 7 0.0564
Qena 2,801,000 14 0.0499
Dakahlia 5,559,000 26 0.0467
Asuan 1,323,000 6 0.0453
Al Sharqia 6,010,000 27 0.0449
Sohag 4,211,000 17 0.0403
Luxor 1,064,000 3 0.0281
Kafr El Sheikh 2,940,000 8 0.0272
Red Sea 321,000 0 0
Total 81,396,000 1983 0.2436
Notes: Source: Population numbers from CAPMAS (as of January 2012) and number of deaths from Wiki Thawra for the
period 25.January 2011 to 30.June 2013. Column 4 shows the relative number of deaths, dividing column 3 by column 2
and multiplying by 10,000.
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Figure 4.2 displays the geographical distribution of death occurrences between January
2011 and June 2013. Based on the Wiki Thawra database, we created three revolution
intensity levels: weak, medium and strong. A weak intensity group witnessed less than
10 deaths in their region and contains one third of all observations. The strong (medium)
intensity group witnessed more than 160 death occurrences (between 11 and 159) and
contains one third of all observations. We have conducted robustness checks by creating
several other intensity measures (by number of regions, relative number of deaths etc.) to
verify whether we receive different results but the results were consistent with any type
of intensity measure. The reason for this is that regions typically change their position
in the ranking only slightly if we use alternative measures and thus they stay in the same
category of weak, medium or strong treatment. To summarise, strongly affected regions
have witnessed a relatively high number of death occurrences. These regions are marked
in dark blue in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Egypt revolution intensity at governorate level
(0.283, 1]
(0.057, 0.283]
[0, 0.057]
Notes: Deaths per 10.000 inhabitants.
4.3.3 Measuring Political Instability
Social and political instability is hard to define and to measure in a way which can be
used for econometric work. Political instability can be viewed in two ways. The first
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one emphasises executive instability. The second one is based upon indicators of social
unrest and political violence.
The first approach defines political instability as the ’propensity to observe government
changes’. These changes can be ’constitutional’, i.e. take place within the law, or ’un-
constitutional’, i.e. they can be coups d’etat. The basic idea is that a high propensity
to executive changes is associated with political uncertainty. Alesina and Perotti (1996)
investigate the relationship between political instability and per capita GDP growth and
find that in countries with a high propensity of government collapse, growth is signifi-
cantly lower. Yiannis P. Venieris (1986) identify an inverse relationship between political
instability and the savings rate. In their paper, political instability introduces a new
element of uncertainty in the decision-making calculus of the economic actor since it
is usually perceived as a precursor of conceivable changes in the governmental regime,
which, in turn, may affect one’s future level of accumulated wealth and income.
The second approach to measuring political instability is constructing an index which
summarises various variables capturing phenomena of social unrest. Our paper is in line
with the second approach, although it is not the first one aiming to measure political in-
stability by focusing on the number of deaths occurring during demonstrations. Notably,
Barro (1991) uses indicators such as number of assassinations, the occurrence of violent
revolutions and military coups in a cross-country analysis to study their effects on average
growth levels on a large sample of countries. Alesina and Perotti (1996) study the effects
of income distribution on investment, by focusing on political instability as the channel
which links these two variables. Their paper relies on an index constructed by using
information on the number of politically motivated assassinations; the number of people
killed during mass violences as a fraction of total population; the number of successful
coups etc. An important reference on this point is Hibbs (1973), who uses the method
of principal components to construct such an index. Gupta (1990), Özler and Tabellini
(1991) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1992) have used several indices of socio-political insta-
bility as an explanatory variable in various regressions in which the dependent variable
is growth, savings or investment.
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4.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
This Section aims at providing some basic descriptive statistics. Table 4.2 contains sum-
mary statistics of the Egypt Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey
across all three time periods we are observing (2009, 2011 and 2013). We look at several
variables such as household total expenditure, total disposable income, some household
characteristics, and focus on expenses on education by educational level, health expenses
as well as savings. In the Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey all
expenditure variables are recorded as yearly amounts. The data is deflated using specific
inflation rates that differ by rural and urban region and by expenditure category (specific
education and health inflation rates). 2009 and 2011 (column 1 and 2) show outcomes for
households before the revolution started and 2013 (third column) presents outcomes for
households after the revolution had started. We observe that between 2009 and 2011 to-
tal expenditure and all education related expenditures have increased. Between 2011 and
2013, however, these expenditures have decreased. Medical expenses increase continually
over the years, whereas savings decrease between the first two rounds and increase again
between 2011 and 2013. The number of earners per household as well as the household
size (number of persons) decreased over the three survey years. There are over 7000
households observed in each survey year.
It is worth mentioning that the variable expenditure on education includes expenses for all
education levels and does not cover expenditure on educational materials such as books,
catering and transport services. Education expenses by education level (primary, sec-
ondary and tertiary) also include costs of private tutoring and tutoring groups. Expenses
on health include medical products, appliances and equipment, outpatient services, and
hospital services. Payments for health insurances are excluded. Savings are calculated
by deducing total expenditure from total disposable income.
The revolution started on 25 January 2011. However, we consider the two survey years
2009 and 2011 as the pre-revolution phase, and only 2013 as post-revolution. This is
mainly because the relevant variables on household expenditure and income are provided
on an annual basis and we consider the few months after 25 January 2011 as too short to
identify any effect of the revolution. Therefore, the survey year 2010/2011 is considered
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as pre-revolution in our analysis. We have conducted a robustness check by running the
same estimations without the year 2010/2011 and we receive consistent results.
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics by year
2009 2011 2013 Total
Total expenditures 18025.4 19042.4 18707.3 18586.0
(14328.0) (14294.1) (11752.8) (13538.9)
Total disposable income 21838.9 21533.3 21712.4 21695.9
(24750.0) (17738.7) (15398.5) (19779.3)
Net wages 13791.8 14273.9 15288.9 14430.2
(11321.1) (11059.9) (10698.2) (11055.0)
Number of earners 1.781 1.735 1.646 1.722
(0.955) (0.933) (0.868) (0.922)
Expenses on education 1087.3 1266.3 1145.8 1163.7
(3473.8) (3942.2) (2486.8) (3355.9)
Expenses on primary education 475.2 562.7 509.9 514.3
(2048.5) (1379.9) (990.1) (1559.2)
Expenses on secondary education 910.1 1027.1 968.9 967.3
(2298.4) (2607.7) (1670.5) (2221.7)
Expenses on tertiary education 1296.4 1887.0 1453.9 1518.2
(3080.8) (5960.0) (3870.4) (4342.6)
Education exp. as % of total expenditure 0.0409 0.0438 0.0432 0.0426
(0.0516) (0.0535) (0.0529) (0.0526)
Expenses on health 999.2 1702.1 1911.1 1529.4
(3098.4) (2872.5) (2828.0) (2963.7)
Eavings 3813.5 2490.9 3005.1 3109.9
(17945.3) (10245.1) (8150.0) (12918.5)
Observations 7913 7719 7528 23160
Notes: This table shows the mean and the standard deviation in brackets. Data is deflated, using 2010 as the basis year.
The price index is based on information provided by CAPMAS. These figures are annual numbers for the Egyptian financial
year, i.e. 2009 means July 2008-June 2009. Source: CAPMAS and ERF, Egyptian Household, Income and Expenditure
Survey (HIECS).
Table 4.3 provides basic descriptive statistics for the different governorates by revolution
intensity (weak, medium and strong) in 2013. There are considerable differences among
households living in these three regions. Total expenditure, income and wages are much
higher in the strongly affected regions. Overall education expenditure in strongly affected
regions is double the expenditure in weakly affected regions (three times as high for
primary education). When it comes to health expenditures, however, there are only small
differences. Savings are slightly lower in strongly affected areas. Overall, we observe 7528
households in 2013 with a slightly higher number in weakly affected areas.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics by revolution intensity (in 2013)
Weak Medium Strong Total
Total expenditures 17422.1 17745.1 21043.0 18707.3
(9330.6) (10085.5) (14872.2) (11752.8)
Total disposable income 20455.9 20954.4 23825.7 21712.4
(12565.5) (14785.0) (18344.3) (15398.5)
Net wages 14792.4 14067.5 16852.4 15288.9
(9509.0) (9641.7) (12379.4) (10698.2)
Number of earners 1.610 1.729 1.610 1.646
(0.851) (0.925) (0.827) (0.868)
Expenses on education 806.5 676.7 2004.1 1145.8
(1604.2) (1393.9) (3672.5) (2486.8)
Expenses on primary education 311.4 295.9 978.7 509.9
(463.8) (515.1) (1533.9) (990.1)
Expenses on secondary education 707.0 594.1 1648.6 968.9
(897.3) (1113.7) (2451.6) (1670.5)
Expenses on tertiary education 1024.0 1077.6 2103.1 1453.9
(2949.5) (2232.3) (5163.6) (3870.4)
Education exp. as % of total expenditure 0.0341 0.0282 0.0686 0.0432
(0.0424) (0.0363) (0.0667) (0.0529)
Expenses on health 1928.1 1737.8 2054.5 1911.1
(2575.0) (2313.7) (3460.6) (2828.0)
Savings 3033.8 3209.3 2782.7 3005.1
(7024.1) (8830.4) (8646.3) (8150.0)
Observations 2763 2298 2467 7528
Notes: This table shows the mean and the standard deviation in brackets. Data is deflated, using 2010 as the basis year.
The price index is based on information provided by CAPMAS. These figures are annual numbers for the Egyptian financial
year, i.e. 2009 means July 2008-June 2009. Weak (Strong) means the 33 percent least (most) affected regions (measured
in number of deaths). Source: CAPMAS and ERF, Egyptian Household, Income and Expenditure Survey (HIECS).
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4.4 Empirical Identification Strategy
In this paper, we provide evidence on how households respond to political instability
and political change using the outset of the Egyptian Revolution on 25 January 2011 as
a quasi-natural experiment. This involves answering the counterfactual question: what
would have been the household’s behaviour in terms of expenditure, income and consump-
tion in the absence of the Egyptian Revolution? Obviously, it is impossible to observe
the same household in these two scenarios at the same time and therefore, we rely on the
construction of a counterfactual to assess the impact of an increased politically unstable
environment. Although the Egyptian Revolution affected the entire country, it is possible
to differentiate the intensity of the revolution by region.
One key assumption behind our approach is that individuals living closer to violent
demonstrations and casualties are more sensitive, because of the higher perception that
they themselves or relatives may be affected. While everyone is aware of the violent
events through various media channels, households residing in higher risk areas are more
likely to feel insecure and at risk.
We measure political instability by the number of deaths per region that occurred during
political demonstrations. Violences and deaths are to a large extent unpredictable events.
To account explicitly for the possibility that households in the affected regions had differ-
ent time-invariant characteristics, the identification strategy is based on the comparison
of household expenditure, income and consumption before and after the outbreak of the
Egyptian Revolution in weakly, medium and strongly affected regions. This approach
could be interpreted as a continuous difference-in-difference analysis (Meyer, 1995).
Suppose that there are two groups indexed by treatment status D = 0, 1 where D = 0
indicates households living in a region where very few or no violences took place, i.e.
the control group, and D = 1 indicates households living in a region that was affected
by violences, i.e. the treatment group. We take into account that the intensity of the
revolution varies by region, therefore the treatment variable has different intensities mea-
sured by the number of death occurrences (medium and strong) across regions. Assume
that we observe households in two time periods, t = 0, 1 where t = 0 indicates a time
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period before treatment i.e. before the revolution started, in our dataset this would be
the years 2008/9 and 2010/11 and t = 1 indicates a time period after treatment i.e. after
the revolution started, in our dataset this would be the year 2012/13. The outcome is
modeled by the following equation:
yh,t = α + βDm/s + γt+ δ(Dm/s ∗ t) + λXh,t + h,t (4.1)
where h and t are household and time indices. X consists of a number of additional
controls, such as household size, education of the household head and rural area. The
coefficients given by α, β, γ, δ are all unknown parameters and  is a random, unobserved
“error” term which contains all determinants of yh that the model omits. The coefficients
in the equation have the following interpretation:
α = constant
β = treatment group specific effect (to account for average permanent differences
between treatment and control group)
γ = time trend common to control and treatment groups
δ = treatment effect for coefficient of interest
The purpose of the analysis is to find a good estimate of δ through a difference-in-
difference approach. The difference-in-difference estimator is defined as the difference in
average outcome in the treatment group before and after treatment minus the difference
in average outcome in the control group before and after treatment:
δDD = [E(treatedafter)− E(treatedbefore)] - [E(controlafter)− E(controlafter)]
The method of estimation is least squares and clustered standard errors at the governorate
level are calculated throughout. For the main specification above to yield causal estimates
of the treatment effects, we rely on two assumptions: 1. Exogenous revolution pattern;
2. Common trend assumption. We complement this with a placebo test.
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4.4.1 Balancing Test
Table 4.4 provides a balancing test for 2009 including the mean and standard deviation
for each variable of interest as well as the t-test for the difference of means. We have
split the governorates by revolution intensity i.e. low, medium and strong. Low means
that this group was weakly or not affected by the revolution in terms of number of
death occurrences. This is our control group. The other two groups were affected by an
increasing intensity level. A balancing test allows us to understand if the affected areas
(by intensity level) had different baseline characteristics in 2009 (pre-revolution). We can
see that the difference between the control group (i.e. low) is not significantly different
from the medium affected group (column 5). This means that the baseline characteristics
of these two groups are very similar i.e. they are comparable. The difference between the
strongly affected group and the other two, however, is significant, which means that the
baseline characteristics of these comparison groups are quite different and they cannot
be compared easily. The only variable where the difference is insignificant across groups
is the variable for savings suggesting that savings behaviour is similar across all three
groups. In the difference-in-difference analysis it is not problematic to have different
baseline characteristics, as long as the trends are the same. We will analyse this in the
next subsection.
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Table 4.4: Balance table, 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Low Medium Strong t-test M-L t-test S-L t-test S-M
Total expenditure 18586.03 16889.62 16933.25 21816.32 43.63 4926.69*** 4883.06***
(13538.93) (9738.98) (9958.22) (18266.89) (-0.27) (-19.57) (-21.70)
Total disposable income 21695.94 20067.15 20222.56 24671.45 155.41 4604.30*** 4448.89***
(19779.30) (15235.51) (20846.51) (21461.21) (-0.51) (-14.54) (-13.57)
Net wage 14430.22 13009.92 12861.02 17016.68 -148.90 4006.77*** 4155.66***
(11054.99) (9158.60) (9302.30) (13218.76) (0.78) (-16.44) (-19.24)
Rural residence 0.46 0.28 0.27 0.80 -0.01 0.52*** 0.53***
(0.50) (0.45) (0.45) (0.40) (0.92) (-73.54) (-80.07)
Number of earners 1.72 1.73 1.76 1.68 0.03 -0.05*** -0.08***
(0.92) (0.92) (0.95) (0.89) (-2.22) (3.24) (5.79)
Household size 4.48 4.52 4.71 4.20 0.18*** -0.33*** -0.51***
(2.05) (2.10) (2.16) (1.83) (-5.21) (9.93) (16.28)
Education expenditure 1163.70 736.39 703.95 2061.52 -32.44 1325.13*** 1357.56***
(3355.87) (1709.78) (1648.02) (5203.87) (0.90) (-14.81) (-17.71)
Primary education exp 514.28 289.98 284.18 1005.64 -5.80 715.65*** 721.45***
(1559.24) (540.09) (477.17) (2603.36) (0.46) (-14.03) (-16.61)
Secondary education exp 967.29 598.39 605.37 1745.67 6.98 1147.28*** 1140.31***
(2221.73) (793.22) (963.47) (3587.36) (-0.27) (-14.38) (-16.39)
Tertiary education exp 1518.23 1100.08 1067.30 2185.44 -32.78 1085.36*** 1118.14***
(4342.56) (3426.19) (3319.39) (5445.69) (0.18) (-4.35) (-4.90)
Education of total exp 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.07 -0.00 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (1.62) (-26.46) (-31.91)
Health expenditure 1529.43 1445.71 1383.96 1760.48 -61.75 314.77*** 376.52***
(2963.70) (2511.24) (3121.14) (3109.19) (1.30) (-6.54) (-7.76)
Savings 3109.91 3177.52 3289.30 2855.13 111.78 -322.39 -434.17
(12918.51) (10632.10) (16687.22) (9339.62) (-0.47) (1.94) (2.04)
Notes: This table shows differences in the control group (low) and the two treatment intensities (medium and strong)
for 2009. All figures are deflated, using 2010 as the basis. For column (1) to (4), it shows means and standard errors
in parenthesis: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Column 5-7 respectively show the mean difference between medium
treatment intensity and the control group, strong treatment intensity and the control group and medium and strong
treatment intensity (t-statistic in parenthesis). Source: CAPMAS and ERF, Egyptian Household, Income and Expenditure
Survey (HIECS).
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4.4.2 Common Trends Assumption
The difference-in-difference estimation strategy requires that the counterfactual trend
behaviour of treatment and control group is the same. Treatment, which is in our case
being exposed to a medium or high level revolution intensity, induces a deviation from
this common trend. Although the treatment and control regions can differ, this differ-
ence is meant to be captured by the respective region fixed effect. The common trends
assumption can be investigated by using data on multiple periods. We obtained data
of the Egypt Household, Expenditure and Consumption Survey for the 2000 and 2005.
This enables us to investigate the common trends assumption for the variables of interest.
For most variables, the graphs in Figure 4.3 and 4.4 provide strong visual evidence that
follow a common underlying trend, and a treatment effect that induces a deviation from
this trend. Figure 4.3 shows trends for total expenditure, total disposable income, net
wage, education expenditure, medical expenditure and savings (all in logarithms).
Figure 4.3: Trends for outcome variables
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Notes: Blue indicates weak, red medium and green strong treatment. The red line marks the onset of the
revolution. Data is deflated. Source: CAPMAS and ERF, Egyptian Household, Income and Expenditure
Survey (HIECS).
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Figure 4.4 shows trends for expenditure on education (all education levels) and well as
education expenditure by education level (primary, secondary and tertiary level, all in
logarithms).
Figure 4.4: Trends for education expenditure variables
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Notes: Blue indicates weak, red medium and green strong treatment. The red line marks the onset of the
revolution. Data is deflated. Source: CAPMAS and ERF, Egyptian Household, Income and Expenditure
Survey (HIECS).
4.4.3 Placebo Analysis
An important validity instrument of the assumptions in our research context is a placebo
test. The placebo test verifies whether treated and control regions have experienced dif-
ferent behaviour also during previous time periods, in the absence of the violent protests
and demonstrations. Table 4.5 provides a placebo test for the main outcome variables
using the year 2007 as the placebo year. The results of the placebo test confirms our
original assumption of the parallel trend in variables of interest across governorates that
were to a varying degree affected by the revolution. As we do not find any significant
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effects we can conclude that the results we identify are driven by the casualties during
violent demonstrations and protests.
Table 4.5: Placebo table, using 2007 as the revolution year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wages Tertiary education exp. Health expenditures Savings
Strong*2009 -0.0117 0.0477 -0.154 0.199
(0.0252) (0.189) (0.110) (0.130)
Medium*2009 0.0259 0.00831 0.0331 0.0591
(0.0227) (0.207) (0.118) (0.138)
Strong Revolution -0.149∗∗∗ -0.477∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ -0.646∗∗∗
(0.00860) (0.0383) (0.0313) (0.0414)
Medium Revolution -0.108∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗ 0.0172 -0.377∗∗∗
(0.00956) (0.0530) (0.0293) (0.0376)
after_placebo 0.205∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ -0.726∗∗∗
(0.0194) (0.153) (0.102) (0.130)
logtotdinc 0.675∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 1.899∗∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0437) (0.0211) (0.0850)
Observations 51232 8344 74197 63350
r2 0.574 0.282 0.366 0.354
Notes: This table shows the mean and the standard deviation in brackets, all standard errors are clustered at the governorate
level. Variables are measured in logarithms. Data is deflated and 2010 is the basis year. These figures are annual numbers
for the financial Egyptian year, i.e. 2009 means July 2008-June 2009. Controlling for urban, education of household head,
household composition. The source is CAPMAS and ERF, Egyptian Household, Income and Expenditure Survey (HIECS).
4.5 Estimation Results
In this paper we address the question whether and to which extent a politically unstable
environment affects household’s economic behaviour in terms of expenditure and savings.
This Section presents the estimation results on 1) overall income and expenditure; 2)
education expenditures (by education level and child); 3) health expenditures and 4)
savings. We show heterogeneous effects throughout the Section where applicable (by
income level and gender).
4.5.1 Average Effects on Income and Expenditures
Table 4.6 presents the results of our estimation with total expenditure, total expenditure
per capita, total disposable income and net wage and salaries as dependent variables.
These variables are not the primary focus of our analysis and the results are mainly pre-
sented to provide a complete picture of the revolution effects. The coefficients of interest
129
Household Behaviour in Times of Political Change
are the interaction terms Strong*2013 and Medium*2013. They illustrate households
after the revolution in medium or strongly affected areas. We can see that the revolution
had a sizeable and significant effect on almost all variables. Total expenditure decreased
by 3.0 percent in strongly affected areas. The revolution had the strongest effects on net
wage with a 12.1 percent decrease in strongly affected areas and a 3.8 percent decrease
in medium affected areas.
Table 4.6: The effects of the revolution on expenditure, income and wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
expenditures log(exp.) log (exp. p.c.) log(income) wages
Strong*2013 -934.9∗∗ -0.0296∗∗ -0.0166 -0.0235 -0.121∗∗∗
(382.7) (0.0129) (0.0156) (0.0419) (0.0307)
Medium*2013 -743.5∗ -0.00927 -0.0148 0.0980∗∗∗ -0.0377
(406.2) (0.0134) (0.0157) (0.0318) (0.0289)
Strong Revolution 5370.5∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0861∗∗∗ 0.0496∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗
(165.4) (0.00651) (0.00886) (0.0209) (0.0103)
Medium Revolution 2212.9∗∗∗ 0.0351∗∗∗ -0.00230 0.00977 -0.116∗∗∗
(218.9) (0.00519) (0.00652) (0.0127) (0.0104)
2013 285.5 0.0293∗∗ 0.0291∗∗ 0.0383 0.136∗∗∗
(299.2) (0.0113) (0.0126) (0.0278) (0.0241)
income 17844.6∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗
(2371.7) (0.0244) (0.0311) (0.0158)
Observations 23159 23159 23159 23159 15121
r2 0.583 0.853 0.780 0.389 0.445
Notes: This table shows the mean and standard errors (clustered at the governorate level) in parenthesis: * p=0.10, **
p=0.05, *** p=0.01. Data is deflated and 2010 is the basis year. These figures are annual numbers for the financial Egyptian
year. Controls: governorate, rural, household size, education of household head. Column (1) shows total expenditures,
column (2) total expenditures in logs, column (3) shows total per capita expenditures in logs and column (4) total disposable
income in logs. Column (5) shows a standardised measure of wages. Data source: CAPMAS/ERF, HIECS.
4.5.2 Effects on Education Expenditure
Analysing revolution effects on education expenditure is one of our main purposes for
this paper. Particularly in post-conflict contexts and in otherwise fragile states, educa-
tion plays a significant stabilising role. Education is the one public service that touches
the lives of most individuals and the quality of education is quickly apparent to most
people. Educational outcomes are fundamental in determining what opportunities are
available to an individual after leaving school. If, because of a politically unstable envi-
ronment, households invest less in their children’s education this would be another “cost”
of the Egyptian Revolution because of negative long-terms effects. Education is normally
paid by the parents who expect their children to benefit in the future (provided that
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expectations of returns to education are large enough) but at the same time opportunity
cost need to be taken into account. Theoretically, parental decision can go into two di-
rections: First, education is a consumption good and parents are altruistic. In case of
liquidity constraints, a redistributive policy is needed. Second, education is an investment
and because parents are considered selfish there is an underinvestment in education. In
this case, subsidising educational expenditure is needed.
With political instability, education expenditure can develop in both directions: House-
holds may chose to invest more in education because there is a possibility that returns
to education might increase with the prospective change of the political system. At
the same time, household may chose to disinvest in education because political insta-
bility makes it unlikely that returns to education will be sufficiently high. Also, with
household budget constraints, households may prefer family members to work in order to
smooth consumption. The empirical literature on the effects of idiosyncratic shocks shows
that in richer countries, like the United States, child health and education outcomes are
counter-cyclical: they improve during recessions. In poorer countries, mostly in Africa
and low-income Asia, the outcomes are pro-cyclical: infant mortality rises and school
enrollment and nutrition fall during recessions. In middle-income countries, the picture
is more nuanced: health outcomes are generally pro-cyclical and education outcomes
counter-cyclical.
Tables 4.7- 4.9 show our estimation results for all education related outcome variables.
Table 4.7 shows the effects of political instability (by revolution intensity) for overall
education expenditure by income level. Table 4.8 presents education expenditure by
child and by education level. Table 4.9 shows education expenditure by gender. Exist-
ing literature argues that parental education positively influences children’s schooling by
improving children’s ability through home education and also through the better manage-
ment of children’s health conditions (Strauss and Thomas, 1995). We therefore control
for the education of the household head, the region and the household size throughout
the analysis.
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4.5.2.1 Total education expenditure
Table 4.7 provides the result of the difference-in-difference estimation of the revolution
effect on households’ total education expenditure. We observe that being exposed to
a strong revolution intensity, leads households to spend on average 10 percent more
on education. Households living in medium affected areas do not seem to significantly
change their behaviour. We analyse what type of household drives this result by looking
at different income levels. It seems that medium income households spend relatively more
on education when being exposed to a highly unstable environment. This might be due
to the fact that the top income tertile already spends a lot on education, whereas the
bottom tertile cannot afford to spend more. It is thus the middle class that significantly
increases education expenses.
Table 4.7: Education expenditure by income level
expenses on education logeducexp top33% medium33% bottom33%
Strong*2012 26.17 0.109∗∗∗ -0.0292 0.238∗∗∗ 0.0754
(179.6) (0.0377) (0.0837) (0.0741) (0.192)
Medium*2012 -189.5 -0.0216 -0.148 0.136∗∗ -0.0803
(123.5) (0.0479) (0.0961) (0.0606) (0.0833)
Strong Revolution 1799.5∗∗∗ 0.865∗∗∗ 0.940∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗
(72.73) (0.0280) (0.0376) (0.0258) (0.0571)
Medium Revolution 371.9 0.436∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ -0.762∗∗∗
(260.2) (0.0448) (0.0538) (0.0175) (0.0398)
2013 -83.64 -0.0176 0.132∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗ 0.00529
(85.21) (0.0262) (0.0400) (0.0456) (0.0712)
Controls X X X X X
Observations 13231 13231 5510 4792 2929
r2 0.198 0.401 0.338 0.223 0.282
Notes: This table shows the mean and the standard deviation in brackets, all standard errors are clustered at the governorate
level. Data is deflated and 2010 is the basis year. These figures are annual numbers for the financial Egyptian year, i.e.
2009 means July 2008-June 2009. Controlling for urban, education of household head, household size, number of children
under 14. The source is CAPMAS/ERF, Egyptian Household, Income and Expenditure Survey (HIECS).
4.5.2.2 Education expenditure by child
Table 4.8 shows our estimation results on education expenditure by child and by education
level. Children enter school at the age of 6 or 7 and attend primary school up to the
age of 15 (column 1 and 2). Post-compulsory education (upper-secondary education
level) covers teenagers between 15-17 years of age (column 3 and 4), and finally students
attend tertiary education at the age of 18 or above (column 5 and 6). After adding
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a set of relevant controls (column 2, 4 and 6), being exposed to a politically unstable
environment does not seem to have an effect on education spending by child at primary
school level, regardless of the revolution intensity. The strongest effects are observed at
tertiary education level: households increase their education expenditures by 30.7 percent
per student enrolled in tertiary education. The effects for medium affected households
are somewhat weaker although this coefficient is not significant after including the control
variables.
Table 4.8: Education expenditure by child, by education level
primary primary secondary secondary tertiary tertiary
Strong*2013 -0.151∗∗ -0.0753 0.0247 0.213 0.366∗∗ 0.307∗
(0.0588) (0.0556) (0.140) (0.142) (0.175) (0.178)
Medium*2013 -0.0250 -0.0432 -0.0249 0.0222 0.362∗∗ 0.288
(0.0471) (0.0461) (0.124) (0.126) (0.182) (0.181)
Strong Revolution 0.855∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.686 0.733∗∗ -0.748∗∗∗ -0.889∗∗
(0.223) (0.233) (0.531) (0.346) (0.204) (0.397)
Medium Revolution 0.174 0.155 -0.229 0.119 -1.167∗∗∗ -1.042∗∗
(0.233) (0.248) (0.573) (0.410) (0.292) (0.464)
2013 0.216∗∗∗ 0.0765∗∗ 0.130 -0.134 -0.0245 -0.132
(0.0364) (0.0361) (0.0939) (0.0969) (0.130) (0.133)
Controls X X X
Observations 18460 16538 5193 4458 3259 2651
r2 0.129 0.276 0.140 0.247 0.0509 0.220
Notes: This table shows the mean and the standard deviation in brackets, all standard errors are clustered at the governorate
level. Data is deflated and 2010 is the basis year. These figures are annual numbers for the financial Egyptian year, i.e.
2009 means July 2008-June 2009. Controlling in column 2, 4 and 6 for total disposable income, urban, education of
household head, household size, number of children under 14. The source is CAPMAS/ERF, Egyptian Household, Income
and Expenditure Survey (HIECS).
4.5.2.3 Expenditure by gender
Table 4.9 shows our estimation results on the effects of the revolution on education
expenditure by gender (by gender and by education level). We observe no significant
results at primary and secondary education level. At tertiary education level, however,
we observe that households spend 60 percent more on their male children (i.e. students)
and insignificantly more on their female children at tertiary education level. This result
shows that households seem to have a preference for their sons attending university in a
politically unstable environment. Parents might expect the returns to higher education
to increase with the prospect of a change of government and therefore invest more in their
sons. Another interpretation could be that the labour market deteriorated following the
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outbreak of the revolution which meant that young men could not find any employment.
Due to the lack of job offers, households therefore prefer to send their sons to university.
The result for female students is not as high since young women were much less likely
to work before the outbreak of the revolution and therefore the change is not as strong.
The coefficient for female tertiary level students, however, is not significant and therefore
does not allow to draw meaningful conclusions.
Table 4.9: Education expenditure by gender
primary_f primary_m secondary_f secondary_m tertiary_f tertiary_m
Strong*2013 0.0549 -0.0656 0.145 0.173 0.119 0.601∗∗
(0.104) (0.0968) (0.180) (0.180) (0.266) (0.268)
Medium*2013 -0.0101 0.0235 -0.259 0.171 0.219 0.149
(0.0868) (0.0851) (0.167) (0.160) (0.270) (0.269)
Strong Revolution 0.569 0.645 1.479∗∗∗ 1.759∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ -0.474∗
(0.360) (0.457) (0.545) (0.675) (0.173) (0.259)
Medium Revolution 0.0972 0.507 1.095∗ 0.958 1.302∗∗∗ -0.216
(0.378) (0.492) (0.607) (0.731) (0.349) (0.510)
2013 -0.0616 0.0846 -0.0695 -0.240∗ -0.0474 -0.231
(0.0676) (0.0651) (0.125) (0.123) (0.185) (0.204)
Controls X X X X X X
Observations 8009 8529 2181 2277 1183 1468
r2 0.228 0.206 0.280 0.287 0.242 0.188
Notes: This table shows the mean and the standard deviation in brackets, all standard errors are clustered at the governorate
level. Data is deflated and 2010 is the basis year. These figures are annual numbers for the financial Egyptian year, i.e.
2009 means July 2008-June 2009. Controlling for region, disposable income, education of household head, household
size, number of children under 14. The source is CAPMAS/ERF, Egyptian Household, Income and Expenditure Survey
(HIECS).
4.5.3 Health Expenditure
Table 4.10 provides results of the difference-in-difference estimation of the revolution
effect on households’ total medical expenditure. Health expenditures decreased signif-
icantly in strongly affected areas as well as for the top 33 percent income levels. In
strongly affected areas, top income-level households spend 32.8 percent less on health,
whereas bottom income-level household decrase health expenditure by 10.1 percent. It
is somewhat surprising that top income-level households decreased their health expenses
by a higher percentage than bottom income-level households. This could potentially be
explained by the fact that wealthier households spend more on their health to begin
with. In related papers, findings show that relatively poor households have to decrease
health spending to cope with budget constraints (Frankenberg et al., 2003). As described
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above, expenses on health, cover medical products, appliances and equipment, outpatient
services, and hospital services. Payments for health insurances, however, are excluded.
In Egypt, health insurances cover approximately 57 percent of all households, although
coverage is particularly low in rural areas and the majority of low-income households
does not have a health insurance.
Table 4.10: The effects of the revolution on health expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
health exp. log(health exp.) log(health exp.) top33% bottom33%
Strong*2013 -214.7 -0.230∗ -0.204∗ -0.328∗∗∗ -0.101
(177.2) (0.132) (0.116) (0.101) (0.154)
Medium*2013 8.266 0.118 0.0388 -0.102 0.131
(196.4) (0.0973) (0.0935) (0.0845) (0.131)
Strong Revolution 1320.8∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 1.499∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗
(57.58) (0.0415) (0.0372) (0.0314) (0.0836)
Medium Revolution 1310.7∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 1.268∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗
(54.57) (0.0299) (0.0298) (0.0397) (0.0789)
2013 667.0∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗
(139.9) (0.0832) (0.0793) (0.0631) (0.118)
income 0.857∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗
(0.0418) (0.106) (0.0527)
Controls X X X X X
Observations 22953 22953 22952 7637 7636
r2 0.0300 0.103 0.208 0.123 0.144
Notes: This table shows the mean and the standard deviation in brackets, all standard errors are clustered at the governorate
level. Data is deflated and 2010 is the basis year. These figures are annual numbers for the financial Egyptian year, i.e.
2009 means July 2008-June 2009. Controlling for urban, education of household head, household composition. The source
is CAPMAS/ERF, Egyptian Household, Income and Expenditure Survey (HIECS).
4.5.4 Savings Results
Table 4.11 provides results of the difference-in-difference estimation of the revolution
effect on households’ savings. Savings are calculated by deducting expenditure from
total disposable income. Households save more following the revolution, particularly
in strongly affected areas. Households in strongly (medium) affected areas save 25.5
percent (25.9 percent) more. This result is mainly driven by high income-level households,
although the coefficient for low-income households is positive but not significant.
135
Household Behaviour in Times of Political Change
Table 4.11: The effects of the revolution on savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
savings log (savings) top33% medium33% bottom33%
Strong*2012 711.4 0.255∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.214∗
(423.8) (0.0711) (0.101) (0.0795) (0.120)
Medium*2012 -436.9 0.259∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.128
(487.4) (0.0861) (0.104) (0.0809) (0.138)
Strong Revolution -2058.3∗∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗ -1.029∗∗∗ -0.717∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(391.3) (0.0348) (0.0470) (0.0404) (0.0466)
Medium Revolution -3123.1∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗ -0.378∗∗∗ -0.490∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗
(149.8) (0.0270) (0.0426) (0.0517) (0.0483)
2013 -920.9∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗ -0.296∗∗∗ -0.438∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗
(322.1) (0.0687) (0.0893) (0.0586) (0.104)
logtotdinc 11176.7∗∗∗ 1.915∗∗∗ 1.675∗∗∗ 2.416∗∗∗ 1.721∗∗∗
(1590.5) (0.110) (0.109) (0.192) (0.0850)
Controls X X X X X
Observations 23159 18922 6875 6485 5562
r2 0.157 0.361 0.253 0.133 0.121
Notes: This table shows the mean and the standard deviation in brackets, all standard errors are clustered at the governorate
level. Data is deflated and 2010 is the basis year. These figures are annual numbers for the financial Egyptian year, i.e.
2009 means July 2008-June 2009. Controlling for urban, education of household head, household composition. The source
is CAPMAS/ERF, Egyptian Household, Income and Expenditure Survey (HIECS).
4.6 Heterogeneity
Our data allows us to disentangle the heterogeneity of estimated effects by household
characteristics. In Table 4.12, we estimate our empirical model on education expenditure,
health expenditure and savings by the gender of the household head. In Table 4.13, we
compare younger with older household heads.
Table 4.12: Expenditure by gender of household head
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
educexp_m educexp_f medexp_m medexp_f savings_m savings_f
Strong*2013 0.115∗∗ 0.0219 -0.177 -0.331∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.205∗
(0.0426) (0.135) (0.115) (0.150) (0.0736) (0.106)
Medium*2013 -0.0181 0.0317 0.0611 -0.0552 0.277∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗
(0.0506) (0.113) (0.0930) (0.127) (0.0953) (0.112)
strong_revolution3 0.860∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ -0.0784 -0.850∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗
(0.0341) (0.0810) (0.0394) (0.0606) (0.0356) (0.0469)
medium_revolution3 0.123∗∗∗ -0.763∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗ -0.423∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗
(0.0209) (0.0477) (0.0326) (0.0551) (0.0324) (0.0772)
2013 -0.0203 0.0157 0.524∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗
(0.0324) (0.0762) (0.0794) (0.106) (0.0711) (0.0914)
Controls X X X X X X
Observations 11665 1566 19006 3946 15858 3064
r2 0.400 0.431 0.202 0.249 0.362 0.353
Notes: This table shows the mean and the standard deviation in brackets, all standard errors are clustered at the governorate
level. Data is deflated and 2010 is the basis year. These figures are annual numbers for the financial Egyptian year, i.e.
2009 means July 2008-June 2009. Controlling for urban, education of household head, household size, number of children
under 14. The source is CAPMAS/ERF, Egyptian Household, Income and Expenditure Survey (HIECS).
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In Table 4.12 we can observe that in strongly affected governorates households headed by
a man spend significantly more on education even after controlling for income. As seen
in previous sections, all affected households reduce their spending on health. Households
headed by a woman, however, reduce their expenditure relatively more than households
headed by a man. Households headed by a man also tend to save more than households
headed by a woman, although the difference is weaker than for other outcome variables.
In Table 4.13 we look into expenditures and savings in affected households by age of
the household head and we find that households with an older household head spend
significantly more on education. Households with an older head reduce their health
expenditures by a larger share which could be explained by a initially larger amount
spent on health before the outbreak of the revolution. Households with a younger head
tend to save more compared to households with an older head. A potential explanation
could be that households with an older head already have a larger stock of savings and
households with a younger head do not.
Table 4.13: Expenditure by age of household head
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
educexp_o educexp_y medexp_o medexp_y savings_o savings_y
Strong*2013 0.165∗∗∗ 0.0284 -0.225 -0.192∗ 0.219∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
(0.0468) (0.0676) (0.143) (0.107) (0.0850) (0.0867)
Medium*2013 -0.0495 0.0117 0.0555 0.0255 0.238∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(0.0708) (0.0665) (0.0968) (0.0991) (0.0881) (0.0961)
strong_revolution3 1.136∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗ 1.501∗∗∗ -0.927∗∗∗ -0.448∗∗∗
(0.0320) (0.0462) (0.0527) (0.0352) (0.0363) (0.0375)
medium_revolution3 0.606∗∗∗ -0.0292 1.062∗∗∗ 1.355∗∗∗ -0.959∗∗∗ -0.395∗∗∗
(0.0465) (0.0442) (0.0442) (0.0284) (0.0470) (0.0282)
2013 -0.00106 -0.0382 0.560∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗ -0.338∗∗∗
(0.0338) (0.0380) (0.0770) (0.0892) (0.0667) (0.0804)
Controls X X X X X X
Observations 7545 5686 11766 11186 9446 9476
r2 0.421 0.387 0.205 0.208 0.303 0.398
Notes: This table shows the mean and the standard deviation in brackets, all standard errors are clustered at the governorate
level. Data is deflated and 2010 is the basis year. These figures are annual numbers for the financial Egyptian year, i.e.
2009 means July 2008-June 2009. Controlling for income, urban, education of household head, household size, number of
children under 14. The source is CAPMAS/ERF, Egyptian Household, Income and Expenditure Survey (HIECS).
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4.7 Robustness Checks
To verify the robustness of our results, a number of different alternative specifications
have been used. First, we have dropped all observations, which were collected during the
2010/2011 survey as they might already include some form of effects of the revolution.
The survey data was collected from July 2010 to June 2011, which means that almost
half of all interviews were collected after 25 January 2011. However, as the questionnaire
asks for yearly (July 2010 to June 2011) income and expenditure, this should have only
minor effects. Table D.2 in the Appendix shows the effects of the revolution on the main
outcomes but excluding the 2010/2011 observations and only comparing the 2008/2009
with the 2012/2013 observations. Most directions and significance levels remain the
same, the results are just slightly less significant or weaker due to the loss of one third
of observations. All other regression output tables have been checked using the same
procedure and provide consistent results.
One might also be worried about the capital Cairo driving the results. Table D.1 in
the Appendix shows the results excluding Cairo. While the sample becomes smaller, all
coefficients remain robust and only the coefficient of health expenditures loses significance
(but remains positive). All other coefficient estimates remain robust or become slightly
weaker if one excludes Cairo.
Another way to check the robustness of our results is to use a different measure for the
revolution intensity. One option is to look at data on injured and arrested individuals by
region instead of death occurrences. This does not lead to different results because the
number of deaths, arrests and injured is highly correlated and the regions categorisation
into low, medium and strong intensity (i.e. treatment) stays the same. Another option is
to divide the governorates into low, medium and strong treatment using another method
to split the sample. In the main part of the paper, we divided the governorates so
that we have an equal number of observation per treatment group. Another way would
be to use specific cut-offs for death occurrences, for instance, defining low treatment
as governorates with a death occurrence from 0-10, medium treatment as governorates
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ranging from 11-100 and strong treatment as governorates above 101. Robust results are
obtained for all regression tables.
Lastly, one can look at the relative death occurrence by region, measuring death oc-
currence per capita instead of in absolute numbers. This leads to very little changes
because of two reasons. First, the relative and the absolute number of deaths occurrence
are highly correlated. There are no regions, which are ranked high in absolute death
occurrence and low in relative death occurrence or vice versa. Second, the governorates
that change their position in the ranking, are typically very small states, that have an
intermediate death occurrence in absolute terms but a high death occurrence in relative
terms due to their small population size. However, those governorates only contribute
relatively little to the regression because of their low number of observations and thus
barely change the result.
4.8 Channels
We analyse two channels that could explain our results of increased education expenditure
as well as decreasing health expenditure and higher savings. First, we argue that the
decreased health expenditure and increased savings can be explained by precautionary
savings behaviour for households that are particularly affected by the political change
and unstable environment. Second, we argue that the increased education expenditures
can be explained by some level of optimism by households after the fall of the dictator.
4.8.1 Precautionary Behaviour
In the theoretical literature, political instability enters economic models as a constraint
that alters some critical element in the decision-making process of individuals. Theoret-
ical models of buffer-stock saving predict that household consumption would drop when
faced with an uncertainty shock. Political instability can therefore cause economic deci-
sions, such as investment, production or labour supply to differ from the optima under no
uncertainty. In the economics of psychology literature, the distortive effects of negative
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emotions on human behaviour can help in explaining people’s “irrational” response to
an unstable environment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974). Our findings are thus in
line with the precautionary savings behaviour model.
4.8.2 Optimism
“We thought people didn’t care and just threw their garbage on the street, but now we see
that they just thought it was hopeless - why bother when it’s so dirty? Why not be corrupt
when everything is corrupted? But now things have changed, and it’s a different mood
overtaking. Even I can’t stop smiling myself.”
From the New Yorker 2/28/11, quote of an Egyptian student in the context of people
cleaning up Tahrir square.
We find that affected households invest more in their sons’ higher education. Parents
may be more or less willing to invest in their son’s education relative to their daughter
depending on multiple factors. In the literature, there are several channels that may
explain our results. First, parents may treat their sons as an investment for the future,
especially if they consider that labour market prospects are likely to improve in the
future. Labour market participation of women is very low in Egypt and therefore parents
may have preferred investing in their sons’ higher education expecting labour market
prospects to be higher. The second channel could be related to safety as young women
may be perceived as more vulnerable to attacks and abuses on their way to school and
university and therefore may have to stay at home for their protection. We find some
evidence for the first channel.
We argue that the increased spending in particularly affected areas can be explained by
a positive outlook towards the future: households were expecting or hoping for a change
in Egypt with better labour market prospects for their children and therefore invested
more in their education. We analyse data from the Arab Democracy Barometer as well
as election results data of the 2012 election to provide some evidence for this channel.
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The period after the presidential election in June 2012 was a period of optimism in Egypt.
The Arab Democracy Barometer survey5 seeks to measure and track over time citizen
attitudes, values, and behaviour patterns relating to pluralism, freedom, tolerance and
equal opportunity; social and inter-personal trust; social, religious and political identities;
conceptions of governance and an understanding of democracy; and civic engagement and
political participation. In Egypt, data collection took place in the first week of April 2013
and 1200 individuals were interviewed. Results show that despite the negative perception
of the economy and general awareness of the looming economic crisis, respondents were
generally optimistic about the future. Overall, 82 percent expected the economy to
improve within the next 3 years. Only 11 percent expected it to remain the same, while
7 percent expected it to worsen. At the same time, the confidence in public institutions
increased.
We also analyse election results of the 2012 election at governorate level. We assume that
in governorates where a large share of households voted for the opposition, households
in those areas were particularly enthusiastic about the political change. According to
our interpretation, therefore, education expenditure should increase especially in those
governorates because of a more positive outlook towards the future. We analyse gover-
norates where the Muslim Brotherhood party won the votes by at least 75 percent and
higher, which is the case in two governorates (Matruh and Fayoum). We then implement
our difference-in-difference estimator to detect the difference in education expenditures
for governorates with a high vote share for Morsi (treatment) and compare it with gov-
ernorates with a lower vote share (control). As can be seen in Table 4.14 we can in-
deed identify a significant increase in education expenditure in those governorates, which
supports our preferred interpretation of households with a particularly positive outlook
towards the future investing more in the education of their children. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper that provides suggestive evidence on the relationship
between political affiliation, regime change and household investment behaviour.
5The third wave of the Arab Democracy Barometer was implemented from 2012-2014 in 12 countries:
Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia,
and Yemen.
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Table 4.14: Education expenditure in pro-Muslim Brotherhood governorates
(1) (2) (3)
expenses on education log education expenses education expenses of total expenses
Mursi_75_2013 254.6∗ 0.0844∗∗ 0.0838∗
(99.18) (0.0253) (0.0361)
Mursi_75 -1527.1∗∗∗ -1.078∗∗∗ -1.066∗∗∗
(105.4) (0.0495) (0.0243)
After 6.878 0.0687∗∗ -0.0135
(81.95) (0.0236) (0.0246)
Controls X X X
Observations 13232 13232 13231
r2 0.103 0.324 0.236
Notes: This table shows the mean and the standard deviation in brackets, all standard errors are clustered at the governorate
level. Data is deflated and 2010 is the basis year. These figures are annual numbers for the financial Egyptian year, i.e.
2009 means July 2008-June 2009. Controlling for urban, education of household head, household size, number of children
under 14. The source is CAPMAS/ERF, Egyptian Household, Income and Expenditure Survey (HIECS).
4.9 Conclusions
Egypt’s economy has been strongly affected by the political events since 2011 as evidenced
by soaring debt, significant unemployment increases and inflation. While those conse-
quences are well known and studied, there are other, less evident but equally important,
changes at the individual and household level that might have long-term consequences.
We analyse their effects at household level and show that political change and higher lev-
els of instability significantly affects household behaviour in many ways, affecting their
savings as well as health and education investments. Our results suggest that political
instability and political change can affect long-term outcomes for households.
We find that households experience a loss in income and have lower expenditures. Despite
this result, households spend more on the the education of their children, especially on
their sons enrolled in tertiary education. We can also observe that households spend
less on their health and increase their savings. To explain the findings we show two
mechanisms: precautionary behaviour and optimism. The channels leading to the results
depend on the political affiliation of the household. To our knowledge, this is the first
paper providing some indication in this direction.
Our results suggest that social unrest can be an important channel through which political
instability can affect long-term outcomes for households. Those consequences of political
instability may be difficult to quantify, or even to recognise, and they have not yet
been sufficiently integrated in a policy discussion on the consequences of the Egyptian
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revolution. Such a change in economic behaviour, however, requires policy responses that
hedge the risks for individuals through targeted policies such as loans, insurances or risk
pooling in order to keep the ‘cost’ of social unrest at a minimum. However, as research
in emerging economies is scarce, this is often overlooked. With our research we aim to
contribute to a better understanding of these mechanisms.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Additional Tables and Graphs
Figure A.1: Example of Legislation Dummies
Notes: The figure shows a print-screen from Stata to illustrate the construction of the Free Movement variable. 0 denotes
that a given market is closed, 1 denotes that it is open for labour migrants from the new member states. If a country did
not open from the beginning of a calendar year (for example, Great Britain opened in May 2004), the legislation dummy
is weighted accordingly.
145
Appendix: Firms Left Behind
Table A.1: Summary of Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Main_sample Incumbent Foreign Hightech Innovator
Firm-level data:
number of employees 40.5 65.5 80.0 195 87.1 238
[305] [296] [344] [554] [367] [727]
sales, 000 EUR 3,908 5,554 6,686 26,972 9,954 34,662
[162,210] [61,742] [70,814] [172,423] [109,758] [267,709]
assets, 000 EUR 3,251 4,854 5,735 21,440 7,629 28,953
[60,287] [61,480] [65,025] [145,629] [90,648] [226,421]
firm age 9.16 10.7 13.6 10.8 10.8 14.6
[8.03] [7.78] [7.71] [8.66] [7.78] [9.63]
labour productivity (Y
L
) 3.47 3.67 3.69 4.28 3.85 4.22
[1.35] [1.10] [1.09] [1.16] [1.07] [0.90]
labour productivity ( Y
WL
) 2.08 1.97 1.94 1.91 1.71 1.80
[1.08] [0.89] [0.85] [0.92] [0.89] [0.71]
TFP index -0.012 -0.046 -0.050 -0.059 -0.10 -0.15
[0.89] [0.67] [0.68] [0.63] [0.63] [0.55]
Industry-level data, 2 digits:
FM 0.083 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.15
[0.11] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.18] [0.15]
human capital constraints 0.090 0.092 0.10 0.088 0.096 0.12
[0.11] [0.11] [0.12] [0.11] [0.12] [0.13]
financial constraints 0.25 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.12
[0.17] [0.14] [0.14] [0.13] [0.12] [0.12]
number of employees 11.6 15.4 16.6 22.2 21.7 22.3
[20.9] [25.0] [25.9] [38.7] [38.8] [34.8]
sales, 000 EUR 948 1,033 1,136 2,076 1,911 2,468
[5,403] [7,006] [8,135] [7,331] [5,174] [11,083]
labour productivity (Y
L
) 4.03 3.79 3.78 4.03 4.05 4.23
[0.84] [0.70] [0.73] [0.71] [0.67] [0.56]
labour productivity ( Y
WL
) 2.21 1.91 1.92 1.91 1.78 1.91
[0.62] [0.40] [0.40] [0.46] [0.50] [0.41]
Observations 3.25e+06 532760 334693 55979 116540 19143
No. of firms 555072 108256 58245 10628 26224 2758
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations (in brackets) of variables used in the regressions. ‘Full’ denotes
the sample of all available observations. Further sub-samples do not include observations with missing variables. ‘Main
sample’ is a sub-sample of firms used in the main regression. ‘Incumbent’ is a sub-sample of firms that existed prior to 2002.
‘Innovator’ denotes a sub-sample of firms with patents. ‘High-tech’ denotes a sub-sample of firms operating in high-tech
industries according to the Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE) at 2-digit
level. ‘Foreign’ denotes a sub-sample of firms with foreign capital.
Productivity measures are reported in natural logarithms.
Constraints are measured as the shares of firms in a given industry-country-year reporting to be constrained.
FM is our preferred instrument: the sum of legislation dummies, weighted by proximity measures to a given old EU
member-country.
Sources: Amadeus, EU Commission Business Survey, Eurostat Structural Business Statistics
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Table A.2: First Stage Regression. Effect of Free Movement on Skill Shortages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FM, dist FM*skill sh., dist FM, migr FM*skill sh., migr
FMict 0.0522* 0.125*** 0.0767*** 0.112***
(0.0298) (0.0461) (0.0144) (0.0376)
L.log_investmentict 0.00644 0.00650 0.00400 0.00604
(0.00451) (0.00455) (0.00447) (0.00446)
Log_total_salesit 0.0105 0.00993 0.0109 0.00912
(0.00929) (0.00914) (0.00916) (0.00885)
Mean skill sh.it 0.200** 0.165* 0.206** 0.148*
(0.0905) (0.0875) (0.0891) (0.0879)
L.log_FDIct 0.00145*** 0.00148*** 0.00134*** 0.00148***
(0.000484) (0.000483) (0.000480) (0.000482)
D.log_GDPct 0.368*** 0.372*** 0.387*** 0.377***
(0.0807) (0.0794) (0.0812) (0.0802)
Observations 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069
Number of pp 428 428 428 428
R2 0.349 0.352 0.357 0.355
Dummies ci y ci y ci y ci y
Clusters 428 428 428 428
Fstat 3.081 7.332 28.40 8.859
pval 0.0799 0.00704 1.60e-07 0.00308
Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of free movement on skill shortages. All specifications are estimated
with industry·country fixed effects and time dummies. Dependent variable: % of firms reporting skill shortages. FM
denotes the Free Movement variable. In specifications 1 and 2, we use distance-weighted FM dummies, in 3 and 4 -
weights with migration stocks. In specifications 2 and 4, FM dummies are in addition interacted with skill shortages in
destination industries. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the country-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure A.2: Dynamic effects (lagging and forwarding the instrument)
Notes: This graph shows the coefficients of the L&P TFP measure, the TFP index, wage-adjusted labour productivity, the
capital labour ration, capital productivity and personnel costs when the instrument is lagged, simultaneous or forwarded
by up to three years. The 0 value on the x-axis indicates the year of the labour market opening and the values 1,2,3 are
the years following the opening, while the values -3,-2 and -1 are the years preceding the sector openings.
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Table A.3: First Stage Regression (Robustness). Effect of Free Movement on Financial
Shortages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FM, dist FM*skill sh., dist FM, migr FM*skill sh., migr
FMict 0.0791 -0.0414 -0.00399 -0.0800**
(0.0535) (0.0553) (0.0274) (0.0364)
L.log_investmentict 0.00126 0.00115 0.00131 0.00141
(0.00638) (0.00643) (0.00654) (0.00637)
Log_total_salesit 0.00508 0.00522 0.00502 0.00601
(0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0113)
Mean skill sh.it -0.0551 -0.0342 -0.0476 -0.00650
(0.0970) (0.0999) (0.0967) (0.102)
L.log_FDIct -0.000566 -0.000595 -0.000579 -0.000608
(0.000508) (0.000506) (0.000512) (0.000507)
D.log_GDPct -0.381*** -0.393*** -0.391*** -0.400***
(0.0747) (0.0730) (0.0769) (0.0734)
Observations 2,070 2,070 2,070 2,070
Number of pp 428 428 428 428
R2 0.075 0.074 0.073 0.076
Dummies ci y ci y ci y ci y
Clusters 428 428 428 428
Fstat 2.184 0.561 0.0213 4.832
pval 0.140 0.454 0.884 0.0285
Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of free movement on skill shortages. All specifications are estimated
with industry·country fixed effects and time dummies. Dependent variable: % of firms reporting skill shortages. FM
denotes the Free Movement variable. In specifications 1 and 2, we use distance-weighted FM dummies, in 3 and 4 -
weights with migration stocks. In specifications 2 and 4, FM dummies are in addition interacted with skill shortages in
destination industries. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the country-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure A.3: First stage illustration
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Notes: Skill shortages and FM (instrumental) variable are aggregated on a country-level proportionally to the number of
firms in each industry. Source: EU Commission Business Survey, own calculations.
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A.2 Proof of the Comparative Statics and the Sim-
ulation of the Model
In this sub-section, we first present the proof of the comparative statics results using a
general production function and then provide a numerical solution to the model using a
Cobb-Douglas production function.
A.2.0.1 Comparative Statics
We assume a general production function with three variable inputs: skilled and unskilled
labour (Ls, Lu) and training t. Capital is fixed in the short-term. The firm faces the
output price P , wages ws and wu, and job separation rate of skilled labour δs. Vs denotes
the number of posted vacancies, cs denotes the cost of a skilled vacancy, and ct = 1
denotes the costs per hour of training t. For simplicity search and training costs for
unskilled labour are set to zero. The firm solves the following maximization problem:
Π = Pf(t, Ls, Lu)− Lsws − csVs − tVs − Luwu
s.t.
Vs
Ls
= δs.
f(t, Ls, Lu) is increasing and strictly concave in t, Ls, Lu. We denote the first-order partial
derivatives of f by fi where i = t, Ls, Lu. fi > 0. fij are the second-order derivatives.
fii < 0. We assume that the cross-derivatives fij, i 6= j are positive.
Firms maximise profits, by choosing the number of workers and the initial amount of
training (which then affects the level of firm-specific knowledge t). The first order condi-
tions give the implicit solution of the model.
FOC1: ∂Π
∂Ls
= Pfs − ws − δscs − δst = 0
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FOC2: ∂Π
∂Lu
= Pfu − wu = 0
FOC3: ∂Π
∂δs
= Pft − δsLs = 0
We apply the implicit function theorem to determine the signs of ∂L
∗
s
∂δs
- the effect of δs
on the firm’s demand for skilled labour and ∂t
∗
∂δs
- the effect on the initial training and
consequently the firm’s TFP. We assume that the above system of equations has the
unique internal solution L∗s, L∗u, t∗, which maximises the profit function.
∂L∗s
∂δs
= |D˜sδs||D|
where |D| is the determinant of the Hessian matrix:
D =

Pfss Pfsu Pfst − δs
Pfsu Pfuu Pfut
Pfst − δs Pfut Pftt

To fulfil the second-order conditions, D has to be negative-definite, therefore, |D| < 0.
D˜sδs| is the determinant of the following matrix:
D˜sδs| =

cs + t Pfsu Pfst − δs
0 Pfuu Pfut
Ls Pfut Pftt

The sign of ∂L
∗
s
∂δs
depends on the term (P 2fuuftt−P 2f 2ut)(cs+t)+P 2Lsfutfsu−PLsfuu(Pfst−
δs). Under the assumption that the above profit maximization problem has a solution,
this term will be positive.1 Since |D| < 0, ∂L
∗
s
∂δs
< 0.
1(P 2fuuftt − P 2f2ut)(cs + t) > 0, P 2Lsfutfsu > 0. PLsfuu(Pfst − δs) > 0, but should be smaller
than the sum of the two first summands, otherwise the stationary point will be a saddle point.
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Similarly, the sign of ∂t
∗
∂δs
depends on the term (P 2fuufss−P 2f 2su)(Ls)+P 2(cs+t)futfsu−
P (cs + t)fuu(Pfst − δs), which is also positive. Therefore, ∂t
∗
∂δs
< 0.
A.2.0.2 Simulation
We further illustrate the effect of a increasing job separation rate δs on the firm’s factor
demand and TFP. For this exercise, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function and
simulate the model in Matlab.
Π = PtγLαsLβu − Lsws − csVs − tVs − Luwu
s.t.
Vs
Ls
= δs.
The first-order conditions define the implicit solution of the problem.
FOC1: ∂Π
∂Ls
= αPtγLα−1s Lβu − ws − δscs − δst = 0
FOC2: ∂Π
∂Lu
= βPtγLαsLβ−1u − wu = 0
FOC3: ∂Π
∂δs
= γPtγ−1LαsLβu − δsLs = 0
Again, we assume that the solution to the above maximization problem exists: γ+α+β <
1 and the second-order conditions are satisfied.
To simulate the model, we used the following parameter values: γ = 0.1, α = 0.5, β = 0.3,
ws = 1, wu = 0.6, cs = 0.05.
Figure A.4 presents the simulation results. We investigate the effect of δs on the firm’s
demand for skilled workers Ls, on the firm-specific knowledge t, and on the share of
trained workers δsLs
L
. The graph illustrates that if δs increases, the firm’s demand for
the skilled labour decreases and so does the amount of training t that the firm decides to
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provide for the new hires. The latter eventually lowers the firm-specific knowledge and
hence TFP. The share of trained workers to the total workforce, however, increases since
more workers have to be trained.
Figure A.4: The Effect of the Job Separation Rate δs, Simulation Results
Note: This graph shows the simulation results of our theoretical framework for different values of delta
(the job separation rate). "Skilled workers" - the amount of optimal skilled labour, "t" - the amount of
of the optimal training (the firm-specific knowledge). Both "Skilled workers" and "t" are normalised to
their optimal values at δs = 0.05. "Trained workers/L" - the share of trained workers to the firm’s total
workforce.
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A.3 TFP Index Calculation
We calculate the TFP index, following Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013), according
to the formula below:
TFPfict = yˆfict − sLiclˆfict − sKic kˆfict − sMic mˆfict (A.1)
where yˆfict, lˆfict, kˆfict, mˆfict are log deviations of a firm’s output, labour, capital, and
materials from industry’s averages. The latter are calculated on a four-digit industry
level (for each country), by taking geometric means across all firm-year observations.
By using deviations instead of levels, we exclude time-invariant country-industry fixed
effects and make the index more comparable across different industries and countries.
sLic, s
M
ic , s
K
ic are cost shares of labour, materials, and capital, which are computed for each
firm-year and then also aggregated on a four-digit industry level for each country.
As a proxy of output we use firms’ sales, labour (wages and salaries), capital (fixed assets),
and material (material costs). We should note that the obtained TFP index contains not
only firms’ unobserved technology and management ability, but also firms’ market power,
and differences in their workforce composition.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Additional Tables and Graphs
Figure B.1: Migration Flows, Annual Treatment Effects of Free Labour Mobility
−
1
0
1
2
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Years since Free Movement
Notes: Annual treatment effects on migration around the introduction of free movement (1986-2012). The regression
includes destination-year and country-pair-industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair-industry
level.
Source: PATSTAT, European Commission, own calculations.
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Figure B.2: Inventor Mobility in Europe
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Notes: The graph shows the number of mobile inventors normalised to the total number of patent applications. We count
as mobile inventor and inventor who changes his country of residence compared to the previous patent application. Thus
migrants can be identified only if they have at least one patent application in each country.
Source: PATSTAT.
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Table B.1: Overview of the Gradual Opening of the EU15+4 Labour Markets
Country NMS8 NMS2 Sectoral Exceptions
(2004 entry) (2007 entry)
Austria 2011 2014 NMS8 (2007-2010), NMS2 (2007-2013): Construction, Manufactur-
ing of Electronics and Metals, Food and beverage services (restau-
rant business), other sectors with labour shortages
Belgium 2009 2014 -
Denmark 2009 2009 -
Finland 2006 2007 -
France 2008 2014 NMS8 (2005-2007), NMS2 (2007-2013): Agriculture, Construction,
Accommodation and food services (tourism and catering), other
sectors with labour shortages
Germany 2011 2014 NMS8 (2004-2010), NMS2 (2007-2013): sectors with labour short-
ages
Greece 2006 2009 -
Iceland 2006 2012 -
Ireland 2004 2012 -
Italy 2006 2012 NMS8 (2004-2005): sectors with labour shortages; NMS2 (2007-
2011): Agriculture, Construction, Engineering, Accommodation
and food services (tourism and catering), Domestic work and care
services, other sectors with labour shortages; Occupations: Man-
agerial and professional occupations
Lichtenstein 2011 2016 -
Luxembourg 2008 2014 NMS2 (2007 - 2013): Agriculture, Viticulture, Accommodation and
food services (tourism and catering)
Netherlands 2007 2014 NMS8 (2004-2006), NMS2 (2007-2013): International transport, In-
land shipping, Health, Slaugther-house/meet-packaging, other sec-
tors with labour shortages
Norway 2009 2012 NMS8 (2004-2008), NMS2 (2007-2011): sectors with labour short-
ages
Portugal 2006 2009 -
Spain 2006 2009 Reintroduction of restrictions for Romanians: 11/08/2011 -
31/12/2013
Sweden 2004 2007 -
Switzerland 2011 2014 -
United Kingdom 2004 2014 NMS2 (2007-2013): Agriculture, Food manufacturing
Notes: Column 2 shows the year of the labour market opening of the respective country for the NMS10 countries, column
3 shows the year of the labour market opening of the respective country for the NMS2 countries. Column 4 shows, which
sectors were exempt from restrictions.
Source: European Commission.
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Table B.2: Migration and Free Labour Mobility: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU19 and NMS NMS NMS 2004 only EU19 and NMS
VARIABLES all migrants all migrants all migrants patent potential
L3.FM 2.352*** 5.039** 19.37* -0.563
(0.754) (2.320) (10.48) (0.645)
L4.FM 1.860*** 3.271* 4.298 1.156**
(0.630) (1.704) (4.065) (0.506)
L5.FM -0.136 -0.0996 9.662 0.350
(0.375) (0.418) (19.23) (0.292)
in EU 0.447** -4.541* 0.261
(0.204) (2.526) (0.180)
L2.Trade flow -1.077 -74.12 -2.072**
(1.089) (76.99) (0.953)
L2.FDI inflow 1.14e-05 0.000161*** 0.000185*** 1.45e-05**
(2.40e-05) (4.31e-05) (4.76e-05) (6.90e-06)
Observations 383 186 163 383
R-squared 0.597 0.683 0.701 0.363
Region industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
F 10.20 48.57 660.0 10.11
Clusters 53 30 23 53
Notes: The regressions in this table estimate the first stage corresponding to table 2.1 in column 1 and 4: The dependent
variable is the (second lag of the natural logarithm) of emigration in a region and outflow of migrants with patenting
potential, respectively. The instruments are the free movement variables for the three previous years. The regressions
include controls for EU membership, trade flows and FDI inflows. The first pair of columns includes all EU and EFTA
countries, the third and fourth column limit the sample to new member states and the last two columns include only the
2004 accessions. All specifications include year and region-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the region-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
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Table B.3: Patent Applications and Free Labour Mobility (Reduced Form)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU19 and NMS EU19 and NMS NMS NMS NMS 2004 only NMS 2004 only
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents cit. weighted Patents cit. weighted
L3.FM 1.075* 1.309* -0.276 -0.0181 1.758 2.047
(0.576) (0.717) (2.315) (2.193) (3.247) (4.016)
L4.FM 1.786*** 2.206*** -0.606 -0.216 -4.447 -4.335
(0.276) (0.386) (0.863) (0.805) (3.655) (3.624)
L5.FM -0.177 0.0565 -0.395 -0.264 3.418 4.612
(0.392) (0.526) (0.545) (0.710) (3.751) (3.579)
in EU 0.167 0.278**
(0.107) (0.121)
L2.Trade flow -1.399** -1.456*
(0.662) (0.863)
L2.FDI inflow 3.10e-05** 4.29e-05*** 1.45e-05 4.15e-05 2.49e-05 5.34e-05
(1.26e-05) (1.28e-05) (2.70e-05) (2.75e-05) (3.15e-05) (3.20e-05)
Observations 496 496 209 209 184 184
R-squared 0.442 0.742 0.267 0.177 0.257 0.162
Region industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 56 56 32 32 24 24
Notes: The dependent variables in the regressions shown in this table are the number of patent applications (columns
1,3 and 5) and citation-weighted patent applications (columns 2,4 and 6). More precisely, the dependent variable is the
natural logarithm of 1 plus these counts. The same transformation is applied to the trade flow regressor and for FDI
inflows, the percentage change from the previous year is used as regressor. The first pair of columns includes all EU and
EFTA countries, columns 3 and 4 include all countries which joined the EU in 2004 and later and the last two columns
only includes those which joined in 2004. All specifications include year and region-industry fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the region-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
Table B.4: Patent Applications and Migration in NMS10, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents cit. weighted Patents
L2.Migrants 0.0924** 0.0730* 0.115 0.212
(0.0350) (0.0375) (0.156) (0.249)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.203* 0.101
(0.112) (0.0950)
L2.Trade flow 0.482 -0.650 0.758***
(0.518) (0.820) (0.251)
L2.FDI inflow -1.41e-05 -5.82e-06 -3.23e-07 -1.80e-05 -3.03e-05 9.41e-07
(1.87e-05) (1.80e-05) (1.72e-05) (3.34e-05) (4.83e-05) (1.68e-05)
Observations 163 163 163 163 163 163
Region industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 23 23 23 23 23 23
F 16.81 26.31 65.74
Notes: The regressions in this table estimate the relationship between the migration flow out of a country and innovation
in that country. The first three columns are estimated with OLS and the last three column use a 2SLS estimation with
our instrument based on free movement legislation. The dependent variables are the number of patent applications in
an industry and origin region in a year or, in columns 2 and 5, the citation-weighted patent applications (i.e. patent
applications + forward citations to these patents). Patent application numbers and citation-weighted counts, number of
migrants and trade flows are taken in natural logarithms. The sample includes only the 10 countries which joined the
EU in 2004. All specifications include year and region-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
region-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
158
Appendix: Knowledge Remittances
Table B.5: Patent Applications and Migration, USPTO Patents Only, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents cit. weighted Patents
L2.Migrants 0.0270 -0.0894 0.346** 0.503**
(0.0535) (0.0694) (0.171) (0.232)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.000889 0.702
(0.0606) (0.429)
in EU 0.0258 0.402 0.0182 0.115 0.567 -0.0508
(0.204) (0.305) (0.206) (0.238) (0.374) (0.222)
L2.Trade flow 1.623** 2.409** 1.740** 0.252 -0.144 2.493***
(0.687) (1.002) (0.654) (0.901) (1.246) (0.842)
L2.FDI inflow 1.24e-05 3.06e-05** 1.28e-05 7.25e-06 2.11e-05*** 1.13e-06
(1.02e-05) (1.41e-05) (9.91e-06) (1.43e-05) (8.16e-06) (1.16e-05)
Observations 383 383 383 383 383 383
Region industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 53 53 53 53 53 53
F 32.56 273.0 26.87
Notes: The regressions in this table estimate the relationship between the migration flow out of a country and innovation
in that country, counting only patents that were filed with the USPTO. The first three columns are estimated with OLS
and the last three column use a 2SLS estimation with our instrument based on free movement legislation. The dependent
variables are the number of patent applications in an industry and origin region in a year or, in columns 2 and 5, the
citation-weighted patent applications (i.e. patent applications + forward citations to these patents). Patent application
numbers and citation-weighted counts, number of migrants and trade flows are taken in natural logarithms. The sample
includes all EU members and countries in the European Free Trade Association. All specifications include year and region-
industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the region-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
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Table B.6: Convergence in Patenting Levels (Patentsdest/Patentsorigin) and Migration,
NMS only, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
log(
Pdiy
Poiy
) log(
Pdiy
Poiy
) log(
Pdiy
Poiy
) log(
Pdiy
Poiy
) log(
Pdiy
Poiy
) log(
Pdiy
Poiy
)
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents cit. weighted Patents
L2.Migrants 0.0289 0.0349 -0.254* -0.259*
(0.0229) (0.0285) (0.141) (0.151)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.118 -1.809
(0.0747) (2.810)
Patents, origin -1.080*** -1.052*** -1.081*** -1.083*** -1.055*** -1.065***
(0.109) (0.120) (0.109) (0.110) (0.122) (0.119)
Patents, dest 1.078*** 1.128*** 1.080*** 1.071*** 1.120*** 1.044***
(0.0713) (0.0910) (0.0717) (0.0765) (0.0962) (0.0890)
Within EU 0.0435 -0.0278 0.0431 0.0572 -0.0136 0.0724
(0.0529) (0.0584) (0.0533) (0.0555) (0.0612) (0.0693)
GDPd/GDPo -0.444 -0.0942 -0.446 -0.480 -0.132 -0.471
(0.359) (0.413) (0.360) (0.372) (0.430) (0.365)
L3.Trade flow -0.0394 0.0516 -0.0355 0.00323 0.0959 -0.0277
(0.0623) (0.0792) (0.0616) (0.0662) (0.0842) (0.0633)
L3.FDI flow 0.00139 0.00150 0.00108 0.000924 0.00101 0.00544
(0.00662) (0.00662) (0.00663) (0.00750) (0.00741) (0.0112)
Observations 2,763 2,763 2,763 2,681 2,681 2,681
R-squared 0.499 0.565 0.499 0.458 0.535 0.406
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 559 559 559 477 477 477
F 90.89 137.0 81.10
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Patentsdest/Patentsorigin. Number of patents (in origin
and destination countries), number of migrants, FDI, and trade flows are in natural logarithms. The sample includes
country-industry pairs, where origins are NMS and destinations - EU19 countries. All specifications include year and
origin-destination-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
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Table B.7: Convergence in Patenting Levels (Patentsdest/Patentsorigin) and Free Labour
Mobility (Reduced Form)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU19 and NMS EU19 and NMS NMS only NMS only EU19 and NMS (all) NMS only (all)
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents
L3.FM -0.0135 0.00186 -0.0150 -0.00166 0.0179 -0.0131
(0.0368) (0.0434) (0.0412) (0.0496) (0.0122) (0.0130)
L4.FM -0.0631 -0.0573 -0.0534 -0.0554 -0.0403*** -0.0337**
(0.0440) (0.0469) (0.0505) (0.0554) (0.0133) (0.0146)
L5.FM -0.0256 -0.0393 -0.0267 -0.0283 -0.0166 -0.00647
(0.0419) (0.0449) (0.0495) (0.0534) (0.0127) (0.0137)
Patents, origin -1.242*** -1.407*** -1.094*** -1.067*** -0.640*** -0.618***
(0.0797) (0.0873) (0.111) (0.122) (0.0113) (0.0114)
Patents, dest 1.051*** 1.090*** 1.062*** 1.112*** 0.800*** 0.813***
(0.0725) (0.0921) (0.0729) (0.0929) (0.0216) (0.0218)
Within EU -0.00662 -0.100* 0.0241 -0.0442 -0.0781*** -0.0527***
(0.0494) (0.0549) (0.0553) (0.0620) (0.0141) (0.0149)
GDPd/GDPo 0.00771 0.555 -0.251 0.0737 0.183*** 0.175***
(0.331) (0.391) (0.384) (0.451) (0.0393) (0.0402)
L3.Trade flow -0.0450 0.00903 -0.0127 0.0766 -0.0499*** -0.0341***
(0.0629) (0.0810) (0.0629) (0.0807) (0.00866) (0.00878)
L3.FDI flow 0.00170 0.000342 0.00259 0.00241 -0.0140*** -0.0112***
(0.00656) (0.00665) (0.00651) (0.00659) (0.00416) (0.00418)
Observations 2,946 2,946 2,763 2,763 71,496 66,504
R-squared 0.487 0.552 0.500 0.565 0.217 0.225
Origin-dest-ind FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 582 582 559 559 5688 5304
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Patentsdest/Patentsorigin. Number of patents (in origin and
destination countries), number of migrants, FDI, and trade flows are in natural logarithms. All specifications include year
and origin-destination-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level.
Specifications 1-4 show the reduced form regressions for the sample used in the OLS/2SLS estimations (i.e. the sub-sample
for which migration data are available), specifications 5-6 show estimates for the full sample of country-industry pairs in
2000-2012.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
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Table B.8: Citations to Destination Industries, NMS only, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
L2.Migrants 0.00255 0.00895 0.427* 0.436*
(0.0281) (0.0282) (0.222) (0.224)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.124 5.695
(0.133) (5.457)
Patents, origin 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.146*** 0.158**
(0.0332) (0.0331) (0.0369) (0.0622)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0118 0.0121 0.0183 0.0317
(0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0248) (0.0332)
Within EU -0.00869 -0.00991 -0.0280 -0.0827
(0.0608) (0.0609) (0.0637) (0.0991)
L3.Trade flow -0.0575 -0.0566 -0.122 -0.0791
(0.0722) (0.0724) (0.0837) (0.0895)
L3.FDI flow 0.00342 0.00306 0.00393 -0.0129
(0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0268)
Observations 2,763 2,763 2,763 2,681 2,681 2,681
R-squared 0.083 0.087 0.088
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 559 559 559 477 477 477
F 11.64 8.404 6.418
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of citations from a region and industry to another country in a year. Citation
counts, number of migrants, total number of patent application in origin and destination industries, FDI and trade flows
are taken in natural logarithms. The sample is limited to new EU member states. All specifications include year and
origin-destination-industry level. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
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Table B.9: Citations to Destination Industries and Free Labour Mobility (Reduced Form)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU19 and NMS NMS only
VARIABLES EU19 and NMS NMS only (all) (all)
L3.FM 0.00662 0.0785 0.0400** 0.0670**
(0.0349) (0.0516) (0.0163) (0.0306)
L4.FM 0.0734 0.0856 0.0431** 0.0903**
(0.0451) (0.0603) (0.0182) (0.0392)
L5.FM 0.0480 0.0753 0.0255 0.0406
(0.0470) (0.0559) (0.0169) (0.0337)
Patents, origin 0.138*** 0.134*** 0.0591*** 0.0974***
(0.0238) (0.0308) (0.00785) (0.0119)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0478*** 0.000519 0.0258*** -0.0130*
(0.0137) (0.0192) (0.00541) (0.00687)
Within EU 0.0154 0.163*** 0.00274 0.180***
(0.0361) (0.0553) (0.0144) (0.0247)
L3.Trade flow -0.152*** -0.0732 -0.0627*** 0.0372**
(0.0352) (0.0596) (0.00955) (0.0144)
L3.FDI flow -0.000418 0.0114 0.0257*** 0.0235***
(0.00520) (0.0113) (0.00357) (0.00639)
Observations 7,279 3,498 29,604 11,851
R-squared 0.174 0.133 0.099 0.110
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Clusters 1322 592 2304 912
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of citations from a region and industry to another country in a year. Citation
counts, number of migrants, total number of patent application in origin and destination industries, FDI and trade flows
are taken in natural logarithms. All specifications include year and origin-destination-industry level. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level. Columns 1 and 2 show the reduced form regressions for the
sample used in the OLS/2SLS estimations (i.e. the sub-sample for which migration data are available), columns 3 and 4
show estimates for the full sample of country-industry pairs in 2000-2012.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
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Table B.10: Citations to Destination Industries, USPTO Patents Only, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
L2.Migrants 0.0476** 0.0313* 0.679*** 0.288
(0.0188) (0.0178) (0.197) (0.184)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.0512 0.745
(0.0485) (1.703)
Patents, origin 0.193*** 0.194*** 0.186*** 0.195***
(0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0227) (0.0227)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0545*** 0.0542*** 0.0542*** 0.0491**
(0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0150) (0.0195)
Within EU 0.00444 0.00724 -0.00468 0.0300
(0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0343) (0.0667)
L3.Trade flow 0.0797* 0.0858** 0.0294 0.0853**
(0.0416) (0.0417) (0.0552) (0.0418)
L3.FDI flow -0.00960* -0.0102* -0.00738 -0.0152
(0.00526) (0.00527) (0.00568) (0.0134)
Observations 7,299 7,287 7,287 7,136 7,124 7,124
R-squared 0.132 0.150 0.149
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 1322 1320 1320 1159 1157 1157
F 44.41 35.32 34.64
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of citations from a region and industry to another country in a year. Citation
counts, number of migrants, total number of patent application in origin and destination industries, FDI and trade flows
are taken in natural logarithms. The sample is limited to citations among US patents. All specifications include year and
origin-destination-industry level. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
Table B.11: Only Citations Added by the Applicant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
L2.Migrants 0.0234 0.0258 0.489*** 0.336*
(0.0176) (0.0172) (0.170) (0.192)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.0759** 1.239
(0.0342) (1.915)
Patents, origin 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.139*** 0.150***
(0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0231) (0.0233)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0253 0.0247 0.0249 0.0162
(0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0221)
Within EU -0.0992*** -0.0958*** -0.110*** -0.0574
(0.0335) (0.0334) (0.0354) (0.0712)
L3.Trade flow -0.0194 -0.0143 -0.0805 -0.0153
(0.0369) (0.0369) (0.0542) (0.0373)
L3.FDI flow 0.00811 0.00735 0.0108* -0.000953
(0.00506) (0.00508) (0.00554) (0.0154)
Observations 7,299 7,287 7,287 7,136 7,124 7,124
R-squared 0.070 0.080 0.080
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 1322 1320 1320 1159 1157 1157
F 22.90 20.46 18.95
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of citations from a region and industry to another country in a year. Citation
counts, number of migrants, total number of patent application in origin and destination industries, FDI and trade flows
are taken in natural logarithms. The sample is limited to citations which have been added by the applicant according to
PATSTAT. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Eurostat and PATSTAT.
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Table C.1: Balance table
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment = 0 Treatment = 1 Diff. T-C
VARIABLES
Age 27.25 40.98 13.73
[7.520] [149.5] (12.43)
Married 0.223 0.275 0.05
[0.418] [0.448] (0.05)
At least one child 0.250 0.255 0.00
[0.434] [0.437] (0.05)
Months since arrival 7.281 7.566 0.28
[6.994] [6.982] (0.81)
Years of education 10.99 10.67 -0.32
[4.465] [4.545] (0.52)
Years of work exper. 6.571 7.349 0.78
[6.419] [6.157] (0.73)
Attended university 0.264 0.281 0.02
[0.442] [0.451] (0.05)
No formal education 0.0473 0.0392 -0.01
[0.213] [0.195] (0.02)
Started searching 0.568 0.510 -0.06
[0.497] [0.502] (0.06)
Contact to employer 0.297 0.269 -0.03
[0.458] [0.445] (0.05)
Previous offers 0.269 0.145 -0.12***
[0.445] [0.353] (0.05)
Look in Internet 0.152 0.179 0.03
[0.360] [0.385] (0.04)
Language difficulties 0.593 0.455 -0.14**
[0.493] [0.500] (0.06)
Search difficulties 0.262 0.283 0.02
[0.441] [0.452] (0.05)
German 0.209 0.222 0.01
[0.408] [0.417] (0.05)
Attends class 0.669 0.703 0.03
[0.472] [0.458] (0.05)
Integration Index 2.153 2.138 -0.02
[1.108] [1.073] (0.13)
Return intention 0.272 0.321 0.05
[0.408] [0.415] (0.05)
Observations 140 143 289
Notes: This table shows average values for the treatment and the control group and their differences for all relevant
variables in column 3. Standard errors are reported in brackets. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C.2: Cross-correlations
Variables Integrated German friends Feel at home Invited Active Level of German
Integration Index 1.000
German friends 0.722 1.000
(0.000)
Feel at home 0.043 -0.137 1.000
(0.465) (0.020)
Invited 0.752 0.405 -0.030 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.611)
Active 0.522 0.287 -0.140 0.249 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000)
Level of German 0.572 0.126 -0.087 0.206 0.268 1.000
(0.000) (0.032) (0.142) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: This table shows the cross-correlation of the components of the integration index and with the integration index
itself. The integration index is described in details in part 3.3 of this paper. German friends indicates the percentage of
people indicating that they have German friends. Feel at home is a subjective measure ranging from 1 to 5, 5 being the
highest. Invited is an indicator measuring if the person has ever been invited to the house of a German. Active means
that the person does at least two leisure activities and German means that the person has at least reached level A2.
Table C.3: Different clustering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated
Years of education 0.0626∗∗∗ 0.0626∗∗∗ 0.0626∗∗∗ 0.0626∗∗∗ 0.0626∗∗∗
(0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0176) (0.0112) (0.00920)
Months since arrival 0.0475∗∗∗ 0.0475∗∗∗ 0.0475∗∗∗ 0.0475∗∗∗ 0.0475∗∗∗
(0.00857) (0.00902) (0.00892) (0.00640) (0.00961)
Good English 0.306∗∗ 0.306∗∗ 0.306∗∗ 0.306∗∗ 0.306∗∗
(0.128) (0.125) (0.117) (0.104) (0.122)
Syria 0.619∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 0.619∗ 0.619∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.184) (0.197) (0.245) (0.107)
Afghanistan 0.0118 0.0118 0.0118 0.0118 0.0118
(0.174) (0.182) (0.189) (0.194) (0.102)
Nigeria -0.175 -0.175 -0.175 -0.175 -0.175∗
(0.146) (0.140) (0.131) (0.107) (0.0923)
Cluster None Robust Arrival Date Education Country
Observations 283 283 283 283 283
R2 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.274
Notes: This table shows different ways of clustering for OLS regressions of the integration index on years of education,
months since arrival, level of English and a Syria, Afghanistan and Nigeria dummy. Additional controls are age, age
squared, being married and having at least one child. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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C.2 Baseline Survey
Questionnaire for refugees looking for work
Applicant’s ID:
Volunteer name:
Date:
Job search
1. When did you arrive in Germany ?
2. When did you start to look for a job in Germany?
After arrival  After getting the work permit  Not yet 
3. How do you look for work? (up to 3 answers)
Arbeitsagentur  Internet  Social worker  Teacher  Asking em-
ployers/shops directly Friends/relatives Other
4. Have you registered at the Arbeitsagentur as looking for a
job?
Yes  No 
4.1. When?
4.2. How many times were you there?
5. How many hours per week do you spend searching for a job? 0  1− 4  5− 8 
9− 12  > 12 
6. What difficulties do you have during your job search? (up to
3 answers)
Language  Many rules  Don’t know where to search  No suitable
job  Missing skills  Job application  Other
7. Have you been in contact with a German employer? Yes  No 
If yes, how?
Informal meeting  Job interview  Job offer  Work  Other
8. Have you already received one or more offers? (up to 3
answers)
Yes  No 
8.1. From whom?
Arbeitsagentur  Employer directly  From the camp/housing 
Friends/relatives 
Other
8.2. For what kind of work?
Full-time work  Part-time work  Internship  Other
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9. Did you accept the offer? Yes  No 
If not, why?
Low wage  Does not match your skills: too easy  too hard 
Not full-time  Too far  Other
10. If you already had an internship/job in Germany, what
were the reasons to leave it?
Contract is over  Small wage  Didn’t like it  Moving location  Other
Job expectations and interests
1. In which jobs would you like to work? (up to 3 answers)
IT/Software Developer Engineer Construction worker Cleaning
services worker  Security  Bar/restaurant  Manufacturing 
Administrative work  Personal care  Car mechanic  Sales person
 Other
2. Are there any jobs you would never do? (up to 3 answers)
IT/Software Developer Engineer Construction worker Cleaning
services worker  Security  Bar/restaurant  Manufacturing 
Administrative work  Personal care  Car mechanic  Sales person
 Other
3. What is the minimum monthly wage for you to accept a
full time job offer?
4. The minimum monthly wage in Germany is about netto
1000 Euro per month. If it were dropped to 700 Euro, would
you work for this wage?
Yes  No 
5. Do you wish to get education or continue your education?
University  School  Berufsausbildung (job training)  No 
6. Do you have experience being self-employed before arrival
to Germany?
Yes  No 
7. Do you think you will be self-employed in Germany? Yes  No 
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Integration
1. Do you have family in Germany? Yes  No 
2. Are you married? Yes  No 
3. Is your husband/wife here in Germany? Yes  No 
3.1. Is he/she working in your home country? Yes  No 
3.2. Is he/she looking for a job in Germany? Yes  No 
4. Can we contact him/her regarding job assistance? Yes, at: No 
5. In your family, who do you think should look for a job here
in Germany in the future?
You only  Your partner only  You and your partner 
6. Do you have children? Yes  No 
7.1 How many?
7.2 In Germany? Yes  No 
7.3 How old are they? years
8. Are you planning for your wife and/or children to join you
in Germany?
Yes  No 
9. What is the highest education of your father?
No school  Primary School  Secondary School  University 
10. Do you want to stay in Munich? Yes, forever 
Yes, a few years  No 
Don’t know 
10.1. Would you move for work? Yes, within Germany 
Yes, within Europe  No 
Don’t know 
10.2. Do you want to return to your country once it is safe? Yes  No 
Don’t know 
11. What was the main reason for choosing Germany as your
destination as opposed to Italy, France or the UK? (up to 3
answers)
Relatives/friends  Jobs  Safety  Good reputation 
Asylum possibilities  Other
12. Did you make new friends in Germany? Yes  No 
12.1. Where are these people from?
Your country Yes  No 
Germany Yes  No 
Other country Yes  No 
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13. You already feel at home in Germany
1 (Not at all)  2  3  4  5 (Completely) 
14. Have you ever been invited to the house of a German? Yes  No 
15. What activities do you do outside of the GU?
Study/German  Sport  Shopping  Meeting with people  None

Other
16. Since coming to Germany, have you ever felt treated with
less courtesy or respect because you are a refugee?
Never  Sometimes  Often  All the time 
Organisational details
1. For how long have you learned German (in months)?
2. Are you currently in a class? Yes  No 
2.1. If yes, where? Language school  Courses by volunteers 
Other
3. At what day and time is your class?
4. How many hours per week do you learn German on your
own?
5. Do you have the certificate of your highest degree? Yes, original  Yes, copy 
No 
6. Do you have a bank account set-up? Yes  No 
7. How did you hear about this session?
Internet  Flyer  Social worker  Friends 
Teacher  Other
8. We would like to stay in touch and see how we can best
support you in your job search. How can we best reach you?
Phone What’s app
E-Mail Facebook
Phone number/E-mail address of friend or family member
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C.3 Follow-up Survey
Follow-up questionnaire for refugees looking for work
Applicant’s Name:
Applicant’s ID:
Volunteer name:
Gender:
Date:
Job search
1. Are you currently working? Yes  No  Not looking 
Job search - not found
If no, continue here
2. Would you like to work? Yes  No 
3. How do you look for work? (up to 3 answers)
Arbeitsagentur (employment office/job center)  Internet  So-
cial worker  Teacher  Asking employers/shops directly 
Friends/relatives  Other
4. Have you registered at the Arbeitsagentur (employment
office/job center) as looking for work?
Yes  No 
4.1. When?
4.2. How many times were you there?
5. How many hours per week do you spend searching for work? 0  1− 4  5− 8 
9− 12  > 12 
6. What difficulties do you have during your job search? (up to
3 answers)
Language  Many rules  Don’t know where to search  No suitable
job  Missing skills  Job application  Other
7.1 Have you been in contact with a German employer? Yes  No 
If yes, how?
Informal meeting  Job interview  Job offer  Work  Other
7.2 How many times did you send or give your CV to an em-
ployer?
0  1− 4  5− 8 
9− 12  > 12 
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8. Have you already received one or more offers? (up to 3 answers) Yes  No 
8.1. From whom?
Arbeitsagentur  Employer directly  From the camp/housing 
Friends/relatives  Other
8.2. For what kind of work?
Full-time work  Part-time work  Internship  Ausbildung/job
training  Other
9. Did you accept the offer? Yes  No 
If not, why?
Low wage  Does not match your skills: too easy  too hard 
Not full-time  Too far  Other
Job search - found
If yes, continue here
1. How did you find your work? (up to 3 answers)
Arbeitsagentur  Internet  Social worker  Teacher/School  Ask-
ing employers/shops directly  SIR  Friends/relatives  Previous
employer  Other
2. When did you start working?
3.1 What is the name of the company?
3.2 What is your position in the company?
4. In which sector is the work?
IT/Software Developer Engineer Construction worker Cleaning
services worker  Security  Bar/restaurant  Manufacturing 
Administrative work  Personal care  Car mechanic  Sales person
 Other
5. What type of work is it?
Normal job Mini-job (part-time, 1 E job) Internship Ausbildung
 Other
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6. What is the net salary? (What you receive every months
on your bank account)
7. What is the gross salary? (Before tax and other deductions)
8. For how long is the contract? (in months)
9. How many hours do you work per week? (Full time is 40)
10. Is the job too easy for you?
Yes  No 
11. Which languages do you speak at work?
German  English  Arabic  Other 
12. Are you the only refugee in your work place?
Yes, the only one  No, one more  No, several  Don’t know 
13. How happy are you with your colleagues?
1 (Not at all)  2  3  4  5 (Completely) 
14. How happy are you with the salary?
1 (Not at all)  2  3  4  5 (Completely) 
15. How happy are you with the tasks at work?
1 (Not at all)  2  3  4  5 (Completely) 
16. How long does it take you to arrive at work (in minutes)?
17. Are you looking for better work?
Yes  No 
18. Why did the work end?
I quit  fired  contract ended  legal issues  other 
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Not looking
If not looking, continue here
1. Why are you not looking for work? (up to 3 answers)
Studying German  In School  At university  Taking care of
family  Medical reasons  net salary not high enough  Enough
money  Uncertainty about asylum process  no work permit 
Other
2. Will you look for work in the future?
Yes  No 
2.1. If yes, when (date)
Integration
1. Did someone from your family join you in Germany in the
last six months?
Yes  No 
2. Do you want to stay in Munich? Yes, forever 
Yes, a few years  No 
Don’t know 
2.1. Would you move for work? Yes, within Germany 
Yes, within Europe  No 
Don’t know 
2.2. Do you want to return to your country once it is safe? Yes  No 
Don’t know 
3. Did you make new friends in Germany?
Yes  No 
3.1. Where are these people from?
Your country Yes  No 
Germany Yes  No 
Other country Yes  No 
4. Did the refugees you are in contact with find work
Yes, many  A few  One  No one 
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5. Do you feel at home in Germany
1 (Not at all)  2  3  4  5 (Completely) 
6.1 How is your life now compared to 6 months ago?
Better  Worse  Same 
6.2 How will your life be in six months?
Better  Worse  Same 
7. Have you ever been invited to the house of a German?
Yes  No 
8. Do you still live at *address from CV*?
Yes  No 
8.1 If no, where do you live now?
apartment alone or with own family  apartment with flatmates 
another GU/camp 
8.2 What is your new address?
9. What activities do you do outside of your house?
Study/German  Sport  Shopping  Meeting with people  None

Other
10. Since coming to Germany, have you ever felt treated with
less courtesy or respect because you are a refugee?
Never  Sometimes  Often  All the time 
Organisational details
1. For how long have you learned German (in months)?
2. In Deutsch: Bist du gerade im Kurs? Yes  No 
2.1. Welches Niveau? (A1, A2, B1, B2, C1)
2.2. Wann und wieviel?
2.1. Interviewer estimate (A1, A2, B1, B2, C1)
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3. How many hours per week do you learn German on your
own?
4. Did you already get your asylum decision?
Yes  No 
4.1. If yes, what is the outcome?
accepted for 3 years  accepted for 1 year  rejected but can stay 
rejected and have to leave 
4.2. When?
5. How much do you agree or disagree with the following
statements?
5.1. I am happy that I came to Germany.
1 (Not at all)  2  3  4  5 (Completely) 
5.2. I will (still) be working in the next 6 months.
1 (Not at all)  2  3  4  5 (Completely) 
5.3. Compared to what you expected, ist your life better, worse
or as expected?
Worse  equal  better 
5.4. What did you know about the life of a refugee in Germany
before you came?
Worse information  exact information  better information 
5.5. I need to focus on studying German before finding a job.
Yes  No 
5.6. I had wrong information about Germany before I came.
Yes  No 
5.7. What is the most important thing the German government
could do to improve your situation?
Facilitate family reunification  Faster asylum decision  Job finding
support  Better German courses  Better housing  free movement
 Other
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C.4 Excerpt of the Pre-analysis Plan
Analysis
The analysis is divided into two parts, one focusing on labour market outcomes and one on further
integration and self-reported satisfaction outcomes. Below, we focus on each of the parts separately,
emphasizing the effects where our treatment could have an impact. As very effectively discussed in
Olken (2015)1 that is intrinsic in projects like ours.
Labour Market Outcomes
The hypothesis we would like to test here is simply whether participants in the treatment group have
better labour market outcomes in the short (6 months) and medium (12-24 months) term compared to
those in the control group. Evidence of positive effects would suggest that matching frictions between
German employers and job-seeking refugees exist, and that the employment of refugees does not only
depend on the skills they possess, but also on their possibility to be considered by employers who are
trying to fill a vacancy. Overcoming these frictions may then facilitate labour market integration of
refugees in Germany.
We consider two sets of variables. First, we look at a series of standard labour market outcomes, which can
provide experimental evidence of a treatment effect. Second, we investigate a series of ancillary variables,
which are useful to provide some (non-experimental) way of learning about the relative importance of
different underlying mechanisms.
Main variables:
• Employed (at the point of the follow-up survey)
• Duration of employment (in months from the randomization day to the day of the follow-up
survey)
• Wage (monthly (gross and net) wage at the point of the follow-up survey or in the last employment)
We define "employment" broadly as being in a paid job, internship, or vocational training. We might
also consider each of the outcomes separately.
Once the main effect is established, it is important to understand what drives the result. The treatment
may modify the outcomes of the participants by 1) creating awareness of the job opportunity, 2) reducing
the search time, 3) enhancing the quality of the match or 4) serving as a referral to the employer.
1Olken (2015), Promises and Perils of Pre-Analysis Plans, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume
29, Number 3, Pages 61-80.
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Identifying the channel(s) is relevant for policy-making. We would also like to check for alternative
mechanisms, i.e. whether the treatment (rather than or together with removing matching friction)
modified the skills of participants, their knowledge of the local labour market, or job-search behaviour.
This might happen through job interviews, for instance.
Supplementary variables
• Time until the first interview/trial/employment offer
• Number of job interviews for the first job (invited, happened)
• Number of job trials for the first job (invited, happened)
• Number of applications for the first job
• Where searched for vacancies (indicator variable as in the baseline survey)
• Job/skill match (an indicator variable: overqualified/ok/underqualified, based on observables, can
measure for jobs they apply to and for the job they actually get)
• Self reported job satisfaction, self reported match quality
• Reservation wage (at the point of the follow-up)
• Difficulty in the job search (indicator variable as in the baseline survey)
• (Ask employers to see if they consider our treatment as a referral, if refugees contacted them
directly)
Integration Outcomes
The hypothesis we would like to test is whether earlier (better) employment leads to better integration
outcomes in the short- and medium-term. The treatment will serve as an instrumental variable for
employment.
Main variables (measures of integration):
• Intention to stay (dummy variable)
• Knowledge of German language (indicator variable)
• Local acquaintances (dummy)
• Activities: study, sport, shopping, meeting with friends (total number)
• Feel at home (indicator on Likert scale)
• Integration index: ≥ A2German+German friends+ Invited+Activities+ Feel home
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• Any other investment in human capital (as driving license)?
• Housing conditions
• Stress, happiness and optimism levels
These outcomes directly correspond to questions in the follow-up survey. Because many of these questions
are included in the initial (pre-treatment) survey as well, these variable can be analysed both in levels
and in changes.2
Network Effects
Two measures of network: 1) proxy - address (camp) and nationality, 2) directly ask in the follow-up
survey, if their friends participated in the NGO’s CV sessions and if, yes, ask for the names.
Possible outcomes: spillovers within the network, sharing information about vacancies and referrals.
This would allow us to evaluate the extent to which results depend on whether contacts/friends of the
focal individual have been treated as well. In addition, this also allows us to evaluate the extent to which
knowledge of a friend being treated has any effect.
Inclusion Rules
All observations, for which we have CV information, pre- and post-treatment survey, will be included in
the analysis. Participants who are not eligible for the experiment (see eligibility rules in section 3.3.2)
will be excluded from the analysis.
Statistical Model Specifications
We will start by comparing the means between the treatment and the control group as the treatment
should be orthogonal to the covariates.
We will complement the analysis with OLS regressions with treatment as the main independent variable.
Although these may be too demanding given our sample size, we will include some specifications in which
we add location and time fixed effects to our regressions: as the entry into the experiment spans over
several months and locations, we expect significant differences between the locations over time, which
2Clearly, because of the randomisation the two results should be identical, but adding pre-treatment
levels as controls might lead to more precise estimates, which could be important given our limited
sample size.
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will lower precision of the unconditional estimates. The coefficient of the treatment variable will, hence,
measure the "intention-to-treat" effect within a given location for a given time.
For medium-term labour market outcomes and integration results, we will estimate both "intention-to-
treat" effects and LATE using the treatment variable as an instrument for (earlier) employment.
We then will perform heterogeneity analysis and robustness checks with covariates (education, years of
work experience, region of origin), for which the balance tests indicates significant differences.
There might be an opportunity to merge our data with some data from the lab, where some of our
Arab speaking candidates have participated in an experiment. We could potentially get measures of risk
taking and time preferences. However it is not yet clear if enough people will be part of both studies so
that a meaningful analysis is feasible.
We intend to cluster observations at the location and time level. We have conducted CV preparation
sessions around five different locations: EWH, Kammerspiele, Gruenwald, Caritas, Bayernkaserne.
Balance Tables
We will present balance Tables for the following variables: Country of origin (largest countries of origin),
months in Germany, family in Germany, years of education, years of work experience, date of job search
start, previous contact with employer, received job offer previously, uses Internet in job search, has
language difficulties in job search process, does not know where to search, level of German, currently in
German class, integration index, return intention. These all correspond to questions in the pre-treatment
survey.
Heterogeneity
For both labour market and integration outcomes, there are several interesting dimensions of hetero-
geneity, which we intend to analyse. First, by nationality or by nationality group.3 We might be able to
analyse the countries with many refugees (Syria, Afghanistan and Nigeria) seperately, while the rest of
the countries can be grouped as other Arab countries, other Asian countries, other Subsaharan African
Countries.
Another dimension of heterogeneity will be the level of education. Here, we can group people according
to the highest school level completed (no school, primary completed and some secondary, secondary
completed and some university, university completed).
3Given our sample size, it is unlikely that we will be able to get meaningful results if we analyse each
individual country of origin separately.
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Other interesting dimensions of heterogeneity will be age group, single refugees versus refugees that came
with their family, asulym opportunities, and duration of stay in Germany.
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C.5 Consent Form
Consent form: University of Munich
Researchers at the University of Munich (Giesing Yvonne, Nadzeya Laurentsyeva) and the Ifo Institute
(Michele Battisti) are planning a research project to study the integration of job-searching refugees in
the German labour market. The purpose is to find out how refugees can be integrated into the labor
market, which characteristics are especially important and how this impacts further integration.
The datasets that contain information about your CV and questions about integration in Germany are
analysed in Munich in a pseudonymous form and information that allows personal reference will be stored
separately for data security reasons. Only employees of the research team of the University of Munich
and the Ifo Institute will have access to the data. The data will be saved on local files on computers of
the LMU and the Ifo.
Your personal data is used only for this research project. It will not be passed to third parties for other
purposes. As soon as the research purpose permits, the information that creates a personal reference
will be anonymised or destroyed for data security reasons. The data is processed pseudononymously, so
that no identification of individuals is possible. Anonymised and aggregated results will be published.
Your consent is voluntary. By withholding your consent you incur no disadvantages. You can revoke
your consent for the future at any time and request deletion or destruction of your data.
I have received the information about the research project. I agree with the intended use of my data
and currently have no further questions. For questions I can write to yvonne.giesing@econ.lmu.de
Date, Place, Signature
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C.6 E-Mail
Dear NAME,
Kindly find your German CV attached to this email.
There is a chance that we match you with a possible employer from our database. If we find an employer
that is looking for someone with your qualifications, we will send your CV and they will contact you
directly. While we do our best to support you in the job search, we cannot guarantee that we can find
you a suitable employer, this is why we highly encourage you to keep searching for a job on your own.
Here are some job-search tips for you:
• Register at the Agentur für Arbeit
The Agentur für Arbeit helps job-seekers by providing advice and finding job vacancies.
• To register, you need to go there in person, once you have your work permit, and fill a form. Do
not forget to take your ID (Ausweiss) and certificates if available!
• To get the address of the Agentur für Arbeit in your area, visit this link
https://www.muenchen.de/rathaus/dienstleistungsfinder.html, search for “Arbeitsvermittlung” and
then give in your address.
• Please, visit their website for further information: www.arbeitsagentur.de
• Use job-search websites Many people in Germany find jobs online, so you can additionally look
for jobs using websites like:
– http://www.monster.de
– http://www.stepstone.de
– http://www.jobpilot.de
– http://www.jobboerse.de
• Continue to learn German, as this will greatly improve your chances of finding a job
If you find an employer through your own search and need support in preparing for the interview or in
understanding the contract, please, contact us at this email address (e-mail address) and we would be
happy to assist you.
In order to be able to contact you regarding possible job vacancies and other activities, it is extremely
important for us to have your updated contact details (e-mail, phone, and whatsapp number). Please,
let us know as soon as you change any of your contact details.
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Please also like our Facebook Page to stay updated about new events:
Link to Facebook page
If your friends are also looking for a job, please recommend them to meet us every Thursday 3-5pm at
address.
We wish you good luck and best regards,
Your NGO Team
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C.7 Flyer
Figure C.1: Flyer to advertise CV preparation sessions
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C.8 Pictures of the CV Preparation Sessions
Figure C.2: Pictures taken during CV preparation sessions in Munich
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Appendix to Chapter 4
D.1 Additional Tables
Table D.1: The effects of the revolution without Cairo
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lognwag logteduc logmedexp logsavings
Strong*2012 -0.100∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗ -0.109 0.248∗∗∗
(0.0271) (0.0768) (0.115) (0.0761)
Medium*2012 -0.0380 0.147 0.0414 0.250∗∗∗
(0.0287) (0.103) (0.0937) (0.0865)
Strong Revolution 0.105∗∗∗ 1.465∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ -0.964∗∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0272) (0.0303) (0.0280)
Medium Revolution 0.240∗∗∗ 1.811∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.0266
(0.0132) (0.0369) (0.0297) (0.0338)
2013 0.135∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗∗
(0.0240) (0.0681) (0.0793) (0.0702)
Observations 13222 1905 20286 16686
r2 0.425 0.205 0.210 0.376
Notes: This table shows the mean and the standard deviation in brackets, all standard errors are clustered at the governorate
level. Data is deflated and 2010 is the basis year. These figures are annual numbers for the financial Egyptian year, i.e.
2009 means July 2008-June 2009. Controlling for urban, education of household head, household size, number of children
under 14. The source is CAPMAS/ERF, Egyptian Household, Income and Expenditure Survey (HIECS).
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Table D.2: The effects of the revolution without the 2010/2011 survey round
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lognwag logteduc logmedexp logsavings
Strong*2012 -0.148∗∗∗ -0.0882 -0.264∗ 0.146
(0.0364) (0.137) (0.151) (0.104)
Medium*2012 -0.0472 0.168 0.134 0.186
(0.0306) (0.143) (0.144) (0.111)
Strong Revolution -0.00381 -0.337∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ -0.668∗∗∗
(0.0167) (0.0362) (0.0720) (0.0510)
Medium Revolution 0.0571∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ -0.798∗∗∗
(0.0157) (0.0741) (0.0601) (0.0593)
2013 0.173∗∗∗ -0.0510 0.843∗∗∗ -0.494∗∗∗
(0.0228) (0.105) (0.107) (0.0926)
logtotdinc 0.695∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 1.901∗∗∗
(0.0172) (0.0790) (0.0444) (0.108)
Observations 10095 1585 15325 12863
r2 0.449 0.234 0.265 0.394
Notes: This table shows differences in the control group (low) and the two treatment intensities (medium and strong)
for 2009. All figures are deflated, using 2010 as the basis. For column (1) to (4), it shows means and standard errors
in parenthesis: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Column 5-7 respectively show the mean difference between medium
treatment intensity and the control group, strong treatment intensity and the control group and medium and strong
treatment intensity (t-statistic in parenthesis). Source: CAPMAS and ERF, Egyptian Household, Income and Expenditure
Survey (HIECS).
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